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Summary 
This thesis examines whether two well documented financial market anoma- 
lies - the "Mehra & Prescott puzzles" and the dividend controversy - can 
be resolved by allowing for the effects of uninsurable risks. The dissertation 
contains an extensive review of the theory of consumption based asset pric- 
ing and the Mehra & Prescott puzzles. This provides more comprehensive 
coverage of this material than any previous review of the area: see chapters 2 
& 3. The role that uninsurable risk might play in resolving market anomalies 
is clearly demonstrated. Three chapters of substantive original contribution 
follow that examine: (i) the predicted equity premium when marketable and 
nonmarketable risks are independent (ii) the potential relevance of aggregate 
dividends to equilibrium asset prices in economies with idiosyncratic endow- 
ment shocks and (iii) the response of the stock market and riskfree rate to 
unemployment shocks. The main findings are: (i) Chapter 4: an integrated 
approach to local proper risk aversion is presented and a new form of risk 
aversion emerges naturally (ii) Chapter 4: it will not, in general, be possible 
to make accurate quantitative predictions concerning the impact of a small 
probability, high impact, negative shock to endowment (ccunemployment") 
on asset prices on the basis of current knowledge concerning investor prefer- 
ences (iii) Chapter 5: aggregate dividends are shown to play an important 
role in helping individuals to consumption smooth in incomplete markets if 
the level of aggregate investment is uncertain. The observed behaviour of 
dividend smoothing and concentrating rights issues into times of economic 
prosperity is consistent with the model that is presented (iv) Chapter 6: 
the rise (fall) in the riskfree rate prior to "bad" ("good") unemployment 
news does not appear to be consistent with precautionary savings behaviour. 
It is concluded that, while incomplete market models have great theoreti- 
cal strength and some empirical support, 'Current applications of this theory 
leave many issues unresolved. 
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1 Incomplete markets, financial puzzles 
1.1 Issues to be addressed 
"Because human capital represents such a large part of wealth, it is 
essential that future research focus on the effects of nontraded assets 
on individual behavior... " 
Robert C. Merton (1992), p. 575 
This dissertation examines whether theoretical models that explicitly in- 
corporate sources of nontradable endowment risk are better able to explain 
observed financial market behaviour than models that assume that markets 
are complete (markets where all sources of financial risk can be fully insured). 
More specifically, this thesis examines whether two well documented financial 
market puzzles can be at least partially explained by relaxing assumptions 
of market completeness. The two market anomalies to be examined are the 
"Mehra & Prescott puzzles"' and the dividend controversy. The puzzles 
highlighted by Mehra and Prescott (1985) are that over the last century in 
the USA the average real riskfree rate has been lower, while the average ex- 
cess return to the stock market over the riskfree rate has been higher, than 
standard complete market models can explain. The dividend controversy, 
discussed perhaps most famously by Black (1976), is that, despite the ir- 
relevancy theorem of Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividend policy appears 
to continue to be a matter of concern for corporate treasurers and investors 
alike. 
I More usually referred to separately as the "riskfree rate puzzle" and "equity premium 
puzzle". 
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That market incompleteness may play an important role in determining 
financial market behaviour has been recognised for some time. Leland (1968) 
introduced the concept of the "precautionary savings motive" - the idea that 
investors with convex marginal utility wish to save more ceteris paribus in 
the presence of consumption uncertainty than with a certain consumption 
stream. As introducing uninsurable risk increases the volatility of individual 
consumption, it is predicted that, to maintain equilibrium in financial mar- 
kets, the riskfree rate is lower at times of high risk to personal capital than at 
times when such risk is low. The role of nonmarketable risk in a world with 
multiple risky assets has been under examination since early work by David 
Mayers. Ile showed that a version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, where 
expected returns to marketable assets are linearly related to systematic risk 
(where systematic risk has a component measured against marketable income 
and a component measured against aggregate idiosyncratic income), remains 
valid in a mean-variance framework where not all assets are marketable both 
in the presence (Mayers (1972)) and absence (Mayers (1973)) of a riskfree 
asset. However, two fund portfolio separation is applicable in neither case 
as investors will choose a portfolio of marketable assets that will best hedge 
their idiosyncratic income. Mayers (1976) and Stapleton and Subrahmanyam. 
(1979) developed conditions under which turning nonmarketable assets into 
marketable assets will (and will not) impact on the expected returns to the 
existing marketable assets in a mean-variance framework. However, these 
early models that incorporated nontradable risk did not appear to perform 
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well in practice. Fama and Schwert (1977) argued that Mayer's modified 
CAPM is almost observationally equivalent to the standard CAPNI. This 
is because betas measured in a world with nontradable assets are virtually 
identical to betas measured against the market's return alone as covariances; 
between aggregate human income and asset returns are very small. 
More recently, the impact of nontradable risk in consumption based asset 
pricing models has come under consideration. It is within this paradigm that 
the current thesis is based. In particular, there is a growing literature that 
examines the role that uninsurable risk might play in helping to resolve the 
puzzles of Mehra & Prescott. Several authors, including Gregory Mankiw 
and Philippe Weil, believe that the existence of nonmarketable capital can 
help explain these puzzles as personal risks will significantly alter savings and 
consumption decisions. Others, notably John Heaton and Deborah Lucas, 
have argued that, even in incomplete markets, financial assets can be used 
to largely smooth nonmarketable risks. Therefore, in the absence of market 
imperfections, allowing for incompleteness does not alter the predictions of 
complete market asset pricing models in a way that significantly alters the 
predicted equity premium and real riskfree rate. The first major aim of this 
thesis is to contribute to this debate. To date, incomplete market models 
have not been applied to issues in corporate finance. The second aim of this 
thesis is to examine the dividend policy controversy in an economy where 
investors have nontradable risks. If aggregate investment is allowed to vary 
from the optimal level in a manner that investors cannot predict, it will be 
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shown that this combination of marketable and nonmarketable risks may 
provide a potential explanation for this puzzle. 
The introduction proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the key char- 
acteristics of nontradable risks that will result in predictions that vary in a 
significant way from complete market models. Section 1.3 argues intuitively 
why such variations from the complete market model may be able to explain 
the anomalies under investigation. Section 1.4 describes the development of 
the dissertation and outlines the main areas of substantive original contribu- 
tion. 
1.2 Sources of nontradable risks. 
The principal assumption that runs throughout this thesis and distinguishes 
this work from more traditional theoretical financial economics literature re- 
gards the nature of nontradable risk. Therefore it is useful to provide an 
overview of the economic assumptions regarding the form of the uninsurable 
risks that will drive the models that are to follow. This section sketches 
the main characteristics of the economies under review and provides intu- 
itive justification for why such assumptions are necessary to get results that 
are significantly different from the complete market case. Such sources of 
nontradable risk are then justified from observations of real economics. 
The central assumption underlying the results in this thesis is that there 
is a subset of individuals in the economy who will receive a stream of future 
income at least some part of which is currently uncertain. These future in- 
come streams are exogenous to the financial market models being constructed 
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so that this thesis is based in a partial equilibrium framework. Equally im- 
portantly, financial markets are incomplete so that people are unable to ex- 
change their income stream for any other endowment path all elements of 
which are currently known. The income risk is said to be "uninsurable", 
"nonmarket able" or "nontradable". With this uncertain cash flow from per- 
sonal capital, all individuals then decide how much to consume at present 
and how much will be invested for future consumption. Rates of return 
on financial assets are inferred through the assumption that equilibrium is 
maintained. The role of uninsurable income uncertainty in financial market 
behaviour can thus be determined. 
The key difference between complete and incomplete markets is that 
"with complete markets, investors fully insure against idiosyncratic income 
shocks, and individual consumption is proportional to aggregate consump- 
tion. With limited insurance markets, however, individual consumption vari- 
ability may exceed that of the average, and the implied asset prices may dif- 
fer significantly from those predicted by a representative consumer model" 
(Heaton and Lucas (1993), p. 1). The implications of complete market as- 
sumptions are well summed up by Cochrane (1991b) (his italics, pp. 957-9): 
"If markets are complete ... then an individual's consumption should 
not respond to idiosyncratic income or wealth shocks. This proposi- 
tion can be viewed as a cross-sectional counterpart to the permanent 
income hypothesis: full insurance implies that consumption should 
not vary across individuals in response to idiosyncratic shocks, just as 
constant borrowing and lending opportunities imply that consumption 
should not vary over time in response to forecastable shocks ... Full 
insurance implies the existence of a representative consumer, that is, 
a social welfare function defined over aggregates that is independent 
of changes in the distribution of income or wealth over time. " 
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If markets are complete financial economists can work in a representa- 
tive agent world. However, as soon as complete market assumptions are 
dropped it is no longer clear that representative agent models (such as the 
Consumption CAPNI) need follow. The economics literature contains many 
observations of consumption, wealth and portfolio composition that appear 
to violate the testable implications of complete frictionless market models: 
"Casual empiricism as well as more formal evidence indicates that 
individual consumptions are much more volatile than aggregate con- 
sumption ... Individual wealth holdings appear to be highly volatile 
with large fractions of households moving from one wealth decile to an- 
other over a few years ... the ratio of median to mean income is higher for individuals in occupations with greater income uncertainty, e. g., 
farmers and self-employed businessmen ... The portfolios of house- holds with low wealth contain a disproportionately large share of low 
return risk-free assets and a disproportionately small share of high 
return risky assets. The portfolios of high wealth households exhibit 
the opposite characteristic ... Last, it would be hard to reconcile the 
vast amount of trading in asset markets and the pattern of transaction 
velocities across assets with a complete frictionless market story. The 
above facts constitute quite strong a priori evidence in favor of the 
importance of uninsured idiosyncratic risk. " 
Aiyagari (1994) pp. 662-3 
This suggests that it may be fruitful to amend asset pricing models to ac- 
count for the incompleteness of markets. In order to justify the introduction 
of uninsurable personal capital in financial economics, however, it is neces- 
sary to consider forms of nontradable risk that are both economically "real" 
and give significant deviations from the predictions of complete market mod- 
els. Aggregate consumption data is observed to be highly smooth and as, for 
most investors, labour income is the single greatest source of wealth, the ag- 
gregate income process should also be modelled to have low variability. One 
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route is to model each individual's income stream as having low volatility. 
Existing literature (reviewed in the chapters to follow) will demonstrate that 
equilibrium asset prices in this case do not vary significantly (in an economic 
sense) from the complete markets case. An alternative approach is to as- 
sume that, at any point in time, a small number of investors will face large 
income uncertainty in future while the majority of the population will have 
no income uncertainty. This again will aggregate up to low aggregate con- 
sumption uncertainty but often leads to significant changes in consumption 
for a small number of investors. If, ex-ante, each member of the population 
does not know whether they will be in the high risk or low risk group, the 
savings behaviour of everyone might be expected to reflect the possibility 
of being in the high risk group. It might, therefore, be supposed that, in 
this case, financial market behaviour will be significantly different from the 
complete market case. 
Can this type of nontradable risk be justified by observations of the types 
of uncertainty with which investors are faced in real economies? The concept 
of severe income risk that is uninsurable and only affects a small percentage 
of the population ex-post, but is a concern to most ex-ante, brings to mind 
unemployment'. So, throughout the theoretical and descriptive sections of 
this dissertation (that is, excluding chapter 6, where the study looks explicitly 
at unemployment data), and in keeping with other work in this area, the 
term "unemployment" or "low probability, high impact shocks" will be used 
2Several other risks in the real economy also take this form. Compulsory early retire- 
ment and long-term sickness are other obvious candidates. 
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to signify this type of nonmarketable income risk. So, not only is this type 
of risk likely to cause models to deviate from the complete market case, it is 
also possible to link this uncertainty with (at least one) type of risk faced by 
most investors in a real economy. 
Other assumptions underlying the economies in this thesis are "standard". 
Unless otherwise stated, these assumptions are as follows. There are no 
taxes or market frictions. All investors have homogeneous beliefs. Financial 
markets will consist of two assets (a riskfree asset and a "market" index). 
The riskfree asset will be assumed to be in zero net supply. There is only 
one consumption good which is instantaneously perishable. Investors share 
the same utility of consumption which is additively time-separable and has 
constant relative risk aversion - that is, utility is assumed to take power or 
logarithmic form for all investors. 
1.3 Market anomalies and incompleteness 
Preceding sections have briefly described the two financial market anoma- 
lies that are to be examined and outlined the form of nontradable risk that 
will cause incomplete market models to differ significantly from the complete 
market case. It has also been argued that the type of income uncertainty 
required to get significant deviations from complete market predictions can 
be likened to (at least) one source of risk in real economies - unemploy- 
ment. This section briefly explains why these variations from the complete 
market case will help explain, as opposed to exacerbate, the anomalies under 
consideration. 
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With regard to the Mehra and Prescott puzzles, several authors have al- 
ready examined the potential role that exogenous income risk might play in 
resolving these issues. The desire to precautionary save is seen as being a 
potential explanation for the riskfree rate puzzle. To also explain the puz- 
zle of the equity premium using such endowment risk, the literature takes 
two divergent paths. First the property of proper risk aversion, which places 
restrictions on the first four derivatives of investors' utility functions, pro- 
vides conditions under which introducing income risk will make an investor 
increasingly averse to independent marketable risk. Weil (1992a) uses such 
theory to partially explain the equity premium. This will be considered in 
detail in chapter 4. Alternatively, marketable risk and consumption risk can 
be modeled to be correlated. This approach was taken initially by Mankiw 
(1986), where personal endowment shocks are concentrated in periods with 
contemporaneous low dividends. Within this environment, the consumption 
beta of the market index is raised, thus increasing the predicted equity pre- 
mium. Whether unemployment risk does, indeed, significantly alter financial 
market behaviour compared to the complete market case has been shown 
to depend on the persistency of the risk (see, in particular, work by John 
Heaton and Deborah Lucas that is reviewed below). With perfect financial 
markets, the consumption pattern of a long lived investor for whom periods 
of unemployment are short will be similar to the consumption pattern of 
the same investor with no unemployment risk. This is because, rather than 
saving in advance against the future risk of unemployment, the investor will 
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borrow and / or sell shares (including selling short, if necessary) at times 
of unemployment against positive future income shocks. Only with severe 
borrowing constraints or other market frictions will the savings/consumption 
decision of such an investor be influenced by short term unemployment risk. 
However, if periods of unemployment are long-term then investors must pre- 
pare in advance for the possibility of becoming unemployed. Therefore, in 
order to get equilibrium asset returns that vary significantly from the com- 
plete market case it is not only necessary to model individual income risk as 
resembling unemployment but it is necessary for periods of unemployment 
to be long lived or for there to be severe market frictions. Within this the- 
sis, this is mainly achieved by creating one and two period models where 
investors, once unemployed, never become reemployed, which is in the style 
of both Mankiw (1986) and Weil (1992a). 
No previous literature suggests that such uncertainty might also help 
explain the dividend controversy. It will be argued in this thesis that unem- 
ployment risk might, though, play a role in determining optimal aggregate 
dividends. Consider an economy with one risky firm that is all equity fi- 
nanced. Assume that real investment is under the control of the managers 
of this firm as opposed to the shareholders. That is, private individuals are 
restricted from investing directly in real assets (factories, machinery, etc. ) 
and can only use the equity of the firm as a source for investment. It should, 
though, be emphasised that there is no conflict of interest between agents 
and principals in the model that is constructed. The key assumption is 
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that managers of the firm are not permitted to fully reveal their future in- 
vestment plans (that is, investors are uncertain about future aggregate real 
investment) and, what is more, there is no guarantee that this investment 
will be at the optimal level at any time. So, within this model, the main 
source of marketable risk will come from not knowing future real investment 
rather than the (more usual) uncertainty regarding realised rates of return 
on capital. Let there also be periods when the risk to personal endowment is 
higher than at other time. There will be two effects at work. First, investors 
will want investment to be higher at times of low risk to personal capital as 
there is more money available for saving in this case. So positive investment 
shocks should be concentrated in states with low endowment risk. Second, 
it will be shown that, even if investment shocks have zero mean, they will 
still be more easily absorbed by investors when endowment is secure. That 
is, if investment uncertainty is concentrated in states with high income un- 
certainty then these effects combine to make investors more averse to the 
marketable risk. The implications of this are as follows. First, rights issues, 
which will coincide with periods of high investment, should be concentrated 
in bull markets when unemployment is low. An even stronger conclusion 
can be drawn: mean zero investment shocks should also be concentrated in 
high states. Dividends should be maintained in economic recessions as they 
have an important consumption smoothing effect. It is therefore contended 
that incomplete market models may prove a fruitful path for investigating 
financial management anomalies. 
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1.4 The development of this thesis 
To finish the introduction, the development of the thesis is briefly described. 
This section also discusses the areas of substantive original contribution that 
are made by this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 is a major literature review than considers the theoretical foun- 
dations upon which this thesis is based. First, the fundamental theorem of 
asset pricing, where a linear relationship exists between asset prices and the 
pricing kernel, is reviewed. In order to identify the pricing kernel, investor 
preferences are then briefly discussed. Throughout this thesis the baseline 
assumption is that investors have additively time separable power utility. 
This class of utility function is discussed and it is emphasised that the coef- 
ficient of relative risk aversion is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution in this case. From this basis, the Euler equation is described. 
It is emphasised that representative agent applications of the Euler equation 
are generally only valid if markets are assumed to be complete. In incom- 
plete markets, individual, as opposed to aggregate, consumption must be 
used in this equation. The CCAPM is then developed under various condi- 
tions in discrete time before the continuous-time proof of Breeden (1979) is 
presented. As will be highlighted in chapter 3, the Mehra & Prescott puzzles 
are just one of a number of anomalies that arise from consumption based 
asset pricing models and so it is very useful to show the links between the 
Euler equation and the CCAPM. The CCAPM also provides one of the four 
expressions for the predicted equity premium and real riskfree rate that will 
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form the basis for chapter 3. The chapter concludes by developing these four 
sets of equations. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on a literature review of one particularly notable 
empirical violation of standard consumption based asset pricing theory - the 
Mehra & Prescott puzzles. While reviews of this area are now beginning to 
appear in the literature (see, for example, Kocherlakota (1996), Heaton and 
Lucas (1995), Siegel and Thaler (1997)), the author believes that this chapter 
makes substantive original contribution. The scope of the material covered 
makes this chapter arguably the most thorough review of the topic existent 
at the time of writing. Further, most of the prior studies concentrate on 
outlining potential explanations for the puzzles. Because of the foundations 
laid in chapter 2, the theoretical issues that are raised by these anomalies 
are clearly demonstrated here. The puzzles can be established from any of 
the four expressions for the real riskfree rate and equity premium given at 
the end of chapter 2. From this, it is not only clear what might help resolve 
them but also what can not. Potentially valid explanations are split into 
three categories: (i) that the ex-post realisations of asset returns in the US 
over the past century are not representative of the ex-ante expectations, (ii) 
that investor preferences are not well described by power utility with pa- 
rameters close to current best estimates and (iii) that representative agent 
assumptions are unrealistic in markets both with and without frictions. Al- 
though no new results are presented, innovative demonstrations of existing 
ideas, particularly with regard to incomplete markets, helps clarify the links 
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between major studies. Chapter 3 concludes with a review of other empirical 
tests that have given results that are difficult to reconcile with standard con- 
sumption based asset pricing models. These tests not only provide estimates 
for the coefficients to place in the power utility function used later in the 
thesis but show the general difficulties that this paradigm has in explain- 
ing financial market behaviour. It is concluded that the Mehra & Prescott 
puzzles have been surprisingly difficult to resolve. 
Chapter 4 considers in detail one paper that uses idiosyncratic risk to 
explain the Mehra & Prescott puzzles. In the model of Weil (1992a), mar- 
ketable and income risks are independent. In this case, provided the investor 
is "Standard Risk Averse" (under the definition of Kimball (1993)), then the 
equity premium will be higher than in the complete market case. Chapter 4 
has two distinct parts. Standard Risk Aversion is one of several varieties of 
44 proper risk aversion": a condition where combining two independent risks 
increases the aversion of an individual to one of them. The first section of 
chapter 4 develops an integrated approach to proper risk aversion for broad 
categories of small income gambles, including some that have not been con- 
sidered by previous research. This integrated method also paves the way 
for the proof of a new result. It is shown for the first time that decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (DARA) and decreasing absolute prudence (DAP) will 
increase the risk aversion of an investor to a broader class of small income 
risk than has previously been recognised. The second section of the chapter 
considers the quantitative effects of proper risk aversion on equilibrium asset 
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prices. The predicted equity premium is calculated for Weil's example for 
four utility functions that are very similar locally (at the point of expected 
consumption) and that all exhibit DAP and DARA across the consumption 
domain. These utility functions vary from each other at very high level of 
derivatives (fourth or fifth derivative and above) and therefore are increas- 
ingly different from each other as consumption moves from its expected value. 
Given that unemployment is an "extreme" condition, although the utility 
functions are similar at the point of expected consumption, they are very 
different in the unemployment state. It is shown that the predicted equity 
premium is highly sensitive to the choice of utility functions. In particular it 
is shown that, even for Weil's example, DAP and DARA on their own are not 
sufficient to explain the magnitude of the observed equity premium. Given 
that existing literature finds it difficult to answer fairly basic questions about 
the form of investors preferences (are utility functions time separable? Are 
investors constant relative risk averse? Is 3a realistic coefficient of relative 
risk aversion? ... ) it is argued that the much more subtle 
issues regarding the 
form of utility function that are raised by Weil's example cannot be answered 
by existing results. This chapter concludes by suggesting future research that 
might help resolve the issue of determining the correct utility function to use 
in models that incorporate unemployment risk by estimating risk aversion at 
points of extreme consumption. 
Chapter 5 applies some of the ideas of incomplete market theory to the 
corporate finance issue of dividend policy. In this case, marketable risk does 
32 
not come primarily from uncertainty over future profits. Instead, it is conjec- 
tured that, even at the portfolio level, investors cannot accurately predict the 
aggregate future investment plans of the underlying firms. Further, aggre- 
gate investment is not always at the optimal level. So, it is uncertainty over 
aggregate investment commitments that is the main source of marketable 
risk. It is shown that investors prefer periods of higher than expected in- 
vestment to be concentrated in high states. Further, using simulations, it 
is demonstrated that even mean zero investment shocks are better absorbed 
by the market when there is a low risk to personal capital. It is argued that 
this is consistent with the observed financial market behaviour of dividend 
smoothing and rights issues concentrated in bull markets. Dividends play 
an important role at the aggregate level in helping investors to consumption 
smooth at a time when there is a high risk to idiosyncratic endowment. 
Chapter 6 is the main empirical chapter. The chapter examines the model 
initially introduced by Mankiw (1986) who constrains marketable risk and 
unemployment risk to be highly correlated. This is done to increase the 
absolute magnitude of the covariance between the market's returns and the 
ratio of marginal utilities of consumption. As nonmarketable risk in this 
model is driven by unemployment, and taking the term "unemployment" 
literally in this context, this implies that unemployment surprises should be 
negatively correlated with stock market returns. Similarly, through the pre- 
cautionary savings motive, the riskfree rate should drop (rise) prior to poor 
(good) unemployment news. This is an unusual characteristic as drops in 
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the riskfree rate would, ceteris paribus, be expected to be associated with a 
rise in the market index. This thesis provides estimates of the correlation 
between unemployment shocks and changes in asset returns. It is shown that 
stock market returns do indeed decline (rise) prior to "bad" ("good") unem- 
ployment news in both the UK and the US; an observation that is consistent 
with the theoretical model of Mankiw (1986). However, the riskfree rate rises 
(falls) which is not consistent with the precautionary savings motive. A con- 
clusion of this thesis is that it is difficult to reconcile the data with Mankiw 
(1986) style models. Chapter 7 concludes. It is clear that the testable im- 
plications of incomplete market models with nontradable risk that resembles 
unemployment risk are often very different from the testable implications of 
complete market models. That changes in consumption vary between indi- 
viduals has been clearly established by the economics literature, which makes 
it hard to justify the use of complete market models. Further development of 
incomplete market models might well be expected to help explain financial 
market behaviour. This thesis suggests that even some puzzles in corporate 
finance might be usefully addressed within such a paradigm. However, cur- 
rent theories that incorporate nontradable risks do not appear to capture 
true behaviour. The rise in the riskfree rate prior to poor unemployment 
news is not consistent with precautionary saving as a potential explanation 
for the riskfree rate puzzle if unemployment is the main source of uninsurable 
risk. Further, the testable implications of many incomplete market models 
are highly sensitive to the form of the assumed utility function of investors. 
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The empirical evidence, while not conclusive, does suggest that, particularly 
within the US, individual income risk is not sufficiently persistent to explain 
Mehra & Prescott's puzzles. The conclusion of this thesis is that, while the 
a priori evidence suggests that nonmarketable risk should play an important 
role in determining equilibrium asset prices, current applications of incom- 
plete market theory leave many issues unresolved. 
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Consumption based asset pricing 
Abstract 
This chapter reviews the theoretical foundations upon which this the- 
sis is based. The chapter starts with a derivation of the fundamental 
theorem of asset pricing and develops this into the Euler equation and 
Consumption CAPM. The continuous-time proof of the Consumption 
CAPM as derived by Breeden (1979) is then given. More recent the- 
oretical developments in the area are then reviewed. The emphasis of 
the discussion is on examining how robust consumption based asset 
pricing models are to changes in underlying assumptions. The final 
section provides analytical forms for the equity premium and real risk- 
free rate in a complete market with no frictions and (time-separable) 
power utility. These equations will form the basis for discussing the 
Mehra & Prescott puzzles in the next chapter. It is concluded that 
the testable implications of consumption based asset pricing models 
are highly sensitive to assumptions of market completeness. 
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2 Introduction 
This dissertation investigates whether the Mehra & Prescott and dividend 
puzzles can be at least partially explained by incorporating nontradable in- 
come shocks into the theoretical model of the economy. The role of this 
chapter is to review the literature on the theory of consumption based asset 
pricing which provides the foundation for this thesis. This theory is devel- 
oped in more detailed discussion of the most relevant literature that can be 
found in other parts of the thesis. Chapter 3 looks in detail at the Mehra & 
Prescott puzzles and other empirical tests of consumption based asset pricing 
models. Chapter 3 also examines the role that market incompleteness might 
play in improving the explanatory power of these models. Chapter 4 exam- 
ines the theory of proper risk aversion - the impact of income shocks on 
independent marketable risk - and chapter 5 briefly discusses the optimal 
dividend policy debate. The structure of this chapter is as follows: 
* Section 3 develops the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. It is 
shown that if there is no potential for arbitrage then the price of any 
asset at time t-1 is given by pit-, = E[(dit + pit)rtl where dit is the 
dividend from the asset in the next time period and 7rt is a "pricing ker- 
nel". Subsection 3.2 reviews a one period, finite state approach to the 
theorem which portrays the pricing kernel in terms of the prices of pure 
securities. The extension of this result to an infinite state economy is 
given in subsection 3.3, where the proof is based on the mathematics of 
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Hilbert spaces. Appendix 9.4 demonstrates the strength and flexibility 
of the fundamental theorem. It is shown that the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), the Arbitrage Pricing Theo- 
rem of Ross (1976) and the options pricing model of Black and Scholes 
(1973) can all be developed directly from the fundamental theorem. 
e In order to apply the fundamental theorem of asset pricing to consump- 
tion based asset pricing problems it is necessary to make assumptions 
about investor preferences in order to get explicit form for the pricing 
kernel. Section 4 describes the utility function most commonly applied 
to consumption based asset pricing problems: time separable power / 
logarithmic utility. This section concentrates on showing the link be- 
tween the elasticity of interternporal substitution and the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion for this form of preferences. We will return to this 
link in the next chapter. 
9 Section 5 combines the fundamental theorem of asset pricing with in- 
vestor preferences in discrete time to give the Euler equation and the 
Consumption CAPM (CCAPM). One of the main difficulties that arises 
when applying consumption based asset pricing models is that the the- 
ory refers to the consumption of individual investors. It is extremely 
difficult to work in these terms and so it is desirable to replace individ- 
I 
ual consumption with aggregate consumption in these models. Subsec- 
tions 5.1 and 5.2 provide aggregation conditions that enable us to work 
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in a representative agent environment. The key assumption for this is 
that markets are complete. Therefore, in the remainder of this thesis, 
where it is assumed that there is uninsurable risk, it is the use of aggre- 
gate, as opposed to individual, consumption within consumption based 
asset pricing models that is the point of contention. Having provided 
conditions for aggregation, subsections 5.3 and 5.4 then derive the Eu- 
ler equation from the fundamental theorem of asset pricing both with 
and without a representative agent. The Euler equation is the central 
model that underlies the work in this thesis. In subsections 5.5 and 5.6 
the link between the Euler equation and the discrete time CCAPM is 
shown. Essentially the CCAPM can be derived from the Euler equa- 
tion provided that we can aggregate, use a "sensible" utility function 
and provided that aggregate consumption is sufficiently smooth. This 
link between the CCAPM and Euler equations is important as it shows 
that the Mehra & Prescott puzzles, which are usually demonstrated 
via the Euler equation, are essentially a CCAPM puzzle. The Mehra 
& Prescott puzzles should therefore be interpreted in the light of other 
empirical tests of the CCAPM. This is discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
* Section 6 develops the CCAPM in a continuous-time environment. Sub- 
section 6.1 gives the Intertemporal CAPM of Merton (1973). Following 
Breeden (1979), this is simplified into the CCAPM in section 6.2. In 
subsection 6.3 the literature that has relaxed some of the underlying 
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assumptions of the CCAPM is reviewed. In particular the work of Back 
(1991) and Aase (1993) is reviewed, where there are jumps in the opti- 
mal consumption path of each individual and asset returns. Subsection 
6.4 contrasts the CAPM with CCAPM. It considers economies where 
the two models are equivalent and presents a model of equilibrium as- 
set prices where systematic risk has both a market and consumption 
component. 
9 Section 7 uses the theory developed in the earlier sections to derive ana- 
lytical forms for the equity premium and real riskfree rate. This is done 
in non-parametric single period, parametric single period, continuous 
time and multi-period discrete time Markov growth environments. It 
will be shown in the next chapter that the puzzles of Mehra & Prescott 
can be demonstrated using any of these models. What becomes clear is 
the assumptions that drive the puzzles: (i) a representative agent exists 
(ii) there are no market frictions or taxes (iii) investors have additively 
time-separable power / logarithmic utility with parameters that ap- 
pear to reflect investor preferences and (iv) aggregate consumption is 
smooth. 
The contribution of this chapter is as follows. While no new results are 
presented, this is, to the author's knowledge, the most comprehensive re- 
view of the theory underlying the Mehra & Prescott puzzles. Reviews of the 
puzzles (Heaton and Lucas (1995), Kocherlakota (1996), Siegel and Thaler 
(1997)) have concentrate more on providing potential explanations than ex- 
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plaining the origins of the puzzles. Original papers have chosen one theoret- 
ical basis for developing the puzzle (e. g. Mehra and Prescott (1985) use a 
Markov growth model, Alm (1990) uses a dynamic programming approach). 
To the author's knowledge, this is the only source that provides four related, 
and yet separate, formulations for the real riskfree rate and equity premium. 
The author believes that, in providing such a solid theoreticaffoundation for 
the puzzles, the role of each of the individual assumptions becomes clear. 
Perhaps equally importantly it is clear what can not explain away the puz- 
zles - for example discrete time / continuous time arguments or subtle 
debates about the exact process describing aggregate consumption 3 or asset 
returns. In particular, the role that market completeness plays in models of 
asset prices is clear and the papers presented in subsection 6.3 hint at how 
the Mehra & Prescott puzzles might be resolved by allowing for uninsurable 
risks. 
3 Fundamental theorem of asset pricing 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this section is to provide a very general theoretical setting for the 
work that is to follow. Under one of the most widely accepted assumptions 
regarding investor preferences - that there exists an investor who is never 
satiated - it is possible to deduce a highly generalised theorem of asset 
pricing. This result, known as the "fundamental theorem of asset pricing", 
3AIthough the debate about potential jumps in aggregate consumption might prove 
crucial as this violates the central assumption of smooth aggregate consumption. 
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states that there must exist a positive linear operator that will value any fu- 
ture set of risky cash flows. The theorem was developed in a one period, finite 
state economy by Stephen Ross (Ross (1977), Ross (1978)) and developed 
by Harrison and Kreps (1979) into a multiperiod, infinite state economy and 
Harrison and Pliska (1981) into a continuous-time economy 4. Individual as- 
set pricing models, such as the CAPAI and Consumption CAPM (CCAPM), 
can be linked through this theorem with the specific linear operator varying 
from model to model. This section of the thesis develops the fundamental 
theorem of asset pricing so that later sections can place consumption based 
asset pricing models within this setting. 
The positive linear operator is presented in different ways by different 
authors: 
"There are many equivalent ways of representing a linear pricing rule 
... In one representation, the price 
is the expected value under arti- 
ficial 'risk neutral' probabilities discounted at the riskless rate. (The 
risk-neutral probability measure is also referred to as an equivalent 
martingale measure). In another representation, the price is the ex- 
pectation of the quantity-times-state-price density, which is the state 
price per unit probability. In yet another representation, the price is 
the expected value discounted at a risk-adjusted rate. " 
Dybvig and Ross (1992) pp. 46-7 
The section proceeds as follows. First, in order to provide the clearest 
interpretation for the pricing kernel, the fundamental theorem of asset pricing 
is presented in a one period, finite state, economy. The theorem is then 
4 There are several text book treatments of the area. For example, Ingersoll (1987), 
Huang and Litzenberger (1988) and Ferson (1995) provide accessible accounts while Darrell 
Duffle (Duffie (1988), Duffie (1992a)) provides more rigorous vector space treatment of the 
type given here. Dybvig and Ross (1992) provide an excellent synopsis of the topic while 
Constantinides (1989) provides an introductory overview of the interrelations between the 
various asset pricing models. 
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developed in subsection 3.3 following Harrison and Kreps (1979). The proof 
relies on the mathematics of Hilbert spaces. Appendices are provided on the 
relevant pure mathematical background. 
3.2 The fundamental theorem in economies with fi- 
nite states 
In this subsection, the fundamental theorem of asset pricing is developed in 
a single period, finite state economy. This subsection is included because it 
provides clear interpretation for the pricing kernel in terms of the price of 
pure securities. As the pricing kernel will be central to the development of 
this thesis, the author considers it important to present an intuitive repre- 
sentation for this variable. 
Before proceeding, the following remark helps place any arbitrage-free5 
pricing theorem within an equilibrium 6 environment: 
Remark 1A market that presents arbitrage opportunities cannot be in equi- 
librium provided there exists at least one investor who is never satiated. 
'As observed by Ingersoll (1987) (p. 52 et. sec. ), there are two types of arbitrage op- 
portunity. An arbitrage opportunity of the first type is a portfolio with non-positive cost 
and payouts that are never negative and have non-zero probability of being positive. An 
arbitrage opportunity of the second type is a portfolio with negative cost and payouts that 
are strictly non-negative. The potential for arbitrage of the first type neither implies, nor 
is implied by, an arbitrage opportunity of the second type. Strictly speaking, this section 
provides proofs only for arbitrage of the first type. However, the results hold equally for 
arbitrage opportunities of the second type and the distinction need not concern us here. 
'Formal definitions of competitive market equilibrium will follow when the theoretical 
models are being developed below. Intuitively equilibrium in a financial market refers to 
an allocation of assets amongst investors and a set of prices that is both feasible (the sum 
of the holdings in each asset is equal to the total supply of that asset) and such that, for 
the prevailing market prices, the portfolio of assets owned by each individual maximises 
the expected utility of that individual subject to the individual's budget constraint. At 
the simplest level, a financial market is in equilibrium if their are no individuals who wish 
to change portfolio at the given market prices. See, for example, p. 1 of Duffie (1988) for 
a simple mathematical description of an equilibrium market. 
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If arbitrage opportunities exist, there is the opportunity for any investor 
to create a free lunch by investing in this opportunity. If there exists a 
subset of investors who are never satiated, these individuals should wish to 
take an infinite position in this free lunch. This is clearly not consistent with 
equilibrium. 
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing is now presented for a single 
period, finite state economy. Consider a single period economy with S (finite) 
potential future states (in an Arrow-Debreu sense) at time t=1. Let there 
also be n (finite) assets in the world. Let the (n x S) payoff matrix at t=1 
be denoted by D and let Di, Di. denote the ith row of this matrix and the 
element in column s of this row respectively. Using RS++ to denote a (S x 1) 
vector of strictly positive real numbers and p as the (n x 1) vector of prices 
of the n assets at time t=0, the only time when trading is permitted': 
Result 1 The economy permits no arbitrage if and only if 3w E RS++ such 
that p= Do. 
In the course of demonstrating the fundamental theorem, a second im- 
portant result will also be shown to hold: 
Result 2 Suppose that the market permits no arbitrage. Then wE Rs++ 
that satisfies p= Dw is unique if and only if the market is complete. 
The proof of this result is presented in three steps. First it will be shown 
that the assumption that 3w E RS++ such that p= Dw cannot hold if the 
7Throughout this thesis the standard mathematical notation 3, V are used to denote 
"There exists... " and "For all... " respectively. 
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economy permits arbitrage. Second it will be argued that such aw must exist 
in a complete arbitrage-free market and that w will be uniquely identified in 
this case. Third, it will be argued that if the market is incomplete then vu 
will not be uniquely defined. 
First suppose that the economy does permit arbitrage. In this case it will 
be shown that no = of the form required by the result can exist. By the 
definition of arbitrage, it is possible in this economy to come up with a self- 
financing trading strategy that will not give a negative payout in any state 
and will give a positive payout in at least one state. Denote the holdings in 
the n assets that provide this arbitrage opportunity by an (n x 1) vector 0 
so that the payout in the S states is given by DTO. The cost of this self- 
financing portfolio is pTO < 0. Suppose that 3w such that p= Dw. By the 
assumption of self financing, p To <0 =ý, WTDTO < 0. By the assumption of 
arbitrage DTO is never negative and positive at least once. Then wi :50 for 
at least one i. This contradicts the assumption that wE Rs++, Next suppose 
that the market is complete and there are no axbitrage opportunities. Then, 
by definition of completeness in an Arrow-Debreu economy, it is possible to 
create the S pure securities'. It may be possible to create the pure securities 
using more than one combination of the n assets, but, however we create 
these securities, the absence of arbitrage ensures that the price of the pure 
securities are uniquely defined. We can therefore denote the prices of the S 
pure securities by the unique (S x 1) vector w. Given the absence of arbitrage 
gThe pure security for state s is an asset that pays 1 if the state of the world is s and 
0 otherwise. 
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and the fact that the pure securities give a positive payout in one state and 
never a negative payout, =E Rs++, The payouts from any asset i can be 
replicated by buying Di, shares in all SE [1, S] pure securities. The absence 
of arbitrage ensures that p= Dru as required. This gives an economic 
interpretation to the vector cu. = is the price of the S pure securities and 
will be referred to as a "state-price deflator". 
, 
Given this interpretation of cu, the situation clearly becomes more dif- 
ficult in the case of incomplete markets and no arbitrage. An incomplete 
market without arbitrage can be considered to be an arbitrage-free complete 
market with certain assets withdrawn. That is, by adding in somewhere be- 
tween 1 and S additional assets, it will be possible to complete the market 
without introducing arbitrage opportunity. In this enlarged market, it has 
already been shown that the state-price deflator exists. Therefore, it must 
also exist in the restricted incomplete market. It has already been shown 
that in a complete market = is unique (as it is the price of the pure securi- 
ties). Therefore, in the case of an incomplete market, = is going to be unique 
if and only if, for any extension of the market that makes it complete and 
arbitrage free, the price of all pure securities will be the same. This will never 
be the case since Oding new assets introduces important degrees of freedom. 
This is demonstrated by example. Consider the case of n 2, S=3 with 
prices and payout matrix given below. This market is arbitrage-free and so 
we know that p= Dw: 
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It can be shown in this case that w is not unique by presenting two ad- 
missible values for this variable. The market could be completed by adding 
a state 1 pure security with price 0.8 or 0.9. Solving: == (0.8,0.46,0.08)T, 
(0.9,0.48,0.04)T respectively. Both these vectors are in R++ and so the mar- 
ket is still arbitrage free in both cases. From this, it is clear that there is 
a continuum of wER3 that satisfy equation 1. So, for an incomplete 
market, the state-price deflator is not unique, but at least one W of the form 
required by the theorem does exist. The result has thus been established. 
As emphasised in the quotation of Dybvig and Ross (1992), several in- 
terpretations can be placed on the linear relationship between prices and 
payouts. The theory has been developed so far in terms of the state-price 
deflator. Two alternative representations are now presented - the existence 
of a "pricing kernel" and of an "equivalent martingale measure" (EMM)'. 
Use P, to denote the probability that all investors ascribe at t=0 to the 
economy ending in state s at t= 11' and E'[-] to denote expectations under 
probability measure x. Consider table 1. Q is, indeed, a probability mea- 
sure. All values are non-negative as tu E RS++ and it clearly sums to one. 
9A formal definition of an equivalent martingale measure is given in appendix 9.1. 
"Throughout this thesis it is assumed that all investors agree on the probability space 
(see, again, appendix 9.1). That is, throughout this thesis "beliefs" about the future 
state of the world are homogeneous across the investment community. This thesis does 
not consider the role that different information sets and different expectations across the 
community of investors might play in determining equilibrium asset prices in financial 
markets. 
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Qs =0 if and only if vu, = 0, which will only happen if the probability of 
S 
state s is zero under the initial probability measure P. Further, . =1 W. 
has interpretation. In a complete market it is the cost of creating a portfo- 
lio of all the pure securities: that is, it is the cost of the riskless portfolio. 
Therefore cu. = 1/(1 + rf), where rf denotes the riskfree rate. So all 
assets payoffs, discounted at the riskfree rate, are martingale under the new 
probability measure Q. This makes Qa well defined equivalent martingale 
measure. 
Of more direct relevance to this thesis is the representation of the linear 
pricing rule as the strictly positive (S x 1) vector 7r which will be called 
the "pricing kernel". We know that each element 7r, in 7r is strictly positive 
as both w, and P, are strictly positive for all sE [1, S]. That, given the 
absence of arbitrage opportunities, the price of any asset i at time 0 can be 
given as E[dir] (where di is the total payout to the asset at t=1,7r is some 
strictly positive pricing kernel and expectations are taken with respect to 
the probability space agreed on by all investors in the community) will prove 
a valuable foundation upon which to develop the theoretical discussions in 
subsequent sections. 
3.3 A Hilbert space proof of the fundamental theo- 
rem 
This dissertation is not restricted to finite state economies. The proof of 
the fundamental theorem in an infinite state, single period economy is now 
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Pricing kernel EMM 
7r, g pl, Q, s E W,, 
s 8=1 ss E Di. r. P. pi E w, E Djý, Qz 
8=1 8=1 X=l s 
Ep[Dirl 1: w. EQ [Dil 
3=1 I 
Table 1: Representing the linear relationship between prices and payouts as 
a positive pricing kernel and equivalent martingale measure (EMM). 
presented. This comes from the work of Harrison and Kreps (1979)". This 
section calls on some pure mathematics on vector spaces that will not be 
explicitly used in the rest of the thesis. A brief discussion of these issues can 
be found in appendix 9.2 and references are given in the body of the text to 
more detailed treatments. 
The notation is as follows. Consider the probability space (11, F, ?) (see 
appendix 9.1) and, for any continuous linear (. F measurable) functional x 





Define X =- L'(? ) := Ix EL: jjxjj < oo}. These square integrable func- 
"The proof in the original paper is for an economy consisting of T (finite) trading 
periods where no funds are either introduced or removed from the market over these time 
periods. This subsection deals only with single period economies. 
12Technical note: If two measurable functions x, y are equal almost everywhere then 
IIx- yj I=0. x=y almost surely but x-y00. Therefore, strictly speaking, this is not a 
well defined norm. To avoid this problem it is assumed here that no two linear functionals 
are equal almost everywhere and leave a more formal treatment of this problem to the 
textbooks. 
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tionals can be considered to be possible payouts on financial assets. Consider 
the subset MCX that represents the payouts to traded assets. X\M is 
then the set of potential contingent claims. The proof of the fundamental 
theorem comes from the observation that X is a Hilbert space: 
Result 3 L'(P) is a Hilbert space with a norm defined above and an inner 
product defined by (xly) = EP[xyl 
Borowski and Borwein (1989) refers to L' spaces as "the most common 
realisations (of Hilbert spaces)" (p. 267)". Having established that L2(, p) 
is a Hilbert space, the Rietz Representation Theorem for Hilbert spaces is 
now presented. See, for example, p. 137 of Bollobas (1990) or page 109 of 
Luenberger (1969) (where this result is called the Riesz-Fr6chet theorem) for 
a full derivation, but an outline of the proof is given in appendix 9.3: 
Result 4 Let f be a continuous linear functional on the Hilbert space H. 
Then there is a unique element yEH such that f (x) = (x1y) for all xEH 
The following corollary is of particular importance, which can also be 
found in Royden (1968), p. 246: 
Corollary 1 Let p be a continuous linear functional on L'(P). Then there 
is a unique element 7r E L'(? ) such that p(x) = E7[x7r] for all xE L'(? ) 
The existence of a unique, strictly positive, pricing kernel with finite vari- 
ance in a complete market 14 follows directly as, in the absence of arbitrage, 
OThe proof of this result is not given here as it is so widely available in the literature 
- see, for example, p. 134 of Bollobis (1990) or p. 210 of Royden (1968). 141n this context a complete market is a market where either M=X or the price of all 
contingent claims in X\M are priced by arbitrage by the set of assets in M. 
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the pricing function p will be a continuous linear functional and 7r must be 
is strictly positive given that p is a strictly increasing functional. 
That 7r is not unique in an incomplete market is not formally shown 
here - see the original paper. It is clear, though, from the discussion given 
above: an incomplete market can be made complete in many different ways 
without introducing arbitrage opportunities. Each of these complete markets 
will have a different pricing kernel and so the pricing kernel is not unique 
in an incomplete market. The formal development of pricing kernels in aT 
period (T may be finite or infinite) discrete time economy is also not given 
here. However, by repeated substitution into the fundamental theorem, it is 
"clear" that, for any asset i that pays dividend di, at timeT, the price of the 
asset at time t, pit is given by: 
T 
pit = 1: Et [di, 7r, l 
-r=t+l 
for some strictly positive 7rr which is independent of i. There are five 
other versions of this relationship which will be useful": 
1= E[(l + rit)7rtl (2) 
0= E[(rit - rjt)rt] (3) 
E [rit] = rf t+ 
Cov(rit, -7rt) 
E[7rt] 




I'Notice that, while equation 4 implies equation 5, the implication does not run the 
other way. Therefore these equations are not equivalent. 
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rft = -- 1 E[rt] 
for any assets i, j and the riskless asset whose return is denoted by rf t 
and where rit := (pit + dit - pit-I)lpit-I is the simple (discrete) return to 
asset i. The secret of asset pricing is now to identify 7rt. The strength of 
the fundamental theorem is that all asset pricing relations can be interpreted 
in terms of a pricing kernel. To demonstrate the strength and flexibility of 
the theorem, the CAPM, APT and Black-Scholes options pricing formula are 
all derived from the fundamental theorem in appendix 9.4. This thesis is, 
though, concerned with consumption based asset pricing models. In section 
4 investor preferences are discussed which will enable 7rt to be interpreted 
as the ratio of marginal utilities in the Euler equation (subsections 5.3,5.4). 
This will form the basis for the consumption based asset pricing models that 
lie at the heart of this thesis. 
4 Investor preferences 
In the previous section the fundamental theorem of asset pricing was dis- 
cussed. Before deriving consumption based asset pricing models and placing 
them within the context of the fundamental theorem, this chapter must dis- 
cuss investor preferences. This is necessary as the pricing kernel will be 
identified as the ratio of marginal utilities in the Euler equation. Different 
assumptions are made by different authors and these will be highlighted in 
the discussions to follow. This section aims to outline the "most common" 
assumptions about preferences that underlie these models. 
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In general, it is assumed that there is only one consumption good and 
that utility is additively time-separable and state independent. That is (in 
discrete time with an obvious continuous-time analogy), if an investor is 
going to consume C1, C21 ... cT amounts of the consumption good at 
times 
t=1,2,..., T during her remaining lifetime before known time of death T, 
then she derives Utility U (Cl v C2 7 ... i CT) = U(Cl 9 1) + U(C2,2) +. --+ 
U(CT, T). 
Here u(ct, t) denotes the utility that results from consuming a quantity ct at 
time t". The next key assumption regards the form of U(ct, t). It is usually 
assumed that U(ct, t) = #'U(ct) where U(ct) is now independent of t and 0 
reflects the time preference of investors. It is generally believed that investors 
prefer to consume sooner rather than later (ceteris paribus) so that 0<1. 
Therefore the form of the utility function is: 
T 
U(Cli C21 i CT) -ý-- 
E #tU(Ct) 
t=l 
With this time-separable utility it is now necessary to make assumptions 
about the form of U(ct). The usual assumption is that the utility function 







Clearly the power form is not well defined for -y =1 but, by Mopital's 
I 'A utility of bequest function B[jVt, 71 is usually added to this to account for the utility 
that the investor gets from leaving wealth IVT to the next generation at time T (assuming 
that the investor is finitely lived). This section ignores the bequest function for algebraic 
simplicity only. 
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rule, the limit of the power form as -y tends to one is the logarithmic form 17 . 
This utility function will be given three names interchangeably during the 
remainder of this thesis. It will be called "power utility" (with logarithmic 
utility implicitly assumed as a special case), "isoelastic utility" or "constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility"". In some cases, power utility will be 
arbitrarily rescaled to U(c) = c1-7/(1 - y) with no loss of generality for al- 
gebraic simplicity. These utility functions have the important property that, 
under "standard" assumptions, investors will invest a constant proportion 
of their wealth in risky assets. This contrasts with constant absolute risk 
aversion utility (exponential utility) where investors will invest a constant 
amount of money in risky assets (see, for example, p. 118 of Merton (1992) 
for this comparison). The concept that someone worth L10,000 invests the 
same quantity in the stockmarket as someone worth E10 million seems un- 
realistic and argues against exponential utility. The concept that both these 
investors might invest 30% (say) of their wealth in the stockmarket is more 
reasonable and is loose support for CRRA utility functions. Early empirical 
support for this was given by Friend and Blume (1975): "Perhaps the most 
accurate single statement is: if there is any tendency for increasing or de- 
creasing proportional risk aversion, the tendency is so slight that for many 
171'116pital's rule (see, for example, p. 104 of Binmore (1977)) states that if f (a) = g(a) = 
0 then lim... f (x)lg(x) = f'(x)lg'(x) - Substituting in f 
(x) = c" - 1, f'(x) = 
d(cl--')Idx = d[Exp[ln(cl-x)]]/dx = d[Exp[(l - x)ln(c)]]Idx = -ln(c)Exp[(l - x)ln(c)]. 
So, lim,, ýj f (x) = -ln(c). If g(x) =1-x then lim,,, ýo g'(x) = -1. "The last two names are somewhat loose. Some time non-separable utility functions 
have constant relative risk aversion and some have constant coefficients of intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution. Unless specifically stated to the contrary, utility functions will 
be assumed to be additively time separable in the remainder of the thesis. 
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purposes the assumption of constant proportional risk aversion is not a bad 
first approximation" (ibid. p. 915)". This reason, together with its tractabil- 
ity, explains the popularity of power utility functions for consumption based 
asset pricing 20 . 
Before proceeding, there are two terms related to utility that are necessary 
for the discussion that is going to follow. Consider a utility function that has 
two parameters X, Y, so utility is u(x, y). The marginal rate of substitution, 
MRSvxj of y for x at a point of consumption Jý, 9 is defined by u(. Tc - 1, g+ 
MRSy--)-u(. Tc, q) = 0. Assuming without loss of generality (through arbitrary 




Notice that, in equilibrium, MRSy.., can be considered to be the price of 
consumption good x in terms of consumption good y. The intertemporal 
marginal rate of substitution, IMRS, t, between time T and t is the marginal 
rate of substitution of consumption at time T for consumption at time t. 
That is, the IMRS is the ratio of marginal utility of consumption at t to 
marginal utility of consumption at timer. However, as consumption at time 
t,, r may not be known with certainty at the time when the MRS is being 
191f anything their evidence supports increasing rather than decreasing relative risk 
aversion. 
2'Although exponential utility is sometimes used. See the next chapter where exponen- 
tial utility will provide closed solutions to certain precautionary savings models that are 
intractible under power utility. See Stapleton and Subrahmanyarn (1978) for an equilib- 
rium asset pricing model based on exponential utility. 
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calculated, it will be useful in general to think of the MRS as stochastic. 
IMRS, t = (oulac) I, 
t=Ft, cr=ar 
The IMRS,, can be interpreted as being the price of consumption at 
time r in terms of consumption at time t. The MRS then has an obvious 
interpretation as being related in some way to the interest rate. This point 
will be returned to in the next section on the Euler equation. The elasticity 
of substitution between two goods x, y, ES, is a measure of how the ratio of 
the level of consumption of x, y varies as the ratio of prices of x, y vary (see, 
for example, p-198 et. sec. of Green (1976) for a relevant discussion). Given 
that, in equilibrium, prices are given by marginal rates of substitution: 
ES = 
A(x/y) MRS--. 
x/y A(MRS., 7y) 
The elasticity of interternporal substitution, EIS, between time t,, r is the 
elasticity of substitution of consumption between time t and 7-. That is, 
EIS = 
A(c, /ct) IMRS, t 
c, /ct A(IMRSt) 
It will now be shown that the utility function given in equation 7 has 
constant EIS with the elasticity of interternporal substitution being 1/-f at 
all points. This is demonstrated by considering the utility functions that do 
have EIS= 11-y at all points and then showing that the functions in equation 
7 are members of this class. So, consider the utility functions for which 
1/-y is the EIS at all points. For notational simplicity let X :=c, /ct and 
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Y := IMRS, t. Taking the previous definition of EIS for infinitesimal changes, 
this means that dYlYy = dXIX. Integrating out, ln(Y)/, y =k+ ln(X) for 
constant of integration k. So, Y'1^1 = KX where K := ek. Substitute back 
in for original notation: 
IMRS', /t' = K(clct) (8) -rt - 
(aUlaC, ) 
"': 
By substituting equation 7 into equation 8 it is now clear that the elas- 
ticity of intertemporal substitution is 1/-I at all points for power utility func- 
tions. 
Next it will be shown that the utility function given in equation 7 has 
constant relative risk aversion in the sense of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1970). 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion R := -U"(ct)ctlU'(ct). By simple 
substitution of equation 7 into this definition, it is clear that IZ = -y at all 
points for power utility functions. 
That -1 has two distinct roles within this utility function is of central 
importance in some of the discussions that follow - particularly subsection 
12.2. It provides information about how sensitive an investor's savings / 
consumption decisions are to changes in the underlying interest rate. Second, 
it provides information on the investors' aversion to instantaneous gambles. 
While these two characteristics may be economically related" there is no 
211f an investor is highly averse to an instantaneous gamble then -Y will be high. It 
might also be reasonable to suppose that this investor would then also have a high desire 
to smooth consumption across time as well as across states. The investor would then 
have a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution - that is, the savings / consumption 
decision is dominated by the desire to smooth consumption rather than being driven by 
the incentive to save. The low EIS implies 1/, y is low, or -t is high. So linking risk aversion 
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reason necessarily why this should be so. Turning the EIS and R into separate 
degrees of freedom within the utility function will be an important factor in 
alternate utility functions that will be considered in the next chapter. 
5 The Euler equation and discrete time the- 
ory 
This section derives the stochastic Euler equation, which was developed by 
LeRoy (1973), Rubinstein (1976) and Lucas (1978). The Euler equation will 
hold for all agents under widely varying assumptions about the nature of 
the underlying economies. This section concentrates on developing sufficient 
rather than necessary conditions. Following Lucas (1978), the discussion 
given here is for pure exchange economies and concentrates on one period 
models. Asset prices reflect the saving and consumption decisions of all 
agents who have access to the market. Sometimes, though, prices behave as 
if there were one "representative agent" in the economy who receives the ag- 
gregate endowment. The first section will show that, in a complete market, 
the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption at t=1 to the marginal 
utility of consumption at t=0 will be fixed across investors whatever state 
occurs at t=1. So, an implication of complete markets is that any idiosyn- 
cratic shock in an individual's endowment at t=1 should not influence the 
consumption of that individual at t=1 as, with full insurance available, the 
with elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the manner of isoelastic utility can be 
economically interpreted by observing that if an investor has a high desire to consumption 
smooth across states instantaneously then she will also have a high desire to consumption 
smooth across time. 
59 
individual will have fully insured all personal endowment risks away at t= 
This provides the basis for the next section, which provides a sufficient con- 
dition for the existence of a representative agent with power utility. These 
conditions are that the market is complete and that each agent has power 
utility with identical coefficients of time-preference and relative risk aversion. 
Next, the Euler equation is established in an economy with a representative 
agent - this is the proof of Lucas (1978). Finally, it will be argued that the 
Euler equation must also hold for each individual investor in an incomplete 
market where the representative agent need not exist. 
5.1 Complete markets and aggregate consumption 
This section aims to show that the consumption pattern for each individual is 
influenced only by aggregate consumption and not the allocation of income in 
a complete market. This section is influenced by the discussion in Cochrane 
(1991b). 
First, note that complete markets must be Parato optimal". This is well 
established in finance textbooks (see, for example, Huang and Litzenberger 
again) and so the proof is not given here. Intuitively it is reasonable. If one 
investor wants to instigate a series of trades amongst counterparties who are 
(at worst) indifferent against whether the trades are made or not and markets 
permit the trades then the trades will take place. The ultimate allocation will 
22 "An allocation of state contingent claims is said to be Parato optimal or Parato efficient 
if it is feasible and if there do not exist other allocations which are feasible and can strictly 
increase at least one individual's utility without decreasing the utility of others", Huang 
and Litzenberger (1988) p. 121, their italics. 
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thus end up being Parato optimal. Notice, though that incomplete markets 
need not provide Parato optimal allocations of claims as there may be trades 
that would increase the utility of some investors and decrease the utility of 
no investor, which might not be permitted through the incompleteness of the 
market. 
The social welfare function is now applied to the complete market case. 
Suppose the economy has K agents each with utility Uk kE (1, K). Then the 
allocation of claims in this economy will be identical to one where the alloca- 
tion of claims is made by maximising the social welfare function T(U,,..., UK) 
where: 
K 
T(Ull ... i UK): -= 
E AkUk 
k=l 
where A,, ý: 0 Vk. (see, for example, proposition 16. E. 2 in Mas-Colell, 
Whinston and Green (1995)). Therefore, in a complete market, the action 
of the K individual agents can be modeled by maximising the linear social 
welfare function. To simplify the algebra assume that the economy is one 
period (see Cochrane (1991b) for the multiperiod proof). At time t=1, there 
are S potential states with probability associated with each P. sE (1, S) - it 
is assumed that there are homogeneous expectations. In a complete market, 
the individual optimisation problems of the individuals can be replaced by 
maximising the social welfare function subject to the budget constraints that 
Ek CkO ý Fak Yko and, for all s, Ek Cksl "": 
Fak Yksl i whereCkO? Ck., refer to 
the consumption at times 0 and time 1, should state s occur , of consumer 
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k. YkO i Yks, has analogous interpretation for endowment (income). There are, 
thus, S+ 1 potential budget constraints. Assuming that the utility Uk of each 




I: I: Ak[Uk(CkO)+PsUk(Ckslil)]-ILOE[ckO-YkOl-l:. Usl: [Cksl-YkalI 
fcko'cksll 
k=l &=I k=l 8=1 k=l 
where the ps represent the Lagrange multipliers. Maximising with respect 
tO CkO i Cksl: 







9 Ps Vk, s Ukl (CkO) p 
SPO 
Notice that the righthand side of this last equation is independent of k. 
Therefore the ratio of marginal utility of next period's consumption to the 
marginal utility of this period's consumption is fixed across investors which 
ever state occurs at t=1. 
Empirical tests of this full insurance hypothesis - that changes in con- 
sumption should be independent of the allocation of idiosyncratic endow- 
ment shocks - have been conducted by Mace (1991) (with a comment by 
Nelson (1994)), Cochrane (1991b) and Attanasio and Davis (1996). It is 
found that the allocation of income shocks does influence relative changes in 
household consumption. "In our view, the magnitude of the covariance be- 
tween relative wages and consumption constitutes a spectacular failure of the 
hypothesis of between-group consumption insurance" (Attanasio and Davis 
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(1996), p. 1259). Cochrane (1991b) finds that, in particular, involuntary job 
loss and long periods of sickness result in significantly lower growth rates 
of consumption than the aggregate (although, surprisingly, the duration of 
unemployment is not shown to be significant). This provides support for 
the informal linking of endowment shocks with unemployment that is made 
throughout this dissertation and the idea that complete market models may 
not accurately reflect the savings and consumption decisions of individuals. 
5.2 The representative agent 
Most tests of the Euler equation and related models assume that there is a 
representative agent whose preferences are well represented by power utility 
function U(ct) = fit(cl--f - 1)/(l - y). This section provides a sufficiency 
condition for such a representative agent to exist". This result is given in 
sections 5.24-5.25 of Huang and Litzenberger (1988). The conditions that 
we will require are that the marginal utility for all agents 
Uk(Ckt) ý #tCkt -, I 
where P, -y are independent of k. In this case, substituting back into the last 




where A. :=p. /(P. po) -a constant". Therefore, Cksl= (A. 1P)-(11")CkO 
23General papers on the existence of a representative agent are given by Rubinstein 
(1974) and, of particular relevance in this context, Constantinides (1982). Scheinkman 
(1989) provides a very clear example to demonstrate that assuming the existence of a 
representative agent is generally invalid in incomplete markets. 
241i, /po has interpretation. From table I in chapter 2, it is known that the pricing kernel 
7r, can be represented by w, IP, where w, is the price of the pure security for state S. It 















(A, 1P)-W")j: CkO VS 
k=l 
A, Vs 
That is, the allocation of consumption across states and time would have 
been identical if the K individual agents had been modeled by a single rep- 
resentative agent whose marginal utility is the same as that of each of the 
individual agents. The sufficiency condition for the representative agent has 
thus been established. 
5.3 The Euler equation for the representative agent 
Assume the existence of the representative agent in an economy where there 
is only one consumption good. Utility of consumption is time-separable and 
state independent 
25; U (Cl i C2 i** ') '*: -- 
U(Cl 
1 
1) + U(C2,2) +--.. There are n 
production units all producing the consumption good. Denote the output 
of the ith production unit at time t as dit. The shares in these production 
units are traded ex-dividend. It is not possible to store this good (this is a 
"pure exchange economy"). Denote the proportion of the total holdings in 
the ith production processes held by the representative agent at t=0 and 
before any trading by zi. As the agent must hold all assets zi =1 Vi. At 
t=0, after the production units have paid their dividends, the agent is, in 
Therefore, p. /yo = w.; the price of the pure security. See, again, section 5 of Huang and 
Litzenberger, who set po =1 and associate p, with the price of the pure security. "The extension to time non-separable utility is straight forward. 
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theory, able to trade these assets in order to maximise expected utility of 
consumption. Denote by Zi the proportion of the total holdings in the ith 
production processes held by the representative agent at t=0 after trading. 
However, as she is the only investor in the world, Zi = zi =1 Vi. 
Let pi denote the price of asset i at time 0. Given that there is no storage 
potential, if we denote z, Z to be the (1 x n) vectors of holdings at time 0 
before and after trading respectively, p to be the (n x 1) vector of prices and 
dt to be the (n x 1) output vector, it is clear that the consumption of our 
investor at time 0 is (z - Z). p + z. do and at time t>0 is Z. dt. So, the 
problem for the investor becomes: 
Oo 
max U[(z - Z). p + z. dol + 
1: O'Eo(U[Z. dt]) S. t. z=Z=l z t=l 
where 1 is just a (1 x n) vector of I's. By undertaking the constrained 
maximisation with respect to the n variables in Z and setting to zero, it is 
clear that we come up with n equations of the form: 
00 
-piul[(z - Z). p + z. dol + 
57ß'Eo(ditU'[Z. dt]) =0 vi 
t=l 
Using the constraint that Z=z=1: 
P1 
00 
E Eo(ditU'[l. dt, t]) 
t=l 
UI[Ldo, 0] 
Ldo is just E'i I dio, or the total production of the physical good at time 
0. Given that there is no storage in the economy, total production must 
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equal total consumption, so that Ldo = co, where co is total consumption 
at time 0. Similarly, Ldt = ct, where ct is total consumption at time t. We 
have now arrived at Lucas' key 1978 result in a multiperiod pure exchange 
economy with a representative agent where that agent has time separable, 




UI [Co, 0] 
5.4 The Euler equation in incomplete markets 
The proof of the Euler equation has so far only been demonstrated in the 
complete market case. As this thesis concentrates on incomplete markets, it 
is important to establish the general version of this equation. Consider the 
K investors in the economy who have time separable and state independent 
utility of consumption Uk(4, Ck,... ) = Uk(4,0) + Uk(Ck, 1) +.... In addition 11 
to the n production units, each agent receives an endowment Ykt at time t 
that cannot be traded. If Ykt =0 Vk, t, then we return to the complete market 
case. Suppose that at time t= -1 there is a feasible distribution of shares 
in each production process i amongst the k investors. When tE [-110)1 
trading takes place in financial markets to establish a price pi for each asset 
i. At time t=0, investor k has holdings Zki in asset i under the constraint 
that Ek Zki 1 Vi- If the market is in equilibrium at time t=0, then each 
investor is "happy" with her holdings Zki and has no incentive to change to 
any other holding Zkj where Zki i Zki. That is (in vector notation) Zk ý Zk 
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must be a solution to: 
max Uk [(Zk - Zk)P + Zkdo + YkOl + zk 
00 
E Eo[Uk[Zkdt + Ykt]] 
t=l 
Undertaking the constrained optimisation: 
S-t- Zk ---: 
Zk 
00 
1 -PiUk[(Zk - Zk)-P + Zk. do + Yk01 +E ß'Eo(ditUk[7jk. dt + Yktl) =0 
t=I 
AsZk = Zkmust be a solution to this optimisation: 
00 
E Eo (dit Uk[Zk. dt + ykt, 
t=l 
A=I Uk[Zk. do + yko, 0] 
vi 
kk Now Zk. dO + YkO= c6 andZk. dt+ Ykt= ci, so the general Euler equation 
in an incomplete market is: 
00 




This is the (stochastic) Euler equation and is, in many ways, the central 
theoretical model of this thesis. As outlined by Grossman and Shiller (1981) 
(their italics, p. 223): 
The theory of asset returns eml. odied in ... (the Euler equation) ... is very powerful tecause it can 1--e applied so generally. It holds for 
any asset, or portfolio of assets. It holds for any individual consumer 
who has the option of investing in stocks (even if he chooses not to 
hold stocks) and thus it must hold for aggregate consumption so long 
as some peoples' consumption is well represented ty the aggregate 
consumption. It holds even if the individual's choices regarding other 
assets are constrained ... The model holds for any time period ... 
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From above, we know that all equilibrium asset pricing models can be 
interpreted within the context of the fundamental theorem of asset pric- 
ing. That is, there is some strictly positive 7r such that, in a one period 
setting, for all i, pi = E[dirl. From the Euler equation we know that 
k 
pi = E[djUk(cj, 1)lUk(4,0)]. The Euler equation is, therefore, easily rec- 
k 
onciled with the fundamental theorem: r =- Uk(cl I 1)1Uk(4, O). So, the 
association of the pricing kernel with the ratio of marginal utilities and the 
fact that this kernel will only be uniquely defined if the market is complete 
has now been established. 
5.5 Towards the CCAPM 
So far the Euler equation has been established both in complete and in- 
complete markets and placed in the context of the fundamental theorem of 
asset pricing. So, equations 2-6 hold in an Euler equation world with 7rt 
replaced by Uk(cýt, t)1Uk(ctý-j, t- 1). In the complete market case, the ks can 
be "dropped", while in the incomplete market case they cannot be excluded. 
This subsection aims to introduce the consumption CAPNI and link it in to 
the Euler equation. By taking a discrete time approach, the key assumptions 
that underlies that CCAPM are readily apparent. 
Remembering that 7r = Uk(clk, 1)fflk(cý, 0) for all k, equation 3 becomes 
k E[(ri - ri)U'(cl, 1)], which again holds for all k. Let Zk := E[ck, ] and 
ik :=_p) Ut (ýk + ik 1 
1)] for all k. Taking a Taylor's c', - Z'. So, 0= E[(ri jk 
series expansion: 
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it(Zk 1) Um(Zk, 1) 
E[ri - rij = 
Uk 
I [Ek (ri 
- rj)] 
kE [(Ek)2 (ri 
- ri)] - Ukl W1 1) 
Ek 
2Uk(Zk, 1) 
E[ril - ri = 
Ukll(Zkl 1)7-k 
E[ -ri] + O(Ek) Uki W" 1) Zk- 
In order to derive the CCAPM, this equation needs to be reduced in two 
ways. First, the O(Zk) term needs to be negligible. Second, individual con- 
sumption/utilities must be replacable with the consumption and utility of 
a representative agent. Take these in turn. The O(Zk) term will be zero if 
utility is quadratic. It will be negligible if the consumption of all consumers 
is smooth. With regard to replacing individual consumption with aggregate 
consumption, this can certainly occur if the market is complete. It can also 
occur if the market is incomplete in the quadratic utility case provided that 
zk , Uk(-) are independent of 
k- in other words, if investors are "ex-ante 
homogeneous". Zk may still be k-dependent so there is no representative 
agent. In this case we can sum the left and right hands sides over k and, 
because covariances are additive, the individual Zk terms can be replaced 
with aggregate consumption uncertainty. That the CCAPM will hold un- 
der assumptions of quadratic utility and incomplete markets with ex-ante 
homogeneous consumers was shown initially by Mankiw (1986)". Alterna- 
tively the assumption that all investors have smooth consumption and are 
ex-ante homogeneous will also give the CCAPM. A more formal derivation 
261n the next two chapters the role that the third and fourth derivative of the utility func- 
tion plays in determining equilibrium asset prices in incomplete markets will be discussed 
in detail. This is the first indication that differences between complete and incomplete 
market models with ex-ante homogeneous investors will only occur with non-quadratic 
utility functions. 
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of this result will be given later in the chapter. Notice that in the type of 
model that will be developed in this thesis - incomplete markets, power 
utility and endowment shocks - the CCAPM will not follow because the 
O(Zk) terms will be k-dependent and will not be negligible. Therefore, even 
though investors will be ex-ante homogeneous, it is not possible to sum over 
k and replace individual consumption with aggregate consumption. So, even 
if aggregate consumption is smooth, provided that individual consumption 
is not and provided that markets are incomplete, the CCAPM will not hold. 
0 5.6 The CCAPM in discrete time 
Having loosely linked the CCAPM to the Euler equation , this subsection 
provides a number of more formal discrete-time developments of the CCAPM. 
The theoretical robustness of the model to changes in underlying assumption 
that were discussed above are then demonstrated. While similar issues are 
discussed in continuous time, the papers in this area are less intuitive. So 
understanding the role of "smoothness" of consumption in the discrete time 
development of the CCAPM should help provide understanding for later 
sections. Throughout this section there is a representative agent: that is, 
this is a complete markets development of the CCAPM. 
5.6.1 The CCAPM under bivariate normality 
An early proof of the CCAPM was provided by Rubinstein (1976) under the 
assumptions of a representative agent and bivariate normality of consump- 
tion and asset returns in discrete time. Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) 
70 
extended this result to heterogeneous investors in a complete market - see 
the discussion on aggregation given above. The key to the result is that, 
if variables i, 5 are bivariately normal and f (-) is a differentiable function 
then Cov [i, f (9)] =E [f'(9)] Cov [i, Pl. So, if ri and cl (consumption here is 
for the representative agent and so the k superscript can be dropped) are 
bivariately normal for all i and letting rc denote the return to a portfolio of 
assets (perhaps, but not necessarily, the portfolio of assets most correlated 
with aggregate consumption) then, rearranging equation 5 gives: 
E[ril - rf = E(r, - rf 
Cov(ri, cl) 
Cov(r,, cl) 
This is a version of the consumption CAPM. 
5.6.2 The CCAPM under quadratic utility 
That the CCAPM follows from the assumption of quadratic utility U(cl, 1) = 
0(aci-bc2, ) in a complete market is also easily shown. In fact, by substituting 
this utility function into equation 5, the CCAPM, equation 13, follows direct. 
That the CCAPM follows under quadratic utility is particularly important 
within continuous time for Grossman and Shiller (1982) who exploit the 
"local linearity" of marginal utility for differentiable utility functions to prove 
the CCAPM under fairly general conditions. 
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5.6.3 The CCAPM in discrete time under isoelastic utility, log- 
normal consumption & normal asset returns 
Define C, := In(cl) and assume that C, is normal - that is, aggregate 
consumption is lognormal. If the representative agent exists and has power 
utility so that U'(cl, 1) = Oc-l'Y, then equation 5 can be rearranged to give: 
E[ril - rf = E[r. - rf] 
Cov[ri, (exp[Cjj)-t] 
Cov[r,, (exp[Cl])-'Y] 
= E[r, -rf] 
Cov(ri, exp[--yCI) 
Cov(r,, exp[--yC, ]) 
Assume that ri is normal and let f (g) = exp[--tg]. Remembering that 
C, is normal by assumption and applying the result that, for normal i, g, 
Cov[i, f (g)] = E[f'(9)] Cov[i, 9): 
E[ril-rf = E[rc-rf] 
Cov(ri, Cl) 




which is an alternate (and more usual) version of the CCAPM where 
covariances are taken with respect to log consumption. Here Alnc := In(cl) - 
In(co) and the last line follows as Cov[ri, ln(co)] =0 as co is known with 
certainty. 
5.6.4 The CCAPM: an approximation under isoelastic utility and 
smooth consumption 
It has just been shown that if aggregate consumption is lognormal in a com- 
plete market and the returns on assets are normal then the CCAPM follows 
direct. It can be shown that if these assumptions are weakened so that 
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consumption is smooth and removing all restrictions on the distribution of 
asset returns, then the CCAPM follows as an approximation under isoelastic 
utility. If utility has power form, then: 
ul(cl, 1) ß( ,) --y ul(co, 0) CO 
= fl(expAInc)-" 
; ýý fl(l - -tAlnc) 
Terms in o(Alnc) have been ignored in the approximation, which follows 
as exp(6) =1+8+ o(6) and, from the binomial theorem, (1 + 6)-27 =1 
xb + o(b). Substituting the ratio of marginal utilities given in equation 14 
into equation 5: 
E[ril - rf = E[r, - rf ] 
Cov[ri, Alnc] 
Cov[r,, Alnc] 
The CCAPM in continuous time 
This section gives a formal, continuous-time derivation of the CCAPM as de- 
rived originally by Breeden (1979). This section sticks closely to the Breeden 
proof and, indeed, the notation in this section differs somewhat from that 
used elsewhere in the thesis in order to to be comparable with the original 
paper. 
The proof is based on a dynamic programming approach as initially ad- 
vanced by Merton (1969), Merton (1971)". By looking at a partial equilib- 
27 See Hakansson (1970) for another important early paper analysing consump- 
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rium economy 28 with asset returns and consumption assumed to follow Ito 
processes driven by m state variables, the Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) 
of Merton (1973) is proven. By concentrating on the fact that utility is 
state-independent, it is shown that the multi-beta ICAPM can be reduced 
to the single beta CCAPM with no further assumptions. This is the insight 
of Breeden. 
Assumption 1 There are K investors (not necessarily homogeneous) within 
the economy. At time t, each investor, k, is given an initial allocation of 
wealth jVk. The investor receives no further endowment of the consumption 
good. 
Assumption 2 There is only one physical good in the economy. Utility of 
consumption can therefore be expressed in terms of this single physical good". 
Assumption 3 Utility is time-additive and of fixed form. So, the utility 
of consumption before the economy terminates at known time T is given by 
ft T U(c(r), r)dr. It is assumed throughout that the utility function is state 
independent". 
tion/savings decisions. While the dynamic programming approach has now been largely 
superseded by the martingale technique of Cox and Huang (1989), it is still a satisfactory 
method for analysing many types of continuous-time savings and consumption decisions. 
See, for example, Karatzas, Lehoczky, Sethi and Shreve (1986) who use this approach to 
solve a very general class of investment problems and Svensson and Werner (1993) who 
consider the investment problem under exponential utility in the presence of non-tradable 
risk. 
"The partial equilibrium assumption imposes structure on asset price and consumption 
movements. This partial equilibrium approach is in contrast to the general equilibrium 
models of, for example, Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985). 
2'Breeden (1979) does develop the CCAPM in a multi-good economy but this is outside 
the scope of this analysis. 
"This is required for the consumption CAPM. The intertemporal version can be derived 
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Assumption 4 There exists a riskless asset paying an exogenous rate of 
return r at each instani3l. 
Assumption 5 There are n traded risky assets in the economy that are in- 
fluenced by m state variables. The evolution of these state variables, si, and 
the asset prices, Pi can be described by exogenous diffusion processes: 
dsi = fidt + gidqi 
dPilPi = aidt + oidzi 
where qi, zi are Weiner processes. Denote the instantaneous correlation be- 
tween dqi and dqi by vij. 
Assumption 6 Asset price evolve over time in a way prescribed by the m 
state variables. Denote the covariance between zi, zi by oij and let the corre- 
lation coefficient between zi, qj be denoted by %. 
The problem that the investor faces is as follows. She must make her 
wealth IV' last for the remainder of her life and may derive a "utility of 
bequest", Bk [IV(T), T] if leaving an amount TV(T) to her benefactors when 
she dies at a known (non-stochastic) future time T. She is therefore trying 
to maximise two things: how much to consume c' at each time and what 
percentage of her remaining wealth Wk (a (n x 1) vector) should she place 
in each of the n risky assets (with the remainder going to the riskless asset). 
under the more general condition of state dependent utility. The reader is referred to the 
reprint of Merton (1973) in Merton (1992) (Chapter 15) for the relevant extension. 
3'Again, Breeden derives the CCAPM in an environment without a riskless asset and 
the interested reader is referred to the original paper. 
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At any instant in time, her budget constraint (dropping the k superscripts) 
is that: 
n 
IV(t + bt) = IV(t) - cbt + 
(1 
- WT. 1)Wrbt + wiWdPi 
dIV ý- -cdt + (I _ WT. l)lVrdt 
wi(ai - r) + r] TV& 
wilV(aidt + aidzi) 
wilVoidzi - cdt 
(15) 
where c is the "rate of flow of consumption" at that instant (so that total 
consumption in time period (t, t+ R) r-j c8t) and 1 is the usual (n x 1) vector 
of 1s. We can formulate the investor's problem as 
T 
max Et [ U(c, r)dr + B[W(T), T]l =: J(Wk, s, 
(C, W) 
it 
Here J(IV', s, t) denotes the total utility (including bequest) made from 
making the optimal choices w, c. Equation 16 can be solved using a dynamic 
programming approach: see appendix 9.5. The optimal holding of the n risky 
assets at time t is given by (re-introducing the k superscript) 32 : 
k -jk Jsw 
k 
TOW = 
'v V-1 (a - rl) - V-1 Vag jWkW aa aa jlk VIV 
Here a is a (n x 1) vector whose i" element is ai, V.,, represents the 
(n x n) returns covariance matrix for the n different assets and V,., represents 
"Svensson and Werner (1993) show that, if there is one investor (so the k superscripts 
are redundant) who receives untradable income y(t) which describes an R6 process, then 
we need to add an additional term -VaaVa(y) to the right hand side of this equation, 
where Va(y) is a (n x 1) vector of covariances between asset returns and the nontradable 
income. 
76 
an (n x m) matrix of covariances between asset returns and movements in 
the state variables. Otherwise the general notation xy denotes the partial 
derivative of x with respect to y. So, for example, jk is a (rn x 1) vector sw 
whose ith element is J, ý ajk1aS, ajVk From the envelope condition, Jjkv jTV9 
Uk jk Ck Uk and J, 5w 
k= CkUk33 where Ck is a (1 x m) vector whose C9 IVIV IV cc 8 cc S 
ith element is cki. Let Tk represent the absolute risk tolerance for investor k: 
Uck / U'k 
. c). 
Equation 17 becomes: 
1k 
lVkWk = TkV.; 
ý(a-rl)-V-lVfL' 
aa Ck civ IV 
T'(a - rl) = V.. WklVkCk + V., ýck IV 8 
This equation will form the basis for both the intertemporal CAPM of 
Merton (1973) and the consumption CAPNI of Breeden (1979). 
6.1 The Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Merton's original 1973 paper proves the ICAPM with one state variable (the 
riskless rate) and obtains a specific case of the ICAPM. This is also the 
main textbook treatment (see, for example, p. 280 et. sec. of Ingersoll (1987)). 
The reprint of Merton (1973) in Merton (1992) produces the general pricing 
relationship in a world with m state variables and with state dependent utility 
33jf U(. ) = U(c, s, t) then J, ý W= ck, U,, k, + U,,, and the proof of the CCAPM not longer 
follows. To quote Stephen Ross (1989) "Breeden's analysis of the Merton model exploited 
the observation that if the local utility function was not dependent on the state of nature 
other than through the dependence of the optimal consumption choice on the state, then 
along an optimal path the marginal utility of wealth would depend only on consumption. 
The key to the result is the state independence of the utility function" (p. 88). The reprint 
of Merton (1973) in Merton (1992), however, shows that the ICAPNI will still hold true. 
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of consumption U(. ). Here, a "middle" route is followed where there are many 
states (initially) but the utility of consumption function is state independent. 
Reduction to one state variable occurs at the last stage to get tractability 
without over-elaborating on the algebra. Define Hý : ": -- Ek CIki/CkIV' Similarly 
Tk Ick and WIV: =EkwklVk define T: = Ek IV , the total money invested in 
each asset. Then, summing equation 18 over k and rearranging: 
wTV = TV-Ra - rl V-'V. IHý aa aa 
Assume that assets n-m+1 to n are perfectly correlated with the 
m state variables. That is, asset n-m+i is perfectly correlated with 
state variable iE [1, m]. Then, for the return of any asset ri, Cov(ri, si) = 
Cov(ri, r,, -,,, +i)Std(si)/Std(r,, -,,, +i) = Cov(ri, 
r,, _, n+i)9i/O'(n-m+i)- 
SOi Vas 
is the last m columns of Va. multiplied by an (m x 1) vector whose ith 
element is given by 9i/O'(n-m+i). Therefore, V-'V.., is the last m columns aa 
of a diagonal matrix whose non-zero element in the ith column (of the trun- 
cated matrix) is 9i/a(n-m+i). This (n x m) matrix will be denoted by Kas. 
Rearranging the previous offset equation: 
a-rl = 
VaaLa(s) + VM(a)IV 
T 
La(s) := KasH,, is a (n x 1) vector whose elements are zero up to, but 
not including, the (n - tn + 1)th and non-zero thereafter. VM(a) = Vaaw 
is a (n x 1) vector of covariances between the market portfolio and the indi- 
vidual assets. Left multiply the this equation by WT, the weightings of each 
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asset in the market portfolio. Then the left hand side becomes the excess ex- 
pected return to the market portfolio rm (even if there is non-zero aggregate 
investment in the riskfree asset) and: 
VT 
E[rm - rf] 
M(a)La(s) + Var(rAf)IV 
T 
In order to get an equilibrium asset pricing relationship there are m+1 
elements to identify: then m non-zero elements in L,, (s)/T and WIT. The 
m+1 variables that will be substituted in for these element are the expected 
returns on the m assets that are perfectly correlated with the state variables 
and the return to the market. We are thus in a position to create an equilib- 
rium asset pricing relationship. Substituting in for WIT in equation 19 and 
coming out of matrix notation we get: 
ami n amiamj] Lj(. ) E[ri - rf] = ýýE[rm - rf] +- 13 2 El am T M j=l 
where Lj(, ) is the jth element of L. (,, ) and sigmas represent variances and 
covariances of asset returns. In general this is complex to solve analytically 
but will lead to the general ICAPM pricing relationship. In particular, if 
m=1, it is simple (but long-winded) to show that this equation can be 
rearranged to give equation 34 of Merton (1973) - the main result of that 
paper. It is also clear from this equation that if m=0 then the CAPM 
follows. Thus it is possible to construct the CAPM in a continuous-time 
economy if there is a constant opportunity set34. 
"For an excellent discussion of the links between dynamic and static equilibrium models 
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6.2 The Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model 
6.2.1 The Breeden proof 
Return to equation 18. Consider the term Vaaw kIV'. The element Vaa 
is the covariance matrix of asset returns. The term WkWk tells us how 
investor k has distributed her wealth across assets. It is therefore clear that 
Vaaw kjVk =V Wk. That is it represents a (n x 1) vector whose ith element 
is the covariance between the returns of asset i and the wealth of investor k. 
Rewriting equation 18: 
T'(a - rl) = c' V. Wk + VasC 
k (20) IV 8 
Next, look at Vack, that is the (1 x n) vector of covarianccs between 
the returns of the assets and the change in consumption of investor k. Take 
the i" element of this: Cov(ri, ck). We know that Ck = C(Wk, S), So , using 
the chain rule dck = Ck djVk + J: M 1 Ck dS,. So, the i" element of V IV i= Si ack 
Cov(ri, ck jVk + Ck S, ). Separating out the covariances and returning to IV Si 
matrix notation, it is clear that: 
vkvk 
ack -: -- CIV aWk 
+ VasCs 
Notice that the right hand sides of equations 20 and 21 are the same. 
Therefore, equating the left hand sides: 
the reader is referred to Ross (1989). 
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Vack = Tk(a - rl) (22) 
The next step is to aggregate this across the economy. That is, sum the 
left and right hand sides of equation 22 across all k. Because of the additive 
nature of covariances, Ek Vack = Va, where c is total consumption in the 
economy. Letting T: = Ek T': 
rl = T-'V,,, (23) 
Multiply and divide the right hand side of equation 23 by C. The i" 
element of SV.,, = c/cCov(ri, dc) = cCov(ri, dc1c) r-. 0 cCov(ri, Alnc). We can C 
therefore clearly rewrite equation 23 as: 
c 
-rl = TVaAlnc 
(24) 
This is an important representation of the CCAPM, a version of which 
was derived in discrete time in section 5.5 but perhaps which has not been 
sufficiently emphasised to date. All the discrete time versions of the CCAPM 
given above could be presented in a form similar to this. clT is the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion for the representative agent. So, the ex-ante risk 
premium for any asset in equilibrium is just the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion of the representative agent multiplied by the covariance between the 
asset's returns and changes in log consumption. This will be important when 
discussing the equity premium puzzle in the next chapter. Returning to the 
previous offset equation, we can substitute in for clT by looking at returns 
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on portfolio with returns rc. Substituting back in we get the consumption 
CAPNI in its "usual" form: 
E[ri - r] = E[r, - r] 
Cov[ri, AIncl 
Cov[r,, Alnc] 
6.2.2 Exploiting local linearity 
While this analysis gives the original derivation of the CCAPM as given by 
Breeden (1979). Grossman and Shiller (1982), however, exploit It6's lemma 
to provide a simpler derivation of the result. The exposition here does not 
consider the aggregation of consumers but assumes that a representative 
agent exists. A more formal analysis of the aggregation process is given in 
the original paper. Let Vit represent the value of any asset i at time t. Assume 
that (Vit, ct) is an Ito process, then, Zit := U'(ct) Vit develops according to: 
dZit = U'(ct)dVit + U"(ct)[Vitdct + dctdVit] + OW ... (ct)Vit(dct )2 
The Euler equation tells us that the expectation of the left hand side is 
the same for any two assets ij. So, equating the expectation of the right 






dct dVit dVjt 




Ct I vit ýTtl 
Letting asset j be the riskless asset, the CCAPNI follows direct. 
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6.3 The CCAPM and ICAPM with nonmarketable 
assets 
Formal conditions on the primitives of the economy which will guarantee the 
existence of an equilibrium supporting the CCAPM are provided by Duffie 
and Zame (1989). Within a continuous-time environment, the conditions are, 
essentially, that utilities are smooth, monotonic increasing and concave with 
marginal utility tending to infinity as consumption tends to zero from above, 
aggregate endowment is an It6 process and markets are complete. 
Grossman and Shiller (1982) allow investors to hold assets whose returns 
might not describe Ito processes and which might be traded with transaction 
costs 35 . They show that, provided the overall consumption pattern of each 
individual follows an It6 process, the CCAPM still holds (over short time in- 
tervals) for the subset of assets whose returns are R6 and which can be traded 
costlessly. David Brown (1988) examines the CCAPNI and ICAPM under the 
assumption that a subset of the population receives continuously changing 
nonmarketable income. He also places liquidity constraints on these individ- 
uals so that they cannot have a portfolio of marketable assets with negative 
value - thus distinguishing his paper from that of Grossman and Shiller 
(1982). He shows that, under logarithmic utility, these constrained investors 
may find it optimal to have zero wealth (no investment in marketable assets) 
and to consume "hand-to mouth" their nonmarketable income. In this case, 
he argues, the CCAPM will no longer hold in its original form. Instead, a 
"They also allow for heterogeneous information, but this is of less interest to us here. 
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variation of the CCAPM is derived where consumption betas are calculated 
against the aggregate consumption of the subset of individuals with positive 
wealth. Essentially his proof is as follows. Consider an economy with no 
constrained individuals. Then the CCAPNI holds in its original form. Now 
add a constrained investor to the economy whose optimal policy is to con- 
sume hand-to-mouth. This investor will not affect asset prices as she will 
have no wealth to invest in marketable assets and is constrained from selling 
short. However, the introduction of this agent changes aggregate consump- 
tion and so, possibly, the consumption betas of the individual assets. The 
CCAPM cannot hold both in the presence and absence of this individual and 
the pricing relationship is therefore refuted. Brown points out, however, that 
the ICAPNI still holds. The reason for this is as follows. In the CCAPM, 
aggregation is done across consumption. Introducing constrained investors 
whose optimal policy is to hold no wealth affects this aggregation process. 
In the ICAPNI, however, aggregation is done across wealth. Given that the 
constrained individuals who consume hand-to-mouth have no wealth, intro- 
ducing such agents does not affect this aggregation process. The proof of 
the ICAPM proceeds unhindered. The proof of the CCAPM requires that 
aggregation is carried out across investors with positive wealth only. 
A paper of great relevance for the discussions to come is Back 
(1991)36 
"See also Aase (1993), who considers a similar problem in a representative agent en- 
vironment. Aase (1996) extends the earlier paper by considering cases when the jump- 
diffusion processes of asset returns and aggregate consumption are assumed to be Gaussian 
inverse Gaussian and inverse Gaussian respectively. In this case, there is a closed form 
"Consumption CAPNI" (his equations 3.38,3.39), which is, of course, significantly different 
from the CCAPM given above for returns that are continuous. 
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who describes an economy where individual optimal consumption paths and 
asset returns are assumed to follow jump-diffusion processes. 
The risk premium of a security can te divided into two parts: the 
premium for the continuous part of the return and the premium for 
the jump part. Each premium is proportional to its covariance with 
the corresponding part (continuous or jump) of the state price density 
process. The covariance Ietween the jump parts of the security price 
and state price processes is zero unless jumps occur simultaneously. 
Thus, if the state price density does not jump simultaneously with the 
security, then the jump risk of the security is unpriced. 
Back (1991), p. 372 
The amended version of the CCAPNI in the case of jump-diffusion re- 
turns and consumption paths is given in his theorem 3. The risk premium 
on the continuous part of asset returns is determined by its covariance with 
the continuous part of aggregate consumption. To stress: even in an incom- 
plete market we can use the continuous part of aggregate consumption to 
price the continuous part of asset returns. This result was hinted at much 
earlier in, the chapter in section 5.5. "The assumption of complete markets 
is not necessary, however, to obtain a formula for the continuous risk pre- 
mium in terms of aggregate consumption, because the linear relations for the 
various investors can be aggregated" (ibid. footnote 18). The risk premium 
on the discontinuous parts of an asset's return is determined its covariance 
with a variable q. "... notice that the process, -q is not defined simply in 
terms of jumps in the aggregate consumption rate, but rather depends in a 
complicated way on the jumps in the various investor's consumption rates" 
(ibid. p. 387). As in an incomplete market the optimal consumption path of 
each investor need not be perfectly correlated risk premia will depend on the 
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distribution of consumption jumps amongst investors. This is first evidence 
presented in this thesis to suggest that introducing low probability, high 
impact uninsurable shocks to individual endowments will make significant 
difference to equilibrium asset prices. Jarrow and Rosenfeld (1984) (US) and 
Bentzen and Sellin (1997) (other major markets) provide empirical evidence 
showing that there are jumps in the return to market indices, suggesting that 
this may provide a potential explanation to the equity premium puzzle". 
An important implication of the Kerry Back's work is that, if asset prices 
and optimal consumption paths are jump-diffusion (with correlated jumps), 
estimated risk premia estimated from the CCAPM of Breeden (1979) will be 
"too low" (or, alternatively, estimates of risk aversion will be "too high"). 
Therefore, as observed by Aase (1993), Aase (1996), jump-diffusion asset 
returns and aggregate consumption may form a (partial) solution to the 
equity premium puzzle. Back's result takes this intuition one stage further 
by showing that jumps in individual (not aggregate) consumption paths and 
asset returns may form the solution to the puzzle. This issue will be addressed 
in much greater detail in later chapters. 
Grossman and Laroque (1990) assume that utility comes from a durable 
good, ICt, which can be bought and sold and otherwise depreciates in a de- 
terministic manner dICt = -aKt. To change holdings in the durable good, 
an investor must sell her existing durable good with transaction costs and 
"Although both develop a theoretical framework that states that jumps in individual 
share price processes will only be priced if they are correlated with these market level 
jumps. This theoretical paradigm is less general than that of Back and Aase as there are 
no endowments, no state variables and markets are complete in their models. 
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repurchase a durable good with the required value. Clearly the introduction 
of transaction costs will mean that investors will want to change holdings in 
the durable good rarely so that Ift will describe a jump and depreciation (no 
diffusion) process. Changes in investor wealth otherwise take place through 
holdings in marketable assets (which are assumed to follow Ito processes) 
and the riskless asset. In this case, it can be shown that the CCAPM will 
not hold but that the CAPM will. Intuitively this is reasonable. The con- 
sumption good follows a jump and deterministic depreciation process, asset 
returns follow a diffusion process. As pointed out by Back (1991) (p. 378), 
the covariance between a diffusion and a jump process is necessarily zero. 
Therefore all assets have zero consumption beta and the CCAPNI cannot 
hold. The CAPM will, though, hold. Investors are trying to minimise the 
time r, subject to their willingness to bear risk, before it is rational, under 
transaction costs, to sell their existing durable good and trade up. Therefore, 
over a short investment horizon (t, t+ 1), investors will, subject to risk aver- 
sion, be trying to maximise financial wealth at t+1. That is, at time t they 
will be behaving in financial markets as if they were maximising v(lVt+, ) for 
some utility function v(-) and level of financial wealth W. Using the "local 
linearity" condition of Grossman and Shiller (1982) and assuming that the 
interval (t, t+ 1) is sufficiently short, if asset returns are Ito then utility of 
financial wealth will behave as though it were quadratic whatever its "real" 
form. It is well known that quadratic utility implies the CAPM. Therefore, 
the CAPM follows as a consequence of investors behaving as though they 
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were maximising their utilities of financial wealth at the next instant and 
through the local linearity condition that follows from the diffusion of asset 
returns. 
So, as can be seen, there are a number of theoretical developments to 
the CCAPAI since Breeden (1979) that are relevant to this dissertation. In 
general, the CCAPM holds if either consumption patterns or asset returns 
are diffusion process but does not hold if there are jump elements. The 
exception is when the consumption good is traded with transaction costs 
when the CCAPNI will not hold. 
6.4 CAPM versus CCAPM 
This subsection aims to compare the theoretical basis of the CCAPM with 
that of the traditional Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. From the approach taken in 
this chapter, we know that there is an abstract link between the two from 
the fundamental theorem of asset prices. The links are much closer than 
this, though. First, notice that the discrete time (one period) version of the 
CCAPM was derived under (i) quadratic utility and complete markets and 
(ii) bivariately normal asset returns/consumption and complete markets. It 
is very well known, though, that in a one period complete market model, 
either quadratic utility or normal asset returns is sufficient to generate the 
vari ance- aversion that leads to the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. In other words, as 
emphasised by Duffie and Zame (1989), "There's only one CAPM" (heading 
to their section 2). This is because aggregate consumption comes from the 
returns of marketable assets as all assets are marketable. In continuous time 
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the two become distinguishable. This is because, with state independent 
utility, the ICAPNI and the CCAPNI are equivalent. The ICAPM reduces 
to the CAPNI only under the additional assumption that there are no state 
variables. There is, therefore, a very close link between consumption based 
and market portfolio based capital asset pricing models. 
It is also possible to show that, under certain types of recursive utility 
functions, an asset's covariance with both market returns and changes in 
consumption will influence its market price. The debate here is based on 
that given in Epstein and Zin (1991). Take, for example, the recursive (or 
Kreps and Porteus (1978)) utility function with the form: 
Ut = lv(ct, P[Üt+IIItl) IV(C, Z) = [(l - ß)CP + ozpll/p 
lt[i] = [Eýo']'la 
where It represents the information available to the agent at time t and 
the notation is otherwise consistent with that used elsewhere in this section. 
This utility function degenerates to the simple time-separable isoelastic util- 
ity function in the case when a=p. If a :Ap then 1-a can be interpreted 
as a coefficient of relative risk aversion and 1/(1 - p) is the elasticity of in- 
tertemporal substitution. More generally, this utility function has important 
characteristics that cannot be captured by time-separable utility3'. Epstein 
and Zin (1991) show that, under this utility function, the Euler equation 
becomes: 
"This topic is too complex to discuss here so the reader is referred to Epstein (1992) 






for all i, where 0 := alp. Dropping tildes and using upper case letters 
to denote logarithms (so, for example, Ct+j := ln(Zt+, )), the previous offset 
equation can be rearranged to give: 
Et[Exp(A + Rit)] = Et[Exp(A + Rit)] 
for any assets i, j and where A: =0 (p - 1) Alnct + (o - 1) R,, t. Next make 
the assumptions that Rit, Rit, R,,, t and Alnct are normally distributed. These 
conditions are, of course, not consistent. If rit is lognormally distributed for 
all i, then r,,, t, which is a linear combination of the individual rits will not 
be lognormally distributed. This point is overlooked in the remainder of the 
analysis. So, if A+ Rit is normally distributed, the expectation of the left and 
right hand sides of the previous offset equation can be calculated. Rearrange 
to get: 




+ (1 - 0)Cov(Rjt - Rit, R t) 
-O(p - 1)Cov(Rjt - Rt, Alnct) 
Therefore asset returns have both a CAPM and CCAPM element. In the 
case of isoelastic utility where a=p, 1- ?P=0 and 1-p=1-a= -y this 
simplifies to give: 




+ -yCov(Rit - Rit, Alnct) (26) 
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This, then, is a version of the CCAPM under the assumption of joint 
lognormality of consumption and asset returns and isoelastic utility. This 
equation has been used by a number of authors in the empirical tests of the 
CCAPNI. 
7 Developing the Mehra & Prescott puzzles 
This chapter is concluded by developing the theory of consumption based 
asset pricing described above into formal expressions for the equity premium 
and the real riskfree rate. These provide the basis for the Mehra Sz Prescott 
puzzles that are described in detail in the next chapter. The key assumptions 
that underlie all the models in this section are: 
9 All investors have time-separable power / logarithmic utility with the 
parameters of time preference and relative risk aversion constant across 
investors. That is, the preferences of any individual are described in 
section 4. There are homogeneous expectations. 
* Markets are complete. In this case, equilibrium prices are the same 
as if there were a representative agent whose preferences could also be 
described by section 4 (see sections 5.1 and 5.2). 
e There are no frictions or taxes so that the Euler equation of section 5.3 
and the dynamic programming theory of section 6 can be invoked. 
* Aggregate consumption is smooth. 
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The exact distribution assumed for aggregate consumption will vary be- 
tween models, but smoothness is required throughout. Some models require 
that the return to the market is also smooth. Theoretical explanations of 
the Mehra & Prescott puzzles concentrate on relaxing one of these four as- 
sumptions. This thesis concentrates on the second assumption - complete 
markets. 
7.1 A one-period economy 
Non-parametric 
We know, from equation 14, that if consumption is smooth, then the pricing 
kernel 7r = P(ci, 1)IU'(co, 0) ; ze P(l - -yAlnc). Using equations 4 and 6 for 
the equity premium and real riskfree rate, it is clear that: 
-yCov(r,,,, Alnc) E[r,,, - rf] =1- -yE[Alnc] 
(27) 
rf =1 (28) PE(l - -yAlnc) 
It is worth noting that, if E[Alnc] is small, then this expression for the 
equity premium is the same as the CCAPM version of the equity premium 
given in equations 12,24 and 25. 
7.1.2 A parametric approach 
It is also possible to develop the equity premium puzzle within a single 
time period using a parametric approach (see Campbell, Lo and MacKin- 
lay (Forthcoming) and Weil (1994)). Define vi := #(I + ri)(cl/co)-t. Then 
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ln(vi) = In(#) + In(l + ri) - yAlnc. Use Ri := In(l + ri). Now, if re- 
turns and consumption are lognormally distributed, then In(vi) is normally 
distributed with mean In(P) + E[Ril - -IE[Alnc] and variance Var(]ý-) + 
72Var(Alnc) - 2-yCov(Ri, Alnc). So, E[vi] = In(#) + E[Ril - -yE[Alnc] + 
O. War(]ý-) + 0.5-y 2Var(Alnc) - -yCov(lý-, AInc). However, from the Euler 
equation, we know that E[vi] = 0. So: 
E[R, l + O. War(lý-) = -ln(, 8) + -I(E[Alnc] + Cov[Ri, Alnc]) - 0.5-t'Var(Alnc) 
(29) 
Substitute in for the riskless asset and the market portfolio to obtain: 
Rf = -In(p) + -yE[Alnc] - 0.5-y2Var(Alnc) (30) 
E[R,,, -Rf] = -yCov(R,,,, Alnc)-0.5Var(R ) (31) 
Notice that equation 31 could also have been derived from equation 26. 
7.2 A Merton (1971) style analysis 
Consider an infinitely lived economy in the style of that described in sec- 
tion 6 and assume that there are no state variables. As there exists a rep- 
resentative agent with isoelastic utility, the investor is trying to optimise 
her investment and consumption plan with respect to the objective function 
Eo[ ' P'c(t)(1-'Y)1(1 - -y)dt] subject to the usual budget constraints given fo, 
by equation 15. Let the riskless asset have fixed return rf and denote the 
dynamics of the price of the risky asset p,,,, by dpm = pmpdt + pmadz for an 
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ordinary Weiner process dz. The key result is given in equation 4.42 of the 
reprint of Merton (1971) in Alerton (1992). It can be shown in this case that 
the optimal consumption path at any time t is some constant tc times the 




Notice that because ct = rlVt then dctlc = dWtIIV. From the budget 
condition (equation 15) we have an expression for dIV, and hence for dc. As 
before, w denotes the optimal proportion of wealth in the risky asset: 
AV = (w(ji - rf) + rf)lVdt + wIVadz - cdt 
dc1c = (w(p - rf) + rf - r,. )dt + wadz 
The final step is to identify w. As there are no state variables, it is clear 
from equation 17 that w= (p - rf ) /0,2, /. Substituting in, we derive an expres- 
sion for the relative change in optimal consumption given by Constantinides 
(1990) equations 11,17 and 18 and Ahn 
(1990)39 equation 11: 
dc rf + In(#) + rf)'(1 
+ -y) dt +p- rf dz 
c7 2-y2o, 2 
-1 
-ya 
From this, the predicted equity premium and riskfree rate can be cal- 
culated for given mean and standard deviation of changes in consumption. 
Using Alnc to approximate for dc1c: 
39There is a slight typographical error in Ahn's equation, which is corrected for here. 
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rf = -In(#) + -yE[Alnc] - 0.5-1(-f + 1)Var(Alnc) 
E[p-rf] = -jStd(AInc)a 
7.3 Markov growth model 
Consider the standard infinitely lived economy with a representative agent 
who has power utility. There is one riskless asset in zero net supply and 
one risky asset. Let income (output) and consumption be constrained to 
equal the dividends from the risky asset. Denote the value of this variable 
at time t by ct. Consumption growth xt := ctlct-I is allowed to take any 
one of s values, JA1, ---, A, } - xt is the state variable. Note that these 
growth rates do not depend on t. Consider the transition probability matrix 
Oij := Prob(xt+l = Aijxt Aj) (again t independent) which describes the 
evolution in consumption dividends over time. If consumption at timer 
is c, and x, = Aj, (that is, the economy is in state i) then what is the price 
p. (c, i) of the risky asset? Use Ej [-] to denote expectations conditional on 
the state at r being i: 
00 -, 
pm (c Ei t t) Ictl cIr 
Ei ßtC7T(ct)l-" 
00 
= cEi Z ßt(x+, ... xt)l--y 
It=T+l 1 
= kic, 
where ki is a constant that depends only on the state at time r. Return 




(C', E floij [pm (c, +i I j) + Aj Cl j=l 
( 
C, 
k-i ar = :L 00ij[kj, \jc, + 
j=l 
ki =t poij(k-j + 
j=l 
Given this, it is now clear that r .. ii, the return to the risky asset between 
states (growth rates) i and j is given by: 
rmii = 
Aj (k-j + 1) 
ki 
Returning to the one period Euler equation, it is clear that the price of 
the riskless asset pp given that the current state (growth rate) is i is given 
by 
Pfi 
7.4 Comparing the models 
We have derived four expressions for the equity premium and the riskfree rate 
that are strongly based on the consumption based asset pricing literature 
developed earlier in the chapter. The Markov growth model is not easy 
to present in an easily interpretable form. This section is concluded by 
presenting the analytical form for the equity premium (EP) and real riskfree 
rate (RRFR) using non parametric single period, parametric single period 
and continuous-time respectively. Bear in mind that these three forms are 
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not directly comparable: 
-yCov(r,,,, Alnc) 
EP =1- -yE[Alnc] -ICov(R,,,, AInc) - 0.5Var(R,,, ) 
-jStd(AInc)a (32) 1 
__ 1 
RRFR = 
#E(l - -yAlnc) 
-In(#) + -yE[Alnc] - 0.5-I'Var(Alnc) 
-In(#) + -yE[Alnc] - 0.5, y(-y + 1)Var(Alnc) 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the main theoretical literature that has developed 
consumption based asset pricing theory. This is the foundation for the work 
that follows in subsequent chapters. It was shown that, provided that payouts 
to assets do not have infinite variance, the absence of arbitrage opportunities 
alone is sufficient to guarantee the existence of a (finite variance) pricing 
kernel. This pricing kernel will only be uniquely defined if the market is 
complete. Work on the theory of asset pricing can be viewed as attempts 
to accurately identify the functional form of this linear pricing rule.. Within 
a consumption based paradigm, it was shown that the pricing kernel can 
be formulated as the ratio of marginal utilities of individual consumption. 
With complete markets, aggregation results can be invoked that allow asset 
prices to be modelled within a representative agent paradigm. However, if 
markets are incomplete, aggregate consumption cannot necessarily replace 
individual consumption in the models. This issue lies at the very heart of 
this thesis. As the empirical evidence shows that individual consumption 
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is more volatile than aggregate consumption, the testable implications of 
complete and incomplete market models are different. 
This chapter also reviews the robustness of the CCAPM to different the- 
oretical developments. Essentially, if a representative agent exists and ag- 
gregate consumption is sufficiently smooth then the CCAPM follows. The 
model will not follow if aggregate (individual) consumption and dividends 
have jump components in a complete (incomplete) market setting. Explicit 
forms for the equity premium and real riskfree, rate are given for economies 
that are "consistent" with the CCAPM (that is, complete market, smooth 
aggregate consumption economies). Chapter 3 examines the ability of these 
models to explain the observed first moments of asset returns in the US over 
the past century. It is will be concluded that the data is at odds with the the- 
ory reviewed so far. Attempts to reconcile the theory and data are discussed 
in detail in the next chapter. 
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9 Appendix 
9.1 Probability space 
The mathematics of the probability space P), with a filtration process 
1, Ft} is widely reported in the mathematics and finance literature and there- 
fore only a brief description is given here. First, the intuitive understanding 
is: 
"Tyche, Goddess of Chance, chooses a point w of R 'at random' accord- 
ing to the law P in that, for B in Y, P(B) represents the 'protatility' 
(in the sense understood ty our intuition) that the point w chosen I: y 
Tyche Ielongs to B" 
WiMams (1991) p. 23 
Because straight mathematical descriptions are so common, the formal 
mathematics here is presented in relation to an example and trying to use 
the minimum amount of mathematical terminology. Consider a two period 
world. At time 1, a die is tossed. At time 2, the die is tossed again. Q is 
the set of possible states of the world at t=2. In this example there are 
36 such states (6 possible outcomes for the first coin toss x6 for the second 
coin toss). The elements of Q are denoted by lw} which here are given by 
{(l, 1), (1,2),..., (6,6)}, where the first number refers to the outcome of the 
first toss, the second to the second toss. Now consider any event (subset) B of 
Q that might be of interest. Such an event might be "The sum of the two rolls 
is more than 10". Individuals assign P(B) at t=0 to the probability that 
the state of nature WEQ at t=2 is such that event B has occurred. That 
is P maps B onto [0,1]. For this example B= 1(6,5), (5,6), (6,6)} c Q. If 
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investors believe that the die is "fair" (that is, each face has a 1/6 probability 
of showing on each toss), then P(B) = 3/36. 
Consider the collection of all events to which individuals can assign a 
probability. This is F. Certain requirements are made of F: 
e If an individual can assign a probability to something happening, then 
the individual can also assign a probability to it not happening. That 
is, if BEF then Q\B =- jw EQ: uý 0 B} E -'*. 
9 If an individual can assign a probability to two events, then the individ- 
ual can also assign a probability to them both happening and to either 
happening. So, if B1, B2E. F then B, nB 2E. F and B, U B2E F. 
9 Individuals assign a probability 0 to nothing happening and 1 to some- 
thing happening: 0, QEF and P(O) = 0, P(Q) =1 
* Probabilities are additive for mutually exclusive events. So, if B1, B2 E 
Jr and B, n B2 --= 
0 then P(Bi U B2)= P(B, )-+ P(B2)- 
The probability space is defined. The filtration f. Ftj refers to 
the set of information available at time t. "For example, if some subset A of 
Q is an element of ... Ft, then at time t, intuitively speaking, one "knows" 
whether the "correct state of the world" is an element of A, that is, whether 
A is "true" or "false"" (Duffle (1988) p. 131). As it is assumed that no 
knowledge is ever forgotten once learned, F, g Ft for all t>s. For our 
coin tossing example F0 has only two elements: 0 is false and Q is true so 
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'r- Jo Q}. At time t=1, if a number 2 comes up on the first throw, then 
f(2,1),..., (2,6)} is true while is false. 
These subsets can be "added" to F0 to give F1. At time 2, all uncertainty 
is resolved so F2 = 17. Within a T-period model, it is standard to assume 
that Fo = 10,111, FT = 17. 
We define a random variable (function) p that is ". F measurable". If 
maps Q --+ R, then for any set ZER the set p-I(Z) ý- (w EQ: P(LO) E 
E F. "Intuitively, P is a random variable if, for any possible outcome, 
we will know whether p has this outcome from knowing the outcome (true 
or false) of the events in F' (Duffle (1992a) p. 223). A process p= fpt) is 
adapted to frt} if, for each t, pt is Ft measurable. If we take p to be the 
price processes of securities then "the assumption that pt is adapted to t} f -F 
simply means that among the information available at time t are the prices 
then prevailing for all traded securities" (Harrison and Kreps (1979) p. 388). 
Finally, we define a martingale and an equivalent martingale measure. A 
process p is a martingale (relative to I. Ft}, P) if pt is adapted to 1, Ft}, has 
finite expectation at all points and E[ptl, 'rt-11 = pt-1. An equivalent martin- 
gale measure to is a probability measure Q on (11,, F) where": 
1. VB E F, P (B) =0 (B) =0 Q 2(, p) 2. Wp- EL 
I The price processes are martingale with respect to Q over I. Ft} 
40L2(P) means "is square integrable7 and is formally defined in the body of the chapter. 
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9.2 Vector spaces - Definitions 
Definition 1A vector space X is a set of elements called vectors together 
with two operations. The first operation is addition which associates with any 
two vectors x, y EXa vector x+yEX. The second operation is a scalar 
multiplication which associates with any vector xEX and any scalar aa 
vector ax. The following axioms are assumed to hold for all scalars a, P and 
X, y E X: 
x+y y+x 
(x + Y) +z x+ (y + Z) 
30 EX such that x+0=x 
CO + Y) ax + ay 




Deflnition 2A nonempty subset M of a vector space X is called a subspace 
of X if Vx, yE Al and scalars a, P, the vector ax + fly E 
Definition 3 We say that a vector space X is the direct sum of two sub- 
spaces Al, N if every vector xEX has a unique representation of the form 
x=n+mfornEN, ME. Al- We describe this by the notation X =. AIEDN 
(where E) differs from + in that it implies uniqueness). 
Definition 4A transformation from a vector space X into the space of real 
(or complex) scalars is said to be a functional on X. A functional f (-) is 
said to be linear if, Vx, yEX and scalars a, fl, f (ax + py) = af (x) + Of (y) - 
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Definition 5A normed linear vector space is a vector space X on which 
there is defined a real-valued function which maps each element xEX into 
a real number lIxII called the norm of x. The norm satisfies the following 
axtoms: 
I. 11XII 't-> 0 Vx E X-11XII =0 4=* x=0 
2. lix + yll < llxll + Ilyll Vx, y EX 
3. IlaxIl = lal. llxll 
Definition 6A functional is continuous at xo in vector space X if for every 
c>0 there is a6>0 such that JIx-xojI <6 implies that If (x)-f(xo) I<c. 
If f is continuous at every point xo EX then f is continuous. 
Definition 7A point xEX is said to be a closure point of a set P if, given 
e 0, there is a point pEP satisfying jjx - p1l < c. The collection of all 
closure points of P is called the closure of P and is denoted by P. If P=P 
then the set P is closed. 
Definition 8A sequence Ix, } in a normed space is said to be a Cauchy 
sequence if Jjx,, - x,,, Il --+ 0 as n, m --+ oo; ie, given e>0, there exists an 
integer N such that llx,, - x,,, 11 <c Vn, m>N. 
Definition 9A normed linear vector space X is complete if every Cauchy 
sequence from X has a limit in X. A complete normed linear vector space is 
called a Banach Space. 
Definition 10 A Hilbert space is a Banach space X together with an inner 
product defined on XxX. Corresponding to each pair of vectors x, yEX, 
the inner product (x1y) of x and y is a scalar. The inner product satisfies 
the following axioms: 
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1. MY) = (YIx) 2. (x + y1z) = (xlz) + (ylz) 
3. (axly) = a(x1y) 
4. (XIX) = IIXI12 
where the bar on the right hand side of axiom 1 denotes complex conjugation. 
Deflnition 11 Two vectors x, y EX are said to be orthogonal if (x1y) = 0. 
Definition 12 Given a subset S of a Hilbert space, the set of all vectors 
orthogonal to S is called the orthogonal complement of S and is denoted by 
ST. 
9.3 Riesz Representation Theorem 
Before proceeding to the main result, it is necessary to establish a preliminary 
projection theorem. The proof of this result is laborious but trivial, so the 
reader is referred to pp. 50-51 of Luenberger (1969) for the formal proof. 
Intuitively, the result is clear, as its name would imply. If you are trying 
to get to a point xEX from a plane Al in the shortest distance, then you 
project from the point x onto Al orthogonally. This projection is unique. 
Result 5 The Classic Projection Theorem. Let H be a Hilbert space 
and Al a closed subspace of H. Corresponding to any vector xEH, there 
exists mo E Al such that lix - moll :5 llx - mll VM E Al. Furthermore, a 
necessary and unique condition that mo E Al be the unique minimising vector 
is that x- mo be orthogonal to Al. 
Notice that the classic projection theorem is equivalent to saying that 
H= Al ED AIT for any closed subspace, M of H. The main result that is 
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required for the formal proof of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing is 
now presented: 
Result 6 (Riesz-Frechet). If f is a continuous linear functional on a Hilbert 
space II then there exists a unique yE II such that Vx E II, f(x) = (xlY). 
Proof. Define N as the subset of H for which, f (n) =0 4=ý* nEN. That 
N is a (closed) subspace of H is assured through the continuity and linearity 
of f. If N=H, then the theorem holds with y=0. If N0H then, from 
the classic projection theorem, H=N ED NT for non-empty NT. LetzEN T 
and scale z so that f (z) = 1. Now, consider x-f (x)z. This vector must be 
in N as f (x -f (x)z) f (x) -f (x)f (z) =f (x)(1 -f (z)) =0 through the 
assumption that f (z) 1. Since zE NT and X-f (Z)X E N, this implies that 
(x -f (x)zlz) = 0. So (xlz) =f (x)(zlz). So, f (x) = (xlz)l(zlz). Defining 
y := zl(zlz), it is clear that f(x) = (x1y) and so ay exists as required. We 
now need to prove uniqueness. Suppose there were Y, Y' EH with y y' 
such that (xly) = (xly') =f (x) Vx. Then, (xly - y') =0 Vx y y'. 
So, the uniqueness has also established. 
9.4 Applications of the fundamental theorem 
This thesis concentrates on the Euler equation representation of the pricing 
kernel. That is, the pricing kernel is identified throughout this thesis with the 
ratio of marginal utilities of consumption. This formulation of the fundamen- 
tal theorem leads, with a few additional assumptions outlined in the bodY of 
the chapter, to the CCAPNI. This appendix aims to show the strength and 
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flexibility of the fundamental theorem by considering alternate forms for the 
pricing kernel that will give other well known asset pricing models. 
9.4.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
This discussion is based on that given in Duffle (1988). Consider the subspace 
of tradable assets Al. Assuming that the number of traded assets is finite, Al 
is closed (p. 93 of Duffle (1988)) and any closed subspace of a Hilbert space is 
a Hilbert space under the same inner product (p. 132 Bollobis (1990)). The 
Rietz Representation Theorem can now be applied to Al so that the price 
p(x) of any traded payoff xE AI is given by p(x) = Ep[xr] for 7r E Al. In 
other words, 7r is a traded asset, sometimes called the "pricing asset". 
Suppose that a riskless asset exists. Given that this asset pays 1 in all 
states, it will be denoted by ln. Consider the equilibrium choice x' of an 
agent k. Given the existence of 10, r, we can consider the OLS regression of 
xk onto the space spanned by ln, r: 
k=Ak +B k7r + Ck 
where f- k has zero expectations and zero covariance with either In or 7r. 
Now, the price of k's portfolio is p(xk) =E 
[Xk 
r] = E[(Ak+ B 
kr + ek)7r] = 
E[(Ak+B k7r) r] as E [f 
k] 
= CoV[7rj f k] = 0. In other words, for the same initial 
cost, the investor could have bought instead the portfolio yk =Ak+ B'7r, 
which is an achievable portfolio as both the riskless asset and 7r can be 
traded. If our investor is vari ance- averse, then yk >_ Xk (where >- means "is 
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strictly preferred to") except in the trivial case when Var(e) = 0. Therefore, 
in a mean-variance world, all investors will hold an equilibrium portfolio of 
the form xk=Ak+ Bkr. Summing Xk, S over k it is clear that we end up 
with a total payout from all portfolios (that is, the market payout, M) of 
M= a+ br. Assuming that this payout from the "market portfolio" has non- 
zero variance so that b>0, it is clear that 7r = (Al - a)/b. By substituting 
this in to equation 5 with asset j as the market index, the CAPNI follows 
direct. 
9.4.2 Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
This section is based on the discussion in Ferson (1995). Take the standard 
APT assumption that asset returns evolve according to: 
rit = Et-I [rit] 
K 
E biktFkt + Uit 
k=l 
vi 
where Fkt are the K economic factors (with zero expectation) that af- 
fect asset values systematically at time t, bikt is the sensitivity of rit to 
economic factor Fkt and uit is the (zero expectation, zero correlation with 
the specific factors) idiosyncratic effect at time t. From this assumption 
about the process generating asset returns it is clear that Cov(rit, -rt) = 
EkbiktCOV(Fkt? 
-7rt) + COV(Uit7 -7rt). Substituting into equation 4: 
K, 







Now, it is assumed that the residual error terms are diversifiable in a 
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large economy and so Cov(uit, -7rt) =0 V01. The APT now follows 
direct 
by defining the risk premiumAk := Cov(Fkt, -rt)/E[rt]. That is, we need to 
identify the pricing kernel in order to determine the risk premium associated 
with each of the economic factors. 
9.4.3 Binomial Options Pricing 
Consider the paper in options pricing theory written by Cox, Ross and Rubin- 
stein (1979). This paper confirmed the Black-Scholes options pricing formula 
by taking the limiting case of a discrete time binomial share price process. 
While this model is based on pure no-arbitrage (with no additional assump- 
tions about preferences) and hence is fundamentally "different" from other 
models in this thesis (apart from the APT that has just been reviewed), the 
power of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing is that it can be used to 
price contingent claims as well as fundamental securities. 
Consider a share, current price S, that has one period to go to expiry. At 
the end of this time period, the share can have one of two values S1 = (1+u)S 
with probability p and S, = (1 + d)S with probability 1-p. Suppose that 
there is also a riskless bond that will pay (1 + r) at time 1 with certainty. Let 
there be a contingent claim on the risky asset that pays C. if Si = (1 + u)S 
41This is loosely worded in order to enable us to get to an exact pricing relationship. The 
APT is, in fact, an approximate pricing relationship as the covariance between the error 
terms and pricing kernel will not, in general, disappear entirely. Much of the theoretical 
work that has been done on the arbitrage pricing theory has concentrated on working out 
economies in which the relationship is exact and on calculating bounds on the imprecision 
in other economies. Some of this work is directly based on the Hilbert space type anal- 
ysis that has been outlined here. See, for example, Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983), 
Chamberlain (1983) for this type of approach to the APT. 
108 
and Cd if S, = (1 + d) S. NVe will assume throughout that there are no interim 
dividend payments or any incentive to exercise early 42 . 
This market is complete. There are two possible states of the world and 
two linearly independent assets. From section 3.2 it is known that the j" 
elements of the pricing kernel 7r is given in such a world by the price of the 
jth pure security. Denote the prices of the pure securities for states u and 
d by =,, and Wd respectively. Then by buying (1 + u)S units of the pure 
security for state u and (1 + d)S units of the pure security for state d then 
the cash flow for the share has been replicated. Similarly, if we buy (1 + r) 
units of both pure securities, the cash flow for the bond has been replicated. 
Given the absence of arbitrage: 
(1 + u)Sw. + (1 + 
d)S=d 
(1 + r)(=,, + Wd) 
It is now clear that the absence of arbitrage implies that w. = ql(l + 
r), Wd = (1 - qffll + r), where q := (r - d)/(u - d). Therefore 7rT = 
[ql(l + r), (I - q)l(l + r)] (taking the upstate as state 1 without loss of 
generality). Given that p= E[d7r] for all assets, the price of the contingent 
claim is uniquely defined by arbitrage by: 
qC,, + (1 - q)Cd 
(1 + r) 
Notice here that q has an obvious interpretation as a probability measure 
"One of the strengths of this technique is that it enables any contingent claim to be 
priced. For the purposes of this exposition, however, examining these situations is not 
relevant and therefore excluded for simplification. 
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(it is easily checked that qE [0,11) and is, indeed, a well defined ENINI). 
Turn now to aT period economy. Assume that the interval [0, Tj can be 
divided into n subperiods. During each time period, the share can either have 
a return of 1 +u with probability q or 1 +d with probability 1 -q. Therefore if 
our n time periods have j up movements and (n -j) down movements in share 
price, the price of the share will be (1+u)j(l+d), -jS at time T whatever the 
sequence of up and down movements. We can therefore denote the contingent 
claim payout at this time by Cuid-J. The risk neutral probability of being 
in state ujd7'-j after n time periods is n! qj(l - q) n-j/(, - j)! j!. This risk 








(n - j) Ij I 
c? 
Specify the contingent claim so that C,, jdl--i = max[O, (1+u)j (I +d) n-J 
S- 
K] -a vanilla European call option. There must be an aE (0, n] such that 
(1 + U)a-I(j + d)n-a+IS <K and (1 + u)"(1 + d)n-aS > K. So: 
c=ý1-_ )n-i -jS - K] _, nCj 
[(l + u)j(l + d)n + r)n 
ýý 
J=a 
= so -I.., 
i+uqK [a; n, q] 
1+r (i + r)n 
where fl-] is the binomial distribution function and notice that q(1 + u) + 
(1 - q)(1 + d) = (1 + r) as required to make the first fl-I term well defined. 
This is already similar in shape to the now famous option pricing formula of 
Black and Scholes and getting the final result is just a simple application of 
the Central Limit Theorem (see Feller (1968), for example). 
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9.5 Dynamic programming 
In this section, dynamic programming is performed to find the weightings 
Wk in the investor's optimal portfolio. To simplify the notation, we drop the 
superscripts for the appendix: 
T 
J (I V, S, t) = max Et U(c, r)dr + B[TV(T), T11 (C, W) 
it 
t+h TI 
= max Et 
f 




= max Et 
[f U(c, r)dr + J(TV, s, t+ h) (c, w) t (33) 
Where there is a boundary condition that J(TV, s, T) = B[IV(T), TI. Now, 
let h --+ 0 and, by the mean-value theorem ft t+h U(c, r)dr ; z: ý U(c, t)h. We 
will now take a Taylor's series expansion of J(IV, s, t+ h) around t. 
J(IV, S, t+ h) P-ý J(IV, s, t) + dlVJv + dsiJ. i + Wt +1 d'IVJtvlv 2 
+I dsidsjJ. i.,, +1h 
2j 
tt + dlVhJvt 22 
+ dsihJ,, t + dlVdsij. j 1v 
(34) 




wi(ai - r)lVh + (rlV - c)h 
nn 










Substituting back into equation 34, and then in turn, substituting from 
equation 34 to 33, subtracting J(TV, s, t) from both sides and dividing through- 
out by h: 
n 
0= max 
ýu tcl tj + jt + (wi (ai - r) TV + (rTV - c)) Jiv+ (C, W) 
MnnMM 
fjsi +1EEW, WIV2jVIV +1EE vijgigji. is., 22 
mn 
+ 1: E iiijgiajwjlvj,. Ivl 
i=l j=l 
Taking the partial differentials gives the two first order conditions. The 
first of these is called the "envelope condition" and states that the marginal 
utility from consuming a pound in equilibrium is the same as the marginal 
utility from investing the pound. This is very similar to the intuition under- 
pinning the Euler equation. 
UC(Clt) = JIV(IVIS, t) nm 
0= Jiv(ai-r)+Jlv, vEwjlVaij+I: J. jivgjai? lji 
Vi 
j=l j=l 
At this point, it is convenient to drop into matrix notation. Let V,,,, = 
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[aij], Vag = [oigjqijl, J,, w = [J. ilv], a= [ail. The second first order condi- 
tion can be restated as: 
0= (a - rl)Jlv + V.. wIVJmv + VasJsw 
IVW = 
JIV 
V-1 (a - rl) - V-lV 
Jsw 
T, IV -Iv 
aa aa as j IVIV 
To return to body of the text, the k superscripts can be added to this 
equation as no assumptions of homogeneity have been invoked. 
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Part III 
The Mehra & Prescott puzzles 
114 
The Mehra and Prescott puzzleS43 
Abstract 
In a seminal 1985 paper Rajnish Mehra, and Edward Prescott demon- 
strated that the observed equity premium is higher than a standard 
representative agent model can explain while the average real return 
to riskfree assets is too low. This chapter examines the theory behind 
these puzzles and the literature that has attempted to explain them 
away. Possible theoretical solutions include time non-separable util- 
ity and incomplete markets. Persistence of idiosyncratic risk is shown 
to be the crucial factor determining the success of the latter class of 
model to resolve Mehra & Prescott's puzzles. The ability of poten- 
tial explanations to fit the Hansen-Jagannathan bound and explain 
the second moments of asset returns is also discussed. The final sec- 
tion considers other empirical tests of consumption based asset pricing 
models. It is concluded that the Mehra & Prescott puzzles have been 
largely resilient to proposed theoretical explanations. 
43 A version of this chapter was presented as part of the Financial Options Research 
Centre Seminar Series, University of Warwick, February 1997.1 am grateful to the par- 
ticipants for their useful comments. 
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10 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the puzzles of Mehra & Prescott. The structure of the 
chapter is as follows: 
Section 11 develops the Mehra & Prescott puzzles. In subsection 11.1 
evidence is given on the long term average equity premium and real 
riskfree rate for the US and the UK. This will justify the use of 6.18% 
and 0.8% respectively for the observed excess rate of return to the 
market and real riskfree rate in the US to be explained by consump- 
tion based asset pricing models. The Mehra & Prescott puzzles are 
then explained intuitively using graphical evidence. Subsection 11.2 
uses the strong theoretical foundations provided in the previous chap- 
ter to formally develop the Mehra & Prescott puzzles. Using all four 
expressions for the equity premium and real riskfree rate given in sec- 
tion 7 it is shown that 6.18% is "too high" for the equity premium and 
0.8% "too low" for the real riskfree rate. 
Section 12 considers explanations of the puzzles that do not depend 
on market incompleteness. In subsection 12.1 we consider data issues. 
That is, does the observed average excess rate of return to the market 
over the last century provide an unbiased estimate of the ex-ante equity 
premium to which asset pricing theory refers. It is emphasised how 
lo, %v the precision is of estimates of the averaged excess return to the 
market. Further, using US / UK data may introduce biases. Subsection 
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12.2 considers the form of investors' utility functions. In particular, 
this section allows for time non-separability in the form of investor 
preferences. While models allowing for habit persistence and recursive 
utility functions do fit observed financial market behaviour better than 
time separable utility functions, problems still remain. 
* Section 13 considers the most relevant literature to the issues addressed 
later in this thesis. Incomplete market explanations of the Mehra & 
Prescott are considered in this section. The section starts with some 
preliminary issues. In 13.2, the precautionary savings motive is con- 
sidered. This shows that the equilibrium rate of return to the riskfree 
asset will be lower in a world with incomplete insurance than a repre- 
sentative agent model if the third derivative of investor preferences is 
positive. The economics literature on both the theory and empirical 
support for precautionary savings is briefly reviewed. Subsection 13.3 
considers equilibrium asset prices where there is a risky as well as a 
riskless asset in the economy. We start with a one period model in the 
spirit of Alankiw (1986). This model is developed in chapters 5&6 and 
so is of particular relevance to this thesis. In this model income risk is 
highest when dividend payments are lowest44. It is shown in this case 
that the equity premium and real riskfree rate can be very close to the 
observed values. We then consider the multiperiod models of Heaton & 
Lucas. Essentially these models show that persistence of idiosyncratic 
"This should be compared with the model presented in chapter 4 where income and 
dividend risks are independent. 
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income shocks plays a central role in determining predicted equilibrium 
asset returns. If income shocks are short lived then asset markets can 
help smooth consumption across investors unless there are severe mar- 
ket frictions. The data they analyse suggests that incomplete market 
models are unlikely to explain the Mehra & Prescott puzzles. Because 
the persistence of risk is so important in this type of model, the section 
is concluded by looking at the savings / consumption decisions of the 
unemployed and the persistence of unemployment risk. 
* Section 14 briefly considers two problems that are closely related to 
the puzzles of Mehra & Prescott. First, the variance bound of Hansen- 
Jagannathan is examined. Second we consider the ability of the various 
models to explain the second moments of asset returns. Unsurprisingly, 
given that incomplete market / time non-separable utility models have 
not been able to fully explain the first moment of asset returns, they 
also cannot fully explain the second moments. It is the low volatility 
of the riskfree rate combined with the high volatility of equity returns 
that is at the heart of the problem. 
e The chapter is concluded by a very brief examination of other empirical 
tests of consumption based asset pricing models. There are two reasons 
for presenting this evidence. First, we will use -y = 3, fl E [0.97,1] as 
the "most likely" estimates of the parameters that should be used in 
a power utility function throughout this chapter. It is not until this 
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section that this assumption is justified. Second, it should be realised 
that the Mehra &,. Prescott puzzles are by no means the only empiri- 
cal anomalies that result from the representative agent Euler equation 
/ CCAPNI paradigm. This section shows that the low covariance be- 
tween asset returns and any risky asset results in other well documented 
discrepancies between the theory and observed asset returns. 
Published reviews of the Mehra & Prescott puzzles have started to appear 
recently. See, for example, Heaton and Lucas (1995) (with comment by Zin 
(1995)), Kocherlakota (1996) and Siegel and Thaler (1997). Existing reviews 
tend to concentrate on a small part of the problem. For example, Kocher- 
lakota (1996) focuses on the material covered in section 12 of this chapter. 
Heaton and Lucas (1995) concentrate on the incomplete market explanations 
which they have been so instrumental in developing. As emphasised in the 
previous chapter, the discussion given in this thesis combines the theoret- 
ical developments of the Mehra & Prescott puzzles given in a number of 
different sources. The contribution of this chapter is that a wide varietY of 
potential explanations are compared. This is, to the authors knowledge, the 
most comprehensive review of potential explanations of the puzzles as well 
as the most comprehensive review of the theory that underlies the puzzles. 
In particular, the strengths and weaknesses of incomplete market models are 
clearly demonstrated in this chapter. 
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Developing the Mehra & Prescott puz- 
zles 
11.1 Background 
In this section the intuition behind the Mehra & Prescott puzzles is discussed. 
Essentially it shall be argued that, because aggregate consumption is growing 
so fast and so smoothly, the riskfree rate "should be" higher than the observed 
value and because the variation of aggregate consumption is so low the equity 
premium "should be" lower than the observed value. First, evidence on the 
average observed equity premium and real riskfree rate is presented in table 2. 
This list is not exhaustive but does demonstrate that there is broad agreement 
on estimates of the real riskfree rate and equity premium over long intervals 
in the US. UK evidence is also presented. Table 1 in Dimson and Marsh 
(1994) suggests that these values are similar to the equity premium and real 
riskfree rate for many established stock markets: 
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Paper Market Method I r,,, - rf rf a(r,.,, - rf) a(rf) 
Arit hmetic/ S imple returns 
mp85 US - annual Arith 6.18 0.80 16.54 5.67 
1889-1978 s. e. (1.76) (0-60) (n. a) (n. a) 
clm93 US - annual GNINI 6.63 1.19 19.02 5.27 
1892-1987 s. e. (1.78) (0.81) (1.73) (0.74), 
sieg92 US - annual Arith 6.5 1.8 19.3 4.7 
1871 -1990 s. e. (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) 
bc96 US - monthly Arith 5.02 1.12 52.68 3.27 
annualised 1959-1991 s. e. (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) 
ks90 US - quarterly Arith 1.78 -0.05 12.56 1.46 
quarterly 1929-1982 s. e. (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) 
telm93 US - monthly GNINI nx 0.99 n-a 3.75 
annualised 1959-1986 s. e. (n. a) (0.34) (n. a) (0.26) 
jenk UK - annual Arith 7.28 2.44 (n. a) (n. a) 
1919-1992 s. e. (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) 
dm94 UK - annual Arith 9.19 1.69 (n. a) (n. a) 
1955-1993 s. e. (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) 
Geometric / Logarithmic returns 
camp US - annual Log 4.2 1.8 18.0 3.3 
1889-1990 s. e. (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) 
gms87 US - annual Log 4.0 1.8 17.1 5.6 
1890-1980 s. e. (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) 
sieg92 US - annual Geom 4.8 1.7 (n. a) (n. a) 
1871 -1990 s. e. (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) 
jenk UK - annual Geom 5.79 1.49 (n. a) (n. a) 
, 
1919-1992 s. e. (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) 
dm94 UK - nnual Geom 6.05 1.02 (n. a) (n. a) 1 
1955-1993 s. e. (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) (n. a) 
Table 2: Evidence on the first and second moments of the equity premium 
and real riskfree rate. See main text for key to authors. 
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The key to authors is as follows: "telm93" = Telmer (1993), "mp85" 
Mehra and Prescott (1985), "camp" = Campbell et al. (Forthcoming), 
uclm93" = Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1993), "ks90" = Kandel and Stam- 
baugh (1990), "sieg92" = Siegel (1992), "jenk" = Jenkinson (undated), 
%66" = Bansal and Coleman (1996), "gms87" = Grossman, Mellino and 
Shiller (1987), "dm942 = Dimson and Marsh (1994). For Siegel (1992), Kan- 
del and Stambaugh (1990) and Grossman et al. (1987) the quoted standard 
deviation is for the return to equity and not the equity premium. For Jenk- 
inson (undated) the riskfree assets are long dated gilts rather than short 
dated government securities. It should be noted that returns are quoted 
in three forms in this table: arithmetic, geometric and logarithmic. The 
relationship between these three forms is now given. For algebraic simplic- 
ity (only) it is assumed that the market pays no dividends. In this case 
the simple return over any time period rAt := (Pt - Pt_j)1Pt_j. The log- 
arithmic return is given by rLt := ln(PtIPt-1). The arithmetic average 
of simple returns (fA := 1/TErAt), the geometric average of simple re- 
turns (fG := 11[1 + rAtj 11T _ 1) and the arithmetic average of log returns 
(fL :=1 IT F, rLt) are presented in table 2. It will now be demonstrated that 
fA - fL ; ý_ o, '(rL)/2 and that fG _ fL f2 L/2. To prove the first of these ap- 
proximations it will be assumed that rLt is drawn from a normal distribution 
with mean fL and variance U2 (rL) for all t: 
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+ fA 
For the second relationship: 
T 
E[l + rAtl 
t=l 
T 
TE Exp(rLt) t=l Exp(fL + 0.5a 2 (rL 
1+ iz L+0.50,2(rL) 
rL 
Exp(fL) 













Next consider the relationship between the market and aggregate con- 
sumption, which, from the previous chapter, has been demonstrated to be 
the key variable determining equilibrium asset prices. Look at figure 1, which 
compares real aggregate consumption on non-durables in the UK with the 
real total return on the (UK) All-Share index. It is apparent that the market 
crashes of 1974 and 1987 had virtually no effect on consumption at the ag- 
gregate level, suggesting that, within a CCAPNI framework, all market risk 
is non-systematic. As aggregate consumption is so smooth, this makes the 
predicted risk premium on all asset classes using the CCAPNI very small. 
It is clearly going to be extremely difficult to generate an equity premium 
of 6.18% on the basis of such smooth consumption. The riskfree rate puz- 
zle arises because consumption is growing so fast and so smoothly. If the 
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Figure 1: Quarterly real aggregate consumption on non-durables in the UK 
and the real value of the All-share index with dividends reinvested 1967Q1 
- 1992Q2. Both series are readjusted so that the 1985Q1 value is 1. 
consumption then it is difficult to see why any investor should wish to defer 
spending. Only with a high riskfree rate in a standard CCAPNI model can 
equilibrium be maintained. This intuition may help the reader to understand 
the more formal developments in the next subsection. 
11.2 Formal development 
The Mehra & Prescott puzzles can be developed in many ways. This section 
is not exhaustive but does take a number of different approaches to estimating 
equilibrium asset returns". In the previous chapter, four representations of 
"A different approach is taken by Illawitschka, and Tucker (1995). They develop the 
equity premium puzzle from mean-variance analysis. They argue that given three assets 
(stocks, bonds, riskfree assets) the optimal portfolio would have consisted almost entirely 
124 
the real riskfree rate and equity premium were given. Three were presented 
in equation 32, which is reproduced below: 
-yCov(r,,,, AInc) 
EP 1- -yE[Alnc] 




PE(l - -fAlnc) 
-In(#) + -yE[Alncl - 0.5-I'Var(Alnc) 
-In(P) + -tE[Alncl - 0.5-&y + I)Var(Alnc) 
The fourth representation is given in the Markov growth model of sec- 
tion 7.3. Within any one of these models, there are two equivalent ways of 
presenting the Mehra & Prescott puzzles. #, -I can be presented exogenously 
and the equity premium and real riskfree rate inferred. In the second rep- 
resentation we can make fl, -y endogenous and have the equity premium and 
real riskfree rate exogenous. 
E[r,, - rf] 
Cov (r, Alnc) +E [Alncl E [r,,, - rf E[R,,, - Rfl + 0.5Var(R,, 
Cov(R,,,, Alnc) 
E[p - rl (36) 
Std(Alnc)a 
[(l + rf)(1 - -yE(Alnc))]-l 
-y2 Exp[-Rf + -yE[Alnc] - 0.5 Var(Alnc)] 
Exp[-r + -yE[Alnc] - 0.5-t(-I + 1)Var(Alnc)] 
Remember that r,,,, rf refer to simple arithmetic returns, R,,,, Rf refer 
to logarithmic returns and p, a, r refer to the instantaneous returns on the 
market and riskfree asset in a Merton (1971) style environment. In order to 
demonstrate the puzzles we need parameters. On the Mehra and Prescott 
of equity and t-bills since 1970 with virtually no bonds. 
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(1985) data E[r,, - rf I=0.0618, rf = 0.008, E[Alncl = 0.0183, Std(Alnc) = 
0.0357, Std(r,,, ) = 0.1654 and Corr(r,,,, Alnc) = 0.33. Set -y = 3, fl = 0.98. 
If shares are lognormally distributed then E[Ri] = E[ril - O. War(ri). Us- 
ing the Mehra and Prescott data this gives E[R .. 
I=0.0481. Hull (1989) 
pp. 87-8 shows that, over a discrete single period (in this case a year) P= 
R,,, + 0.5Var(R .. 
). NVe can therefore assume that p=r, (as done by Ahn 
(1990), Constantinides (1990)). All other parameters are taken to be the 
same for each representation of the puzzle. Under these parameters the pre- 
dicted equity premium is 0.62%, -0.78%, 1.77% for the three models respec- 
tively. The predicted real riskfree rate is 7.97%, 6.94%, 6.75% respectively. 
Alternatively, by setting -1 = 20.1,31.7,10.47 and #=1.57,0.95,1.11, re- 
spectively the observed equity premium and real riskfree rate are given. As 
will be discussed later in the chapter, these estimates of -Y are much higher 
than we might suppose reasonable 46 . 
For example, if we take an investor 
with wealth Z10,000, and -f = 15, she would pay 6% of wealth to avoid a 
50: 50 gamble of ± Z1,000. It is, of course, very difficult to justify #>1 as 
this implies that, ceteris paribus, investors prefer to invest later rather than 
sooner, although Kocherlakota (1990c) has shown that a value of 0>1 is 
not necessarily inconsistent with equilibrium in a growing economy. 
The puzzles can also be displayed within the Markov growth model as 
original presented by Mehra Sz Prescott. Refer to section 7.3 for the relevant 
notation. In the main parameterisation given by Mehra and Prescott (1985), 
16See Kandel and Stambaugh (1990) for a defense of -y = 55, though. 
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s=2, Al = 1.054, A2 = 0.982,01, = 
022 = 0.43,012 = 
021 = 0.57. Let 
,0=0.98, -t = 3. From these: 
k, = 18.636 k2 = 18.313 
r .. 11 = 11.06% r,,, 12 = 1.77% 
rm2i = 13.01% r .. 22 = 3.56% 
Pf I= 0.9498 Pf 2= 0.9229 
E [r,,, - rf ] = 0.49% E[rf] = 6.87% 
Again the Mehra & Prescott puzzles are clear. For P=1.13, -y = 19 a 
real riskfree rate of 0.52% and equity premium of 5.54% is predicted. Finally 
the Mehra & Prescott puzzles are presented in graphical form. The issue 
is to find parameters P, -y that will generate a sufficiently low real riskfree 
rate and a sufficiently high equity premium. Consider the three models given 
in equation 35. If P is restricted to be in the range [0,1] then the riskfree 
rate is minimised for any given -y by setting P= 147. So by setting 0=1 
and varying -y, a bound can be generated for the maximum equity premium 
for any given real riskfree rate. These bounds are presented for the four 
models in figures 2,3. The graph that needs the most comment is the top 
graph in figure 3. This is a variation of figure 1 of Nlehra and Prescott (1985). 
There are certain differences between the figure presented here and the one in 
the original paper. First, their figure is hand-drawn and therefore somewhat 
inaccurate. By producing computer output, greater precision on the bound is 
achieved here, particularly for low E[rjj. Second, they terminate their bound 
at E[rf] = 4% so by going to E[rf] = 10% the figure produced here shows 
4'Reducing beta increases the attractiveness of consumption today against consumption 
tomorrow. So, the lower beta, the less inclined investors are to save. The riskfree rate 
needs to be increased to maintain equilibrium as beta decreases. 
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a much wider region. Third, they produce a bound for 0E [0,11, -j E [0,101 
by searching a narrow grid in fl, -y space. The figure given here presents 
150 "random" points in the narrower space 0E [0.95,11, -1 E [0,101.75 of 
these points are for P= 1" and 75 are for 0<1. -y is chosen at random 
(rectangular distribution within the admissible) for all 150 points. 
12 Possible explanations of the equity pre- 
mium puzzle 
Since the initial observation by Mehra and Prescott (1985) that the average 
historical riskfree rate was lower in the US than the consumption CAPNI us- 
ing aggregate consumption data, perfect markets and isoelastic utility could 
explain and that the equity premium was too high, there have been several 
attempts to explain these "risk-free rate" and "equity premium" puzzles. 
Duffie (1992b) divides possible reasons of a representative agent model to 
fail into seven categories: transaction costs, short sales and borrowing con- 
straints, the form of investors utility function, non-stationarity of the relevant 
stochastic process, failure of "rational expectations behaviour", noisy data 
and incomplete markets. Kocherlakota (1996) argues that there can only 
be three potential explanations to the puzzles: incorrect specification of the 
utility function, market incompleteness or transactions costs 49. Here the au- 
4'For the other three models setting P=I gives the bound. This is not proven here 
in this Alarkov-growth economy. It is reasonable to expect that, by setting 0=1, the 
riskfree rate would be minimised for a given equity premium in this case as well. These 75 
points may be expected to describe the bound. The other 75 points informally check this 
by seeing if, for P<1, a point can be generated outside this bound. There is no evidence 
that this informal bound is violated. 
4'This author believes that this misses at least one important category of potential 
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Figure 2: The riskfree rate / equity premium bound (below the line). The top 
graph is given by a simple one period model where consumption is assumed 
to be smooth. The bottom graph is given by a one period model in the style 
of Hansen and Singleton where consumption growth and the return to the 
market are assumed to be lognormal. 
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Figure 3: The riskfree rate / equity premium bound. The top graph is given 
by a Markov-growth model. This figure can be directly compared with figure 
1 in Mehra & Prescott (1985). The bottom graph is given by a continuous- 
time model in the spirit of Merton (1971). 
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thor divides the possible explanations for the Mehra & Prescott puzzles into 
slightly different divisions to these: 
12.1 Are these really puzzles? 
The puzzles of Mehra & Prescott are that the average real return to the risk- 
less asset in the US over the period 1889-1978 of 0.80% and equity premium 
of 6.18% are difficult to reconcile with standard equilibrium asset pricing 
models. There is a stream of literature that debates, though, whether these 
numbers give an unbiased estimate of the ex-ante equity premium and real 
risl-free rate to which asset pricing theory refers. First, note that Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) quote standard errors associated with these returns of 0.60% 
and 1.76%. Using a t-statistic of 2 as a bound, Kocherlakota (1996) argues 
that the equity premium can reject the hypothesis that -j :56.5 and the 
riskfree rate can reject the hypothesis that -f ý: 1 (for P=0.99). While this 
is still a puzzle, it is less of a puzzle than the spot estimates would imply. 
Figure 1 of Cecchetti et al. (1993) provides 95% confidence intervals for es- 
timates of the average riskfree rate and equity premium. Interpolating from 
this graph, a riskfree rate of 2.5% real and equity premium of 4% lies within 
this confidence interval. These values again significantly reduce the puzzles 
of Mehra & Prescott, particularly when errors in estimating the parameters 
of consumption growth are also taken into account. 
If we consider, for the moment, only the Markov representation of the 
puzzles, then there are two potential conflicts with the data. First, in the 
ex-ante equity premium and real riskfree rate. 
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Mehra and Prescott (1985) representation, aggregate consumption is con- 
strained to equal total dividends and total output. Mehra & Prescott use 
consumption growth, standard deviation of consumption and first order se- 
rial correlation of consumption to calibrate their economy. It is not clear 
whether the correct macroeconomic variable is being used to estimate these 
parameters. Also, by assuming that output equals dividends, the additional 
risk taken by equity holders is not reflected. Mehra and Prescott (1985), in 
an alternate specification, allow for dividends to be distributed after a large 
"fixed" cost has been allocated to employees and bond holders. Surpris- 
ingly, this makes little difference to the predicted equity premium. However 
Benninga and Protopapadakis (1990) argues that this is because Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) restrict positive time preferences. For P=1.114,, j = 10 and 
debt/market value = 60%, Benninga and Protopapadakis (1990) are able to 
replicate the mean and standard deviation of returns to the market and the 
riskfree asset. 
It has been suggested that these problems with Markov growth models 
can be overcome by using the more general Markov-regime switching model 
of Hamilton (1989). Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1990) argues that this type 
of model can be calibrated to accurately reflect the statistical properties of 
observed asset returns and consumption data. The discussion given here is 
based closely on that in Cecchetti et al. (1993) and, as with that paper, it is 
assumed in this discussion that there are only two states. The extension to 
n states follows direct. Let Ct, Dt reflect the log of aggregate consumption 
132 
and dividend stream to the market index respectively. Assume that these 
processes develop according to: 
01t DDD Dt Dt aa ft +( "0 1 
)+( "' ) st +(:, ) 
Here cc, cD are assumed to be independent and identically distributed tt 
(iid) normal, zero mean variables with covariance matrix E. St is a switching 
variable that can take values 0 or 1. If St-, = 1(0), then the probability that 
St =1 (0) is given by p (q). Therefore, the drift terms are given by ao or 
ao+ a, depending on the state. Notice that this economy is described by nine 
parameters5o (two probability parameters, four drift parameters and three 
variance/covariance parameters). As observed by Cecchetti et. al. (1993, 
p. 27) "We obtain the Mehra and Prescott endowment process by setting 
C=D, p=q and E= 0". The advantages of using this more general 
process are that consumption and dividends are no longer constrained to be 
equal and that noise is introduced into the process. 
There are three problems with this tYpe of model. First, the restriction 
that consumption equals dividends only applies to the Markov representation 
of the puzzles. The other three representations use market and consumption 
data direct. Breaking this link is hence unlikely to be the true explanation 
of the puzzles. Second, while Markov switching allows for noise, Kocher- 
lakota (1996) asserts that the t-statistics that he quotes to reject -y :56.5 
(equity premium) and -y ý: 1 (riskfree rate) are (asymptotically) valid for 
"Compared with three (two drift and, one probability) for the Mehra & Prescott 
representation. 
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Markov switching processes. Finally, by applying Jensen's inequality, Abel 
(1994) shows that under Markov switching the predicted riskfree rate will 
be higher and the predicted equity premium lower than with unconditional 
expectations. Therefore allowing for Markov switching processes will deepen 
the puzzles. 
Perhaps the most telling contribution to this debate was made by Brown, 
Goetzmann and Ross (1995). Essentially their argument is that most equity 
market research is done in the US because this market has been so successful. 
They point out that had one invested in an international equity portfolio at 
the beginning of the century then one would have been invested in Moscow, 
Berlin, Warsaw, Buenos Aires and Cairo. They argue that more than half 
of exchanges that were existent at the start of the century have had major 
trading disruptions since then. Therefore examining the equity premium of 
the US, UK and other "major" markets during periods of continuous trading 
introduces a serious survivorshiP bias into the sample. Rietz (1988) also 
wondered whether, ex-ante, investors were worried about a low probability, 
highly severe, "disaster" state that, ex-post, has not been observed in US 
data. Consider the following one period economy. At t=0 all investors 
are homogeneous and consume co. At t=1, let there be a high state (h) 
with consumption Ch := Yh + dh for all investors and let this state occur with 
probability q-'I. Let there also be a low state (1) with consumption cl := yl+dl 
5'Rietz (1988) explains his economy in terms of a Alarkov-switching model. The expla- 
nation of the puzzle here is more in keeping with the economy described of Mankiw (1986) 
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Figure .1 den ion st rates this relationship for ýE [2,101 for a set of -re- 
1.35 
alistic" other economic values (see figure). It can be seen that, if -y = 
then a 5% chance of a 22% drop in consumption simultaneous with a 54% 
drop in dividend will explain both the equity premium and the riskfree rate. 
This is without taking into account the presumably larger chance of smaller 
drops in consumption and dividend. It is very difficult to equate this size 
of aggregate consumption risk with the very smooth observed consumption 
patterns of the community. This point was made initially by Mehra and 
Prescott (1988). However the more recent work of Brown et al. (1995) would 
appear to give more support to the Rietz model. 
Even ignoring survivorship, errors and small-sample problems in estimat- 
ing averages, Maurice Scott (Scott (1992), Scott (1993)) believes that the 
spot estimates are flawed. With regard to the riskfree rate, he argues that an 
ex-ante return on a t-bill deflated by an ex-post inflation index does not pro- 
vide a realistic estimate of the real riskfree rate. Instead he believes that an 
index-linked government bond provides a better estimate. These have been 
available in the UK since the early eighties and have provided real returns of 
between 3% and 4% over this period. It is not clear to this author, though, 
whether this is a true potential explanation to the riskfree rate puzzle. The 
1980s were periods of high real returns for all riskfree bonds. Using data 
from Dimson and Marsh (1994), the real annual rate of return to 3 month 
treasury bills in London from 1983-1990 varied from 2.8% to 6.9%. There- 
fore the high return to index linked bonds may be due to the short period 
under consideration rather than a bias in using t-bills to estimate the true 
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riskfree rate. Labadie (1989) models an economy with stochastic inflation. 
While her estimates of the equity premium are higher than in the standard 
"known" inflation model, the full equity premium puzzle is not explained. 
Further, including stochastic inflation appears to do little to resolve the risk- 
free rate puzzle. With regard to the equity premium puzzle, Scott argues 
that using arithmetic as opposed to geometric rates of return overstate the 
total return that could be generated from this portfolio. By transferring to 
geometric rates of return, the equity premium will be around 2.2% lower than 
the arithmetic average. 
Siegel (1992) looks at the long term real return to equity and short term 
riskless interest rates over a period from 1802. Ile shows that the long-term 
average real return to equity is fairly constant over this period but the long- 
term average real riskfree rate is much lower over the period studied by Mehra 
& Prescott than over the longer time period. Therefore, if the averages over 
the two hundred year period of Siegel reflects the true mean required rates of 
return, the magnitudes of both the riskfree rate and equity premium puzzles 
are reduced. 
So, while spot estimates of the arithmetic average equity premium and 
risl-free rate in established financial markets provide puzzles for standard 
representative agent models, these estimates may be biased. Survivorship is 
clearly an issue as is the inaccuracy of the spot forecast. Further, geometric 
averages may provide a better (and certainly lower) observed equity premium. 
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12.2 Form of the investor's utility function 
The Mehra & Prescott puzzles comprise of two parts. The equity premium 
puzzle states that, under isoelastic time-separable utility, R (coefficient of 
relative risk aversion) has to be very high to explain the high observed real 
return to the market. However, the low desire to consumption smooth across 
time and the low observed real riskfree rate imply that investors have a high 
elasticity of intertemporal. substitution (EIS). For isoelastic utility, where 
IZ = 1/ElS, the riskfree rate puzzle implies a low R. Therefore, the two 
puzzles suggest very different estimates of R. It is a natural assumption, 
therefore, to use a utility function that has R and EIS as separate degrees of 
freedom. There are two main types of utility function that have this form. 
The first is "habit formation" utility function, which was initially introduces 
as a potential explanation to the puzzle by Abel (1990) and Constantinides 
(1990). The second type was briefly reviewed in the previous chapter - 
Kp reps-Porteus utility functions. There is significant literature that examines 
whether either of these types of utility function can explain away the puzzles. 
These, though, are not the only type of alternate utility function that has 
been used to examine the Mehra & Prescott puzzles; for example, Ahn (1989), 
Alm (1990) analyses these puzzles with a form of multiplicatively separable 
utility functions with some success. 
"Habit formation" utility functions assume that the utility that an in- 
vestor derives from this period's consumption is determined by consumption 
this period relative to consumption in previous periods. That is, if an in- 
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vestor consumes 50 units today then they will derive a higher utility from this 
if she consumed 40 units yesterday than 60 units yesterday. Intuitively this 
form of utility function is justified by saying that if the investor consumed 
60 units yesterday then she is "used" to this level of consumption and loses 
52 utility from dropping below this level . Such functions have two coefficients 
(one for risk aversion, one for the degree of habit formation) which separates 
out R from the EIS. Essentially habit formation can help to solve the equity 
premium puzzle as it will induce "stickiness" in an investor's consumption 
profile. In times of high income, the investor will not wish to consume all 
this income because of the potential cost of not being able to match this 
level of consumption in the future. Similarly, at times of low consumption, 
investors may wish to borrow against future income to prevent consumption 
dropping below previous levels. Therefore habit formation implies smooth 
and upward sloping consumption paths even for reasonable levels of risk 
aversion, thus providing a potential explanation of for the equity premium 
puzzle. Unfortunately, though, this is unlikely to be the sole explanation. 
Because the level of the equity premium is so much higher than the repre- 
sentative agent model can explain the habit formation characteristic must 
be very strong to resolve the puzzle. Constantinides (1990) shows that, to 
explain the Mehra & Prescott puzzles, the level of habit formation must be 
52 Notice, though, that it can also be argued intuitively that if an investor consumes 
50 units today then she will derive a lower utility from this if she consumed 40 units 
yesterday than 60 units yesterday. This is justified by saying that if the investor consumed 
60 units yesterday then she has "spoiled herself', or perhaps bought durable goods, and is 
therefore happy to consume less in the next time period. A utility function that reflects this 
characteristic is called "durable". Mathematically, a durable utility function has the same 
form as a habit formation utility function with a negative coefficient of habit formation. 
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so strong that it is equivalent to having a subsistence level of consumption 
at 80% of current consumption- that is, investors are infinitely averse to a 
drop in consumption of more than 20%. This appears to be inconsistent with 
observation made in Rietz (1988) (footnote 9) that consumption dropped by 
22% in the Great Depression in the US. So, the level of habit persistence 
required is strongly at odds with additively time-separable isoelastic utility 
and is highly inconsistent with duration of utility. There are several prob- 
lems in believing in habit persistence. First, particularly using monthly as 
opposed to quarterly consumption data, there is more evidence of durability 
than persistence in preferences (see, for example, Ni (1993) and the references 
therein). Second, increasing habit persistence implies increasing volatility of 
INIRS which, in turn, implies higher volatility in the riskfree rate. It is dif- 
ficult to reconcile this with the smooth observed time series of real riskfree 
rates (Heaton (1995))". Third, habit persistence implies positive autocorre- 
lation in consumption growth (see again, for example, Heaton (1995)), which 
is difficult to reconcile with the low autocorrelation in quarterly consump- 
tion and "substantial negative correlation in consumption growth rates at 
monthly frequencies "(ibid. p. 706). So the very high levels of habit for- 
mation required to fully explain the Mehra & Prescott puzzles is difficult 
to reconcile with other observations. Heaton (1995) argues that preferences 
that exhibit short-term durability with long term persistence are better able 
to explain market data. 
"See subsection 14.2 for a more detailed discussion. 
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Kreps-Porteus utility functions are also not able to explain the equity 
premium puzzle. While (quarterly) consumption growth may not be iid, to 
assume that it is so is "... not a blatantly counterfactual assumption" (foot- 
note 13, Weil (1989)). It is commonly believed that, as Kreps-Porteus utility 
functions have and extra parameter to separate the EIS from R, they will 
have more explanatory power than time-separable power utility. Kocher- 
lakota (1990b) argues that when consumption growth is iid this is not the 
case and both models have identical explanatory power. She also examines 
whether empirical estimates of 7 in tests of isoelastic utility should be inter- 
preted as estimates of risk aversion (as is generally the case) or the inverse 
of elasticity of interternporal substitution (as Hall (1988) suggests should be 
the case). Again, under iid consumption growth she shows that -t is unam- 
biguously an estimate of risk aversion. Therefore generalising from isoelastic 
to Kreps-Porteus utility functions will lead to only small changes in esti- 
mates of risk aversion as consumption growth only varies marginally from 
hd growth. Therefore, even under Kreps-Porteus utility, an "unreasonably" 
high coefficient of relative risk aversion is need to explain the historic excess 
return to the market. This is clearly demonstrated in table 2 of Kandel and 
Stambaugh (1991). However, Kreps-Porteus utility can help to explain the 
riskfree rate puzzle. It is known that, under isoelastic utility, the riskfree 
rate puzzle and equity premium puzzle can be resolved for values of 0>1. 
This is counterintuitive for isoelastic utility as it is believed that investors 
prefer to consume sooner rather than later. However, under iid consumption 
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growth, if the "true" utility function is Kreps-Porteus but an econometrician 
estimates the parameters of a power utility function, then the estimate of P 
is a function of both time preference and EIS (again Kocherlakota (1990a)). 
So, generalising power utility to Kreps-Porteus utility enables this estimate 
of P>1 observed for isoelastic utility to be decomposed into a true time 
preference parameter that reflects investors' desire to consume early and an 
EIS term that is not necessarily the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion. These points were made initially (and independently from Kocher- 
lakota (1990a)) by Philippe Weil (1989). Epstein and Zin (1990) extend these 
results to preferences where the coefficient of risk aversion is determined by 
the standard deviation (as opposed to the usual variance) of the underlying 
gamble. 
So, in general, turning the EIS and R into separate degrees of freedom 
within the utility function does not appear to be sufficient to explain the 
equity premium puzzle. Therefore either the assumption of isoelastic utility 
is not the driving factor behind the Mehra & Prescott puzzles or economists 
are yet to specify risk preferences accurately for the representative investor. 
13 The Mehra & Prescott puzzles in incom- 
plete markets 
13.1 Introduction 
This section will review existing literature that is of central relevance for 
some of the original findings that are to follow in subsequent chapters: the 
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literature that examines whether nonmarketable risk might help explain the 
Mehra & Prescott puzzles. This introduction aims to highlight the impor- 
tant distinctions between a world with no nontradable risk, a world where 
nontradable and marketable risk are independent and a world where the two 
sources of risk are correlated. 
Consider a one period model where there is a risky asset that will pay a 
dividend d at the end of the period. There is one agent in the economy who 
will receive exogenous income g at the end of the time period. If equilibrium 
requires the investor to hold the asset at the beginning of the period and no 
trading can take place during the period then the period end consumption 
of the agent Z is j+P. From the theoretical work on the Euler equation: 
rf] = -Cov(r,,,, 7r)/E[7r] where 7r = U'(cl, 1)/U(co, 0). While, in 
most examples to follow, the form imposed on j, g is not necessarily normal, 
the assumption of normality is now placed on these variables (and hence 6) to 
help the exposition. Under assumptions of normality, the result of Rubinstein 
(1976) can be invoked that Cov[j, U'(Z)l = E[U"(Z)]Cov[j, Z1. 
Break this last equation into its two constituent parts. First, from elemen- 
tary statistics, Cov[j, E] = Cov[j, j+ g] = VaQ + Cov[j, g]. So, for indepen- 
dent marketable and nonmarketable risk, the covariance term is the same as 
for a world with no income risk. Second, if g is a "small" gamble that is inde- 
pendent to income risk E[U"(6)] P-o E[U'I(j+E[g])+0.5Var[g]U .... (j+E[9])]- 
This is the first important result (and will be shown below to hold in cases 
where assumptions of normality are relaxed) that the impact of nonmar- 
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ketable risk to the predicted equilibrium price of an independent marketable 
risk will be driven by assumptions regarding the first four derivatives (at least) 
of the utility function. The work on proper risk aversion that is discussed in 
chapter 4 is driven by considerations about the fourth order derivative of the 
utility function. 
Turning to correlated risks in the style of Mankiw (1986), suppose that 
dividends at the end of the period can be either high (dh) with probability 
p or low (dj) with probability 1-p. If dividends are high then income 
is high (Yh) with probability 1. If dividends are low then income will be 
high with probability q and low (yj) with probability 1-q. In this case 
Cov [j, g] = (1 - p) (1 - q) (E [ý - di) (Yh - YI) = (E [ý - dj) (Yh -E [g]). If, 
in the low state, dividends crash (that is dh > dj) then the equity premium 
is explained by raising the covariance between dividend and income risk. 
Crash states in income are important for the precautionary savings motive. 
It has been established that, for an investor with power utility and 0=1, 
rf = JE[(cl/co)--v]}-' - 1. Consider the following two economies. In the first 
cl = 11.04co, co} with 50: 50 probability. In the second cl = 11.04co, 0.64co} 
with 95: 5 probability. In both cases E[cj] = 1.02co. However, the predicted 
riskfree rate for -y =3 is 5.88% in the first case and - 3.41% in the second. This 
is a manifestation of the precautionary savings motive. If income is the key 
source of consumption, it is clear how crash states in income might potentially 
explain the riskfree rate puzzle. Therefore, by combining the dividend and 
income crashes, the Mehra & Prescott puzzles might be resolved. 
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13.2 Precautionary savings and liquidity constraints 
This subsection concentrates on the riskfree rate puzzle. The models here 
cannot be considered to be directly addressing the Mehra and Prescott puz- 
zles as there is only one financial asset. Nevertheless, this section introduces 
some key ideas that will be extended to tackle the Mehra and Prescott puz- 
zles in the next section. We consider two classes of model that have been used 
to help explain this violation - the precautionary savings motive and the 
introduction of borrowing constraints". There is a key difference between 
most studies that examine precautionary savings and other models reviewed 
in this thesis. It has been assumed thoroughout this thesis that aggregate 
consumption is exogenous and the riskfree rate endogenous. Most studies of 
precautionary saving specify the rate of return to financial assets and infer 
from these the savings and consumption decisions of investors. 
The concept of precautionary savings motive was introduced by Leland 
(1968), Sandmo (1970) and Dr6ze and Modigliani (1972) and this work has 
recently been updated by Kimball (1990). The Euler equation tells us that 
the riskfree rate is given by :1+ rf t= U'(ct, t)IE [U'(ct-1, t- 1)]. Remember 
that this relationship holds for the consumption and utility function of all 
investors. From Jensen's inequality E[U'(ct)] -, ý! U'(E[ct]) if and only if U` > 
0 with the inequality holding strictly if ct is stochastic. If the third derivative 
"This literature is also used to help explain away other apparent violations of the 
implications of the life cycle /permanent income hypothesis such as the excess sensitivity 
of consumption to current income and the apparent over-saving of the retired. A review 
of such general consumption anomalies is outside the scope of this thesis and the reader 
is referred to one of the excellent published reviews (for example, chapter 6 of Deaton 
(1992)) for more detailed coverage. 
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of the utility function is positive, the greater the uncertainty of next period 
consumption for any investor, the higher their expected marginal utility of 
next period consumption. If the riskfree rate is exogenous then savings must 
rise. Such saving is called "precautionary saving". Kimball (1990) showed 
that an individual's (absolute) prudence P := -U ... (c)IU"(c) measures the 
strength of an investors' precautionary savings motive in the way that A := 
-U"(c)IU'(c) evaluates her risk aversion. This measure of prudence will be 
used extensively in chapter 4 and, to a lesser extent, in chapter 5. 
Is it reasonable to suppose that investors have a positive third derivative 
of utility? It can easily be verified that constant or decreasing absolute risk 
aversion imply a positive third derivative. So, a negative third derivative fol- 
lows only in certain cases of increasing absolute risk aversion -a condition 
that does not seem economically "reasonable". Therefore the conclusion that 
investors should wish to save at an increasing rate as future income becomes 
increasingly uncertain is consistent with large classes of preference that finan- 
cial economists believe to be realistic. For power utility the precautionary 
savings motive is captured in the terms in Var(Alnc) in the bottom two ex- 
pressions for the real riskfree rate in equation 35. Essentially, as -y grows so 
terms in Var(Alnc) grow increasingly important. "Thus as -y increases, the 
sign of the relationship between rf and -f in the time-additive case switches 
from positive to negative as the precautionary- savings motive overtakes the 
effect of positive expected consumption growth" (Kandel and Stambaugh 
(1991) p-56, notation changed). 
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Another wedge can be driven between the implications of the standard 
representative agent model and true consumption and savings decisions by in- 
troducing risky labour income and a borrowing constraint". This is because, 
at the time of a low income shock, individuals may not be able to optimally 
smooth away this shock. Even with quadratic utility (and so no precaution- 
ary saving), risky labour income and borrowing constraints, consumption 
decisions vary substantially from what is predicted by the permanent in- 
come hypothesis (see footnote 11 in Zeldes (1989b) and Aiyagari (1994)). 
Nevertheless, the most "interesting" models will come when there are both 
borrowing constraints and a precautionary savings motive. This is because, 
under precautionary saving, one is highly averse to low income states. If 
borrowing is restricted then it is necessary to save substantially to protect 
against low income states. An alternative to putting in explicit borrowing 
constraints is to put is very low endowment states, which will cause investors 
to have very low borrowing out of choice. Within the papers given below, 
where utility functions are often assumed to be CRRA (and hence U'" > 0) 
and there is a borrowing constraint, it is often difficult to separate out the 
two effects. 
There are two main ways in which this literature has proceeded. First, 
one can try to predict the magnitude of the savings that an investor will 
hold for given income processes with certain borrowing constraints. It is 
not possible, in general, to get an exact analytical solution and therefore 
"See Zeldes (1989a) for a test that appears to show that some investors are indeed 
subject to borrowing constraints. 
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either approximations are made or numerical techniques are employed - we 
will call these the "theoretical approaches". The second technique is to take 
cross-sectional survey data and look at individual savings and consumption 
decisions. We will call this the "empirical approach". 
13.2.1 The theoretical approaches 
Skinner (1988) takes a second-order Taylor's series approximation of the Eu- 
ler equation under the assumption of power utility functions and assumes 
that both the return on the one financial asset and income are risky (but 
independent). Because the Taylor's series is truncated at the second term, it 
is the variance in the income process that drives the precautionary savings 
model. By approximating the Euler equation in this way he is able to get 
an analytical solution to the problem of the predicted level of precautionary 
savings. As is shown repeatedly in the theoretical models, the level of pre- 
cautionary saving predicted depends on the level of persistency in the shocks 
in the income process. Using two parameterisations of the income process 
Skinner estimates that between 12%-56% of aggregate savings are caused by 
precautionary saving. Skinner's model has no borrowing constraints. 
By concentrating on exponential utility functions, Ricardo Caballero (Ca- 
ballero (1990), Caballero (1991)) is also able to derive closed-form solutions 
to problems involving the precautionary savings motive". Under the assump- 
tion that income is a random walk and under plausible parameter estimates, 
"As he imposes no liquidity constraints on his investors his models allow for negative 
consumption -a problem that is avoided by power utility functions. 
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he shows that high consumption growth is consistent with a low riskfree rate. 
Further, he predicts that substantial savings will be accumulated by individ- 
uals under the precautionary motive. If innovations in income are allowed 
to have large negative skewness, as a proxy for unemployment, then this 
significantly increases the importance of the precautionary savings motive. 
This should not, perhaps, be surprising. As income in this model is a ran- 
dom walk and the model specification does not include low probability, high 
income growth events, unemployment is essentially perpetual in this model. 
The threat of potential long term unemployment always has a significant 
impact on individual behaviour in this type of economy. 
Zeldes (1989b) uses numerical techniques to estimate the predicted mag- 
nitude of precautionary savings in an economy where preferences are rep- 
resented by power utility functions, there is uncertainty in labour income 
and no borrowing constraints. Zeldes models two income processes, one with 
permanent and transitory shocks to income, the other with purely transitory 
shocks to income and (as we shall see below, somewhat unusually) finds that 
the predicted level of savings is largely independent of the income process 
used. His model predicts that investors will hold substantial precautionary 
savings: on his main parameterisation. (, y = 3, starting wealth= two year's 
expected income), consumption would be 20% higher than observed levels if 
investors had no precautionary savings motive. 
Turn now to buffer savings. Rearrange equation 30 to give: 
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E[AInc] = -y-'[Rf + In(#)] + 0.5-ta'(Alnc) (39) 
An investor will be called "impatient" if the growth rate in permanent 
income g is such that g> -1-1 [Rf + In(#)]. In this case, and in the absence 
of income uncertainty and borrowing constraints, the investor would wish to 
consume soon and repay later. The introduction of the precautionary savings 
motive (and, possibly, liquidity constraints) will lead the investor to temper 
the desire to consume early and build up "buffer stock". The analysis of 
such behaviour is examined by Deaton (1991), Carroll (1992), Carroll (1997) 
and Carroll (1996) (see also chapter 6 of Deaton (1992)). The model of 
Zeldes (1989b) reviewed above, where g=0,0 = 1, Rj = 0, is the limiting 
case. Deaton (1991) considers an infinitely lived economy with borrowing 
constraints. For income shocks that are transitory, he shows that, provided 
income + wealth is above a certain level, some precautionary saving will 
take place and a buffer stock will be built. If income + wealth is below 
a certain target, the investor will find it optimal to completely dissave and 
then consume hand-to-mouth from income until saving becomes viable again. 
Consumption is smoothed by precautionary savings in this model. However, 
the more persistent the income risk, the less effective precautionary savings 
becomes. This is because the investor pays a high penalty for saving as they 
are impatient. The more persistent the shock, the longer they will have to 
save for at times of high wealth. This makes holdings of buffer stock more 
"lumpy" and does not smooth consumption as successfully in the transitory 
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shock economy. 
Carroll (1992) and Carroll (1997), in economies where there are no explicit 
borrowing constraintS'7 predict that the variance of consumption growth is 
inversely related to wealth as poor individuals are less able than the rich 
to smooth consumption. Therefore, the planned growth in consumption of 
poor consumers is higher than the planned growth in consumption of rich 
consumers. So poor consumers are trying to save, while rich consumers are 
happy to consume wealth (which they wish to do as they are impatient). 
There exists a target stock level where investors neither wish to save or dis- 
save. Carroll (1997) shows that, at this target level, the growth rate of con- 
sumption is marginally below g. Importantly, income uncertainty raises the 
variance of consumption at a given level of wealth. As planned consumption 
growth is monotic decreasing in wealth and as planned consumption growth 
must be just below g at the target stock level, this means that investors in- 
crease their target stock level ceteris paribus as income uncertainty increases. 
This provides Carroll (1992) with a basis to investigate the theory of buffer 
stocks from a perspective that is of great relevance to this thesis. In a simu- 
lated economy he shows that the amount of buffer stock that an investor will 
wish to hold is highly sensitive to the probability of a transitory (one year) 
crash to zero income. In his model, the level of savings is predicted to be 
more than twice as great when the probability of a "zero-income event" is 1% 
57 The models of Christopher Carroll and Zeldes (1989b) include the positive probability 
of zero income in any time period and hence a positive probability of a consecutive run of 
zero income events of any finite length. As the marginal utility of consumption at zero is 
infinite, the introduction of zero income events acts as an "informal" liquidity constraint. 
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against 0.1%. The impact of such unlikely events on savings levels is much 
greater than adjusting the standard deviation of transitory and permanent 
"diffusion" shocks to income. 
Some investigations of the role of precautionary savings have been done 
within a life-cycle model. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994) (with com- 
ment by Kimball (1994)) have a "standard" precautionary savings model 
while Carroll (1997) and Carroll and Samwick (1996) have a buffer stock 
model. The key difference is that, in the former case, savings for retirement 
happens throughout life. In the latter case holdings of wealth between the 
ages of 25-50 is almost entirely driven by buffer stock behaviour as individ- 
uals are too impatient to save for retirement before then. After 50 there 
is a predicted sharp rise in savings as people start to prepare for their old 
age. The two types of model are able to explain different aspects of the 
age-savings pattern (the former is better able to explain levels of aggregate 
saving, the latter able to explain the low changes in wealth with changes in 
the volatility of permanent income) but both perform better than standard 
life-cycle models. 
Huggett (1993) considers a precautionary savings model that has much in 
common with the models of Heaton and Lucas that will be reviewed below. 
Nonmarketable risk is associated with unemployment risk when endowment is 
at 10% of the employed level. It is a multiperiod model with transition prob- 
abilities between employed and unemployed states determined by a Nlarkov 
process. Borrowing constraints are introduced so that individuals have a 
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strong precautionary savings incentive. The only financial asset is a riskfree 
asset. For a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 3 and a borrowing 
constraint equal to one year of employed income the predicted riskfree rate is 
1.8%. While this is well below the predicted riskfree rate in a representative 
agent economy, the rate is still higher than the observed value, which is sur- 
prising given the shock of unemployment. However, as the average period of 
unemployment is 17 weeks, the shocks are too transitory to have significant 
impact on the equilibrium riskfree rate. Notice, though, that the predicted 
riskfree rate is very sensitive to the borrowing constraint. If this is reduced to 
four month's employed income then the predicted real riskfree rate is -23%! 
Aiyagari (1994) considers a model with no aggregate uncertainty but where 
there is individual uncertainty. Individual endowment shocks are smoother 
than an unemployment model might suggest, but the persistence and vari- 
ability in income shocks is modelled on real data". Borrowing is prohibited. 
The precautionary savings motive / borrowing constraint have only a small 
effect on aggregate savings and the equilibrium riskfree rate. Only by increas- 
ing the size and persistence of idiosyncratic shock to apparently "unrealistic" 
levels can the riskfree rate puzzle be resolved. 
13.2.2 Empirical evidence 
The problems with explicit empirical tests of the precautionary savings mo- 
tive are well summed up by Dardanoni (1991) "The main difficulty in im- 
"These parameters are very similar to those used by Heaton & Lucas - see below. 
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plementing the estimation ... is the unobservable nature of almost all the 
variables involved" (ibid. p. 156). Despite this, using 1984 UK data he esti- 
mates that as much as 60% of all savings may be driven by precautionary 
motives. Dynan (1993) runs cross-sectional regressions of the growth in log 
consumption against certain variables including the variance in growth of log 
consumption. She interprets the coefficient on this variable as being a mea- 
sure of prudence, as suggested by equation 39. She finds that, by this mea- 
sure, the precautionary savings motive is small and often indistinguishable 
from zero. However, as emphasised by Carroll (1997), within a buffer-stock 
savings model, predicted -growth in consumption is approximately equal to 
the growth in permanent income. That is, prudence is better measured by 
measuring the size of buffer stocks than looking at growth rates in consump- 
tion. 
If precautionary motives is an important reason for saving, then people in 
less secure jobs might be expected to save more than those in safe jobs59. The 
evidence on this is mixed. Skinner (1988), using the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey of 1972-3 concludes "The savings rates of the self-employed and sales 
workers, those generally thought to receive riskier incomes, are less than the 
benchmark group of craftsmen" (ibid. p. 250, his emphasis). More recent 
work by Carroll and Samwick (1996), using data from 1981 to 1987 from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, strongly refutes this. They show that the 
"There is, though, no general reason why this should be so. People in different jobs may 
well have systematically different preferences. The comparative savings rates of different 
occupations may just inform us about these preference differences and tell us little about 
precautionary savings. 
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variances of the permanent and transitory components of household income 
are positively correlated with household savings. 
Examining savings rates of investors in the Surveys of Consumers, Car- 
roll (1992) demonstrates that individual savings rates are likely to increase 
at times of high unemployment and times when investor are worried about 
becoming unemployed. Expected changes in household income, however, has 
no statistically significant effect on the savings rate. "... consumers both 
express a desire to save and actually save more when they believe that the 
unemployment rate will be rising. They also save more when the unemploy- 
ment rate is high. " (ibid. p. 105). 
Carroll (1992) examines savings ratios in relation to expectations about 
future unemployment as determined by questionnaire. Kantor and Fishback 
(1996) examine the issue in a different way. They argue that the level of 
buffer stocks will be inversely related to income level in a low income state. 
Therefore, as social insurance increases, so the level of buffer stocks should 
decrease. They examine saving levels over the 1917-9 period for the US - 
a time when accident insurance was being widely introduced in the US - 
and reveal a sharp drop in savings over the period. This is consistent with 
precautionary savings. Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992) approach the 
problem in a different way. They include two questions on the Italian Survey 
of Household Income and Wealth survey to assess expectations about future 
income and inflation uncertainty. They discover that individuals consider 
their income risk over 12 months to be much lower than the levels usually 
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assumed in the simulation studies. Therefore, they argue, while precaution- 
ary savings might partially account for some of the consumption paradoxes, 
it is unlikely to be the only explanation. 
This concludes the section on precautionary savings where rates of returns 
on assets are exogenous (and, usually, where only a riskfree asset is available). 
We turn now to more finance style models where aggregate consumption is 
exogenous and where a risky asset as well as a riskfree asset exists. The rates 
of return are endogenous within these models. It will be shown that there are 
many links between these two streams of literature. Of particular relevance, 
that low probability, high impact endowment shocks can have significant 
effects on equilibrium asset prices, particularly if these shocks are persistent, 
is shown below. 
13.3 Risky and riskless assets 
We start this subsection with a brief discussion on the implications of having 
a subset of investors who do not, or will not, invest in financial markets. This 
is clearly a violtion of the representative agent assumptions. Weil (1992b) 
assumes that the world is divided into those who invest in financial markets 
and those who do not60. In this case, the representative agent for financial 
asset pricing will appear as some combination of the subset of individuals 
who participate in financial markets rather than the subset of all individuals 
(see the discussion in the previous chapter on Brown (1988)). In this case 
"Weil suggests that such individuals might exist either because they wish to consume 
hand-to-mouth or because they face infinite transaction costs in financial markets. 
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using aggregate consumption data in asset pricing models will be mislead- 
ing. He provides theoretical conditions where the Mehra & Prescott puzzles 
will be overstated using aggregate data in the presence of non-participants 
in financial markets. In another paper, Philippe Weil (1994) considers the 
theoretical implications of the fact that the subset of individuals who par- 
ticipate in financial markets are, in general, more wealthy and have more 
non-marketable income than normal. With decreasing absolute risk aversion 
and independence of marketable and non-tradable income, the predicted eq- 
uity premium is much lower than in the representative agent case. Only 
with highly correlated labour and financial income can the equity premium 
puzzle be resolved for the "marginal" investor. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) 
take an empirical approach to this problem by examining the consumption 
profile from individuals who invest in the stock market. They find that these 
individuals have consumption that is both "more volatile and more highly 
correlated with the stock market" (pp. 98-9) than aggregate consumption 
data. They argue that a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 6 for investors 
in the stock market may be consistent with the observed historic excess re- 
turn to the market. This result should be tempered by noting the poor 
quality data available to Mankiw and Zeldes (1991). From here on, it will be 
assumed that all investors have access to, and trade rationally in, financial 
markets. 
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13.3.1 A one period model 
It has been well established elsewhere in this thesis that if markets are in- 
complete then the volatility of individual consumption will be higher than 
the volatility of aggregate consumption. Kahn (1990) shows, though, that 
both the theoretical and empirical evidence point to a low standard deviation 
of idiosyncratic endowment risk. "If idiosyncratic risk alone is to account for 
the equity premium, it is necessary that agents (1) believe that they face a 
small possibility of severe (greater than 95 percent) drops in consumption 
and (2) believe that such a possibility is made considerably worse (or more 
likely) by the holding of equity" (ibid. p. 42). This subsection follows the 
spirit of Mankiw (1986) and model I of Heaton and Lucas (1992). At t=0 
consumption for all ex-ante homogeneous investors is co. At t=1 the econ- 
omy is in an upstate with average per-capita consumption Ch with probability 
q or in a low state with probability 1-q and 4verage per-capita consumption 
of cl. However, in the low state, a proportion 1-A retain consumption at 
Ch". Therefore, the subset A of the population where the drop in consump- 
tion it is concentrated, ex-post, has consumption c* := (Cl - (1 - 
So: 
Chi dh q 
Chi d, (1 - q)(1 
C* = (Cl A)Ch)/A7 d, (1 - q)A 
In this case: 
6 'Notice that this implies that the labour income for the subset of the population that 
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d1ldh is the same as in equation 38. This is an important discovery 
that has not been highlighted (to the author's knowledge) elsewhere in the 
literature. Aggregate crash models of the type suggested by Rietz (1988) 
are, for a given rf, equally able to explain the equity premium puzzle as the 
concentrate shock model of Nlankiw (1986). Where the latter class of model 
does better than the former class is in (i) explaining the riskfree rate puzzle 
through an increased precautionary savings motive and (ii) appearing to be 
more economically realistic. The process for cl/co, c*/co that will explain the 
riskfree rate are shown in figure 5. As can be seen, if the shock is concentrated 
in a small subset of the population, aggregate consumption hardly needs to 
fall at all. However, the drop in consumption for the subset of the population 
where the risk is centred is very severe indeed. Suppose there a 5% chance 
that c(l)lc(O) = 0.974". Using the economic data given in figure 5, the 
riskfree rate puzzle can be explained by A=0.08. In this case, c*/co = 0.385. 
Remember, for the equity premium to be explained for -y = 3, dildh = 0.28 
(this is not a function of A). 
It is interesting to note that, because d1ldh is not a function of A, con- 
centrating the risk within a subset of the population does not help explain 
the equity premium. In particular, it will not be possible within this type of 
62 Cecchetti et al. (1993) state that the chance of a "crash" is approximately 4 years in 
every 96, when dividends fall by 29.5% and consumption by 6.2%. We therefore appear to 
be underestimating the size of a crash here. Notice, though, that the size of the dividend 
















beta aI c(l)/C(O) 
+ C*/C(O) 
6.04 0.14 0.24 0.34 0.44 0.54 0.64 0.74 0.84 0.94 1 
lambda 
Figure 5: Two state economy, income risk concentrated in a subset of the 
population, size of risk needed to explain the Mehra & Prescott puzzles. 
model to explain the equity premium using "realistic" data for -y =2 since 
dildh is predicted to be negative for this coefficient of relative risk aversion 
(see figure 4). 
13.3.2 Multiperiod models 
In a one period model, unemployment is persistent. As the economy termi- 
nates at t=1, it is not possible in this model to borrow or sell shares at times 
of unemployment with the intention of repaying the debt or buying back the 
shares when reemployed in future time periods. Clearly the amount that one 
would be prepared to borrow/sell at times of unemployment in multiperiod 
economics will depend on (i) the expected duration of the unemployment pe- 
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riod and (ii) the market frictions inhibiting trades in financial assets. These 
are the complexities that arise in multiperiod incomplete market models. 
The key work in this area has been undertaken by Deborah Lucas and John 
Heaton. Consider first an incomplete multiperiod economy where there are 
no frictions in trading financial assets. Lucas (1994) simulates two long-lived 
economy in which there is dividend risk and untradable labour income risk. 
In the first, the aggregate and individual risks are uncorrelated. In the sec- 
ond, the two sorts of risk are correlated in the manner of Nlankiw (1986) - 
that is, unemployment can only occur in a low dividend state. However, in 
both economies the idiosyncratic element of risk is iid: that is the probability 
of being unemployed at t+1 is independent of the employment status of the 
individual at t- there is no persistency of unemployment. In neither of 
the economies that she considers are the Mehra S. - Prescott puzzles resolved 
by the introduction of uninsurable financial risk. Over a lifetime positive 
endowment shocks will offset negative shocks to personal capital. Therefore 
if an investor has reduced income then all she need do is trade in financial 
markets (borrow or short sell equity) to raise funds which she can then pay 
off when she has an offsetting positive consumption shock. Therefore, in both 
these economies equilibrium asset prices are highly similar to the representa- 
tive agent case. However, such policies allow "Ponzi games" - that is, there 
always a positive probability of the investor exceeding any finite borrowing 
level under this system (for a fuller discussion see, for example, Blanchard 
and Fischer (1989)). Due to the transitory nature of the individual risks, 
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however, Lucas finds borrowing and short-sales constraints rarely bind. 
When the model permits unemployment to have persistence the possi- 
bility of an individual becoming bankrupt increase and introducing trading 
frictions into the model becomes more important. Heaton and Lucas (1992) 
and Heaton and Lucas (1993) consider economies with dividend risk, indi- 
vidual risk, transaction costs and borrowing/short sales constraints. These 
papers differ from each other in theoretical ways. The former is two-period', 
the latter long-lived. The former assumes idiosyncratic shocks to either be 
permanent or transitory, while the latter tries to accurately reflect the per- 
sistence of individual shocks estimated from US data. The former relates 
personal and aggregate shocks in the manner of Mankiw (1986) while the 
latter considers both this and the uncorrelated case. Despite these theoreti- 
cal differences, though, the findings of the two models are very similar. First, 
given that individual shocks appear to be short lived in the real economy for 
the US , unemployment risk on its own is unlikely to explain the Mehra and 
Prescott puzzles. Adding in transaction costs to either the stock or bond 
markets, but not both, will also not explain away the puzzles. In this case 
investors will trade in the market with no transaction costs to smooth their 
individual income shocks. As (virtually) no trading need occur in the market 
with costs equilibrium prices are not affected by these costs". So, only by 
"'They refer to it as three period as the economy has times t=0,1,2. Strictly speaking, 
though, there are three points in time but only two time periods. 
64 See Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) for related work. They consider an incomplete econ- 
omy with no aggregate risk and exogenously determined returns to two riskless assets (one 
traded costlessly, one traded with cost) and predict asset/income ratios and transaction 
velocities. Again, the introduction of transaction costs into the economy does not help 
fully explain observed market behaviour. 
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adding transaction costs into both markets is their a potential explanation 
to the puzzle. 
If costs are the same for buyers and sellers (borrowers and lenders) then 
both the supply and demand of financial assets is affected. The sellers re- 
quire a higher price while the buyers require a lower price compared to the no 
transaction cost economy. These two counteracting effects offset and equi- 
librium asset prices return to approximately the complete market case. In 
stockmarkets, as buyers and sellers pay transaction costs, the introduction 
of such costs need not affect the predicted return to the market". However, 
in debt markets, it can be argued that only the borrower pays transaction 
costs. This assymetry in transaction costs is crucial. The supply, but not 
demand, of debt instruments is effected reducing the riskfree rate (and hence 
increasing the equity premium). So, by having symmetric transaction costs 
in the stockmarket and assymetric transaction costs in the bond market the 
Mehra k, Prescott puzzles might be resolved. Severe borrowing constraints 
are seen as being a form of assymetric transaction cost in the debt market 
and such constraints cause the most significant reductions in the riskfree rate. 
An excellent and more detailed review of this area (with a few minor original 
results) is given by Heaton and Lucas (1995) and the reader is referred to 
this paper for a more complete discussion. 
What level of persistence is needed in income shocks to generate the 
"In fact the return to the market rises slightly as, with transaction costs, individual 
consumption will be more volatile than aggregate consumption which will increase the 
required excess return to the market while at the same time reducing the riskfree rate by 
increasing the precautionary demand for assets. 
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observed equity premium and real riskfree rate? Constantinides and Duffle 
(1996) try to find income processes that are consistent with observed asset 
prices and the Euler equation without trying to verify the plausibility of these 
income processes. It has been shown that the average equity premium and 
real riskfree rate can be resolved within a representative agent economy with 
power preferences, only the value of P, -1 required for such an explanation are 
considered "unrealistic". Let p := -In#. Consider the income at time t of 
agent k: ykt. Restrict it to be of the following form: 
t 




Here yj, dt represent aggregate income and dividends and flks is a N(O, 1) 
2 
process specific to agent k that is independently distributed. y, measures 
the heterogeneity of the investment community. Introduce the new notation 
t -y+-y2)/2)y2, 
St := ES=O(Ysllks - -Ofl. Notice that Eo, jest] = 1, Eo,,, [r, --Yst] 2 
Suppose that agents have power utilitY and an econometrician knows 
that. However, suppose that econometrician mistakenly believes that prices 
in the economy are as if a representative agent existed. Let the estimated 
parameters of the utility function under this assumption be j, P on the basis 
of aggregate data dt, yi. Let the real preference parameters be denoted by 
-y, p for each agent. If heterogeneity is restricted to be: 
"Although, as will be noted later in this chapter "In formal tests of the conditional Euler 
equations, Hansen and Singleton (1982) ... and others rejected the model even though no 
a priori upper bound is imposed on the relative risk aversion coefficient" (Constantinides 
and Duffie (1996) p. 220). 
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22 [p j)AIncl YS 2+ -f 
then the price, pj of an asset that pays dividend dit at time t and zero 
otherwise is: 
pj c-"'Eo[(djt(Ykt + dt)/co)-"] 
c pt 
7--, EO, nEO, dg, dj, ye[djt(dt + CIO 
pt e ((, V+, y2)/2)y2. 
-7-.; 7EO, d,,, dt, yjdjt(dt + Yt) CIO 
. e E[dit(dt + yt) 
Eo[dit(dt + yi)-'] 
In other words, the econometrician is unable to distinguish prices in a 
representative agent community with parameters ý, j from one without a 
representative agent where individual preferences are parameterised by p, -1 
and an income process described by Ykt, y, 2. The degree of persistence in the 
income shocks required to reconcile the Mehra & Prescott puzzles to the 
Euler equation in a frictionless market has now been established. This work 
has been generalised by Saito (1993), who allows for idiosyncratic shocks and 
aggregate shocks to be correlated. Using realistic parameter estimates, he 
finds that the riskfree rate is well explained by this type of model. However, 
the predicted equity premium remains too low as the high precautionary 
savings motive in this economy increases the demand for all financial assets. 
165 
13.4 Savings behaviour of the unemployed 
As emphasised in the previous section, in multiperiod models of incomplete 
markets it is the persistence of the idiosyncratic risk that is the crucial factor 
in determining equilibrium asset prices. In this thesis, particularly chapter 6, 
unemployment will be taken to be the key source of idiosyncratic risk. This 
subsection therefore considers the persistence of idiosyncratic risk in general 
and unemployment in particular. First we consider a representation of income 
where permanent and transitory components are smooth, then one where 
there are endowment shocks of moderate severity and finally unemployment. 
For the smooth income process, the model of Carroll and Samwick (1996) 
is analysed. They assume that income is generated by the following process: 
In(yit) = In(zit) + cit 
In(zit) = In(zit-1) + git + qit 
Here yit, zit, git denote, respectively, total income to individual i at time 
t, the permanent component of that income and the predictable growth in 
income at t-1. qit, cit refer to the permanent and transitory component of 
income fluctuation. For professional and technical workers, total variance in 
annual income is 2.92% which can be decomposed into 1.72% permanent vari- 
ation and 3.31% transitory variation. Standard errors are 0.39%, 0.62% and 
1.16% respectively. Figures for the total population do not differ materially 
from this. 
It is the work of Heaton & Lucas that has shown that the conclusions of 
Alankiw's single period model will not hold in a multiperiod environment. 
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Essentially they believe that endowment shocks are not sufficiently persistent. 
Using the PSID data, they divide investors equally into two categories. Each 
member of one category consumes 75% of average per-capita consumption 
while each memeber of the other group consumes 125% of average per-capita 
consumption. This captures the variance of the innovation of annual house- 
hold income. They estimate the probability of switching category from one 
year to the next as 2G% (see pp. 6-7 of Heaton and Lucas (1995)). While this 
suggests that shocks are "relatively persistent" (ibid. p. 7), the persistence is 
not enough to explain away the Mehra & Prescott puzzles unless there are 
severe market frictions. 
Finally, we turn to severe idiosyncratic endowment crashes. In general, 
research in the US suggests that these crashes are short lived: "... income 
typically recovers from near-zero events within three years, and mostly re- 
covers within a year" (Carroll (1992) footnote 19). However, it should be 
recognised that: 
"... there is a huge variation in unemployment inflow rates and dura- 
tions across countries. Unemployment durations are very low in North 
America, and inflow rates rather high. By contrast, in the EC inflow 
rates are quite low but durations are huge. And the 'virtuous' coun- 
tries (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Japan) have both low inflow and 
low duration. " 
Layard, NickeU and Jackman (1991) p. 222-4 
Evidence presented in Layard et al. (1991) suggests that, of the UK unem- 
ployed, 35% are people with previous work experience who are experiencing 
a period of unemployed that has already lasted for more than three years 
(table 17, p. 271). Of those unemployed for less than three years, the average 
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duration of unemployment is 12.8 months (table 3, p. 45). Table 9 (p. 422) 
shows that 1 in 4 people unemployed have been unemployed for more than 
12 months (the LTU)". For the US, the percentage LTU is 4.2% (table 9, 
p. 422), while the average duration of unemployment is 2.6 months (table 3, 
p. 45). The duration of unemployment for professional and managerial staff 
is similar to the economy-wide duration in both countries (again table 3, 
p. 45). These numbers may, though, overestimate the differences in duration 
of unemployment between the two countries as "one should, at any rate, be 
aware of the fact that roughly half of the unemployment spells in the USA 
end in withdrawal from the labour force rather than in a job" (ibid. p. 270). 
It would, though, seem reasonable to conclude that periods without work are 
more persistent in Britain than in the US. Therefore the one period model 
of Mankiw (1986) may be more applicable to the UK than the US. 
Given that the potential threat of bankruptcy from following a strategy 
of borrowing/selling financial assets increases as the expected duration of un- 
employment increases, we would expect to see the British reluctant to trade 
assets when unemployed. The UK evidence is again presented by Layard et 
al. (1991): 
"Do unemployed people run down financial assets or borrow to main- 
tain their consumption, or do they simply consume less? ... In the 1978 British cohort study ... there was no evidence of savings be- 
ing run down. Later British studies broadly confirm the 1978 results. 
Those aged under 35 in a sample of the 1983 inflow into unemployment 
did not, on average, reduce their savings or increase their borrowings 
67 Notice that this is not consistent with the percentage given for those with more than 
three years continuous unemployment. This may be because people withdraw temporarily 
from the unemployment register without necessarily reentering work. 
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to limit the fall in their consumption during 15 months of unemploy- 
ment, but those aged 35 and over increased their net debt by about 
E400 on average ... The 1987 cohort study shows that those unem- 
ployed for no more than nine months reported an increase in net debt 
from an average of E435 before becoming unemployed to E525 when 
they returned to work. " 
ibid. p. 246-7 
Gruber (1994) presents evidence on the savings of individuals prior to 
unemployment in the US: "There is some limited evidence on the savings 
behavior of the unemployed in the PSID ... Among individuals who lose their 
jobs, only 56% had any savings before the job loss, and only 23% had savings 
of more than two months income. The comparable figures for those not losing 
their jobs were 84% and 52% respectively" (ibid. footnote 6). Therefore, 
unless the unemployed are prepared to build up large debts, there is a limit 
to how much consumption smoothing they can achieve through financial 
markets. 
This is evidence on savings and not consumption, though. It may be that 
individuals are able to keep consumption at near employment levels even 
when unemployed and not run down financial assets through, for example, 
informal help from friends and family. Evidence on changes in log consump- 
tion on becoming unemployed in the US is given by Gruber (1994). Using 
PSID data from 1968-87, he estimates that average expenditure on food 
dropped by 6.8% on becoming unemployed, but the associated standard de- 
viation of 42.4% suggests great cross-sectional variation. In the absence of 
unemployment benefit, Gruber predicts that the average drop in consump- 
tion would be around 22%. It should be noted from table 1 of Nelson (1994), 
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though, that only around 1/5th of total consumption is accounted for by 
food expenditure. 
In conclusion, this evidence is a little confusing. It appears as if periods 
of unemployment are relatively short lived. The work of Heaton and Lucas 
would then imply that people should run down financial assets to maintain 
consumption during this period. It seems, though, that there is little, if 
any, decrease in saving (increase in borrowing) during periods of unemploy- 
ment. At the same time, there also does not seem to be a large decrease in 
consumption on non-durables. This might be reconciled by supposing that 
individuals spend less on durable goods and / or get support from family 
and friends during periods of unemployment. Further empirical research is 
required to more accurately determine the persistence of risk to individual 
income. 
14 Closely related puzzles 
So far, this chapter has concentrated on developing, and then trying to ex- 
plain, the Mehra & Prescott puzzles. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Euler equation is closely bound in with the CCAPNI and, therefore, these 
puzzles should be interpreted in the light of broader CCAPNI empirical tests. 
This literature is briefly reviewed in the next section. This section looks at 
two puzzles that are closely related to the Mehra & Prescott anomalies. 
First, an overview of Hansen-Jagannathan bounds tests is presented. This 
bound also comes directly from the Euler equation. Second we consider the 
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higher moments of asset returns. A valid asset pricing model should be able 
to explain the total behaviour of asset prices and not just the long term 
expectation. 
14.1 Hansen-Jagannathan bounds 
Suppose that there is a riskfree asset. From equation 3 we know that, for 
any asset i: 
E[(ri - rf)7r] =0 
E [ri - rf ]E [7r] = Corr(ri, -7r)Std(ri)Std(7r) 
E[ri - rf] < 
Std[7r] 
Std(ri) - E[7r] 
This inequality must hold for all assets. Notice that the left hand side of 
this inequality is the Sharpe ratio. The asset with the greatest Sharpe ratio 
is the tangency portfolio on the mean-variance efficient frontier. By appeal- 
ing to CAPNI theory we can take the market portfolio to be the tangency 
portfolio and so the bound on Std[r]/E[7r] is given by E[r,,, - rfl/Std(r,,, ). 
On the Mehra & Prescott data the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio is 
0.374. Taking annual consumption data from Grossman et al. (1987) 7r to 
be the ratio of marginal utilities and the usual power utility function with 
0=0.97, this bound is violated with -y < 6.25. 
The alternative is to assume that there is no riskless asset. The real 
rate of return on treasury bills has a measurable standard deviation. So 
short term government securities can be included in a variance / covariance, 
matrix of asset returns. In this case, take the vector version of the Euler 
equation, p(x) = E[rx], for a vector of payouts x. The bound of Hansen 
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and Jagannathan (1991) follows from this. The discussion here is based on 
that given in Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1994). Regress 7r - E[7r] onto the 
horizontal vector (x -E [XI)T whose i" element is xi - E[xil. The regression 
vector will be denoted by z and the error term, which is orthogonal to x- 
E[x], by u. E. = E[(x- E[x])(x- E[x])TI is the variance, co-variance matrix 
of payoffs (not returns). 
r- E[r] 




(x - E[x])TZ +, U 
E[(x - E[x])(x - 
E[x])T]Z + E[(x - E[xl)ul 
E-lE[(7r - E[7r])(x - E[x])T] x E-1(E[rx] - E[r]E[x]) x 
-'(p(x) - E[r]E[x]) EX 
2 )21 Now, consider the variability of 7r. a 7r = E[(7r - E[7r] = E[((x - 
E[x])TZ + U)I] = E[((x - E[x])TZ)ll + E[U2 ] as u is orthogonal to x- E[xl. 
Now, E[U2] > 0, and so 
u2> E[«x - 
E[x])TZ)l] 
Ir - 
= E[ZT(X -E [x]) (x - 
E[X])TZ] 
= ZT E[(x - E[xl)(x - 
E[X])T]Z 
= (p(x) - E[r]E[x])TE-lEXE-1(p(X) - E[7r]E[x]) xx 
u', > [(p(x) - E[r]E[x])TE-1(p(X) - E[7r]E[x])])-, 1 x 
E[r]E[(l + r)I)Tr-1(1 ,r- E[7r]E[(l + r)])l' 
Where 1, r, as usual, denote the vector of ls and of returns to the risky 
asset and the covariance matrix now refers to returns rather than pay- 
offs. Recall the discussion above on the relationship between the Hansen- 
Jagannathan bounds and the mathematics of the tangency portfolio. Divide 
the previous offset equation left and right by E[7r]. Remember that the cur- 
rent environment is no riskfree asset, but, if there were, lIE[7r] =1+ rf. 
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The righthand side is equivalent to E[rT - rf ]/Std(rT) where rT refers to the 
return on the tangency portfolio. This is easily shown using equations (19), 
(20), p. 89 of Ingersoll (1987). So, the Hansen-Jagannathan bound is closely 
related to mean-variance efficiency. In the first representation (with a riskless 
asset) it is assumed that the market index is mean variant efficient. In the 
second representation (no riskless asset), the tangency portfolio is explicitly 
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Figure 6: The Hansen-Jagannathan bound tested on annual consumption 
data from the US 1890-1980: source Grossman, Melino & Shiller (1987). The 
"CRRA" points give the mean and standard deviation of the INIRS using this 
consumption data with a CRRA utility function for #=0.97, -1 E [1,25). As 
-j rises, so the standard deviation rises. The two solid lines give the Hansen- 
Jagannathan bound for this mean / standard deviation pair. The Koch(90) 
line uses the average real returns and (co)variances to the market and a 
riskfree asset for the US over the interval 1888-1978 as given by Kocherlakota 
(1990b). The GMS(87) line uses the real returns and (co)variances to the 
market, a short term riskfree asset and a long term bond index over the 
interval 1890-1980 as given by Grossman, Melino & Shiller (1987). 
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This restriction can now be tested on observed data. Initial tests con- 
centrated on two assets: the market index and a treasury bill. A graph of 
the Hansen-Jagannathan bound is produced in figure 6. Consumption data 
was taken from Grossman et al. (1987) for the interval 1890-1980. It was 
assumed that utility takes the usual time-separable, constant relative risk 
aversion form with coefficient of impatience P=0.97. The coefficient of 
relative risk aversion was allowed to change from 1 to 25 (step size 0.25). 
Two bounds were created. One uses the annual 1888 - 1978 Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) data as presented by Kocherlakota (1990b), who quotes 68 
E[rf, r,,, ] = [0.010,0.070), a[rf, r,, ] = [0.055,0.1651 and Corr[rf, r,,, ] = 0.114. 
This bound is, then, identical to that given in figure 1 of Burnside (1994) 
(although over a slightly wider domain), but differs slightly from figure 1 
of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), who use raw data from Campbell and 
Shiller (1988). The second bound is created using three series of asset returns 
(stocks, long bonds and treasury bills) from 1890-1980 as given by Grossman 
et al. (1987). As can be seen, the two bounds are very similar. Only when -1 
exceeds 17 are both bounds satisfied. 
Notice that, while violations of the Hansen-Jagannathan bound is "simi- 
lar" to the Mehra & Prescott puzzle, it differs in an important way. In the de- 
velopment of the equity premium puzzle one of the key independent variables 
was the covariance between the return to the market and the pricing kernel. 
To draw the Hansen-Jagannathan bound the variance/covariance structure 
68Thisnotationisalittle 
confusing. "rf " is used to denote the return to treasury bills, 
which is no longer assumed to have zero variance and so is not, strictly speaking, riskfree. 
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of asset returns is required but the covariance between asset returns and the 
pricing kernel is not. Therefore models that try to explain the equity pre- 
mium puzzle by increasing the correlation of market and consumption risks 
will not, on their own, help explain any violation of the Hansen-Jagannathan 
bound. 
The reason why, for power utility, the mean / standard deviation pairs of 
IMRS are curved is not initially clear. In the single period, non parametric de- 
velopment of the equity premium puzzle it was shown that r ý- P(l --yAlnc). 
Taking expectations of both sides, it is clear that, under this approximation 
E[7r] should be monotonic decreasing in -1. As figure 6 shows, though, above 
certain values of -f E[7r] increases. This is because of important second order 
terms, captured in the bottom two equations for the real riskfree rate given 
in equation 35 that reflect the precautionary savings motive (see above). 
Figure 6 obviously provides spot estimates as to whether the mean/standard 
deviation pairs for a certain utility function parameterised. on certain data 
fits the INIRS bound calculated from financial returns. It provides no evi- 
dence as to the statistical significance of the violation of the bound. Such 
examination is a detailed econometric issue and is considered to be outside 
the scope of this thesis. The reader is referred to, for example, Ferson (1995), 
Burnside (1994) for a review of this issue. There are also various amendments 
that can be made to the basic Hansen-Jagannathan bound. First, the basic 
test places no restrictions on the strict positivity of 7r. This can be done 
using numerical procedures that provide a sharper bound. Snow (1991) ar- 
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gues that this bound also loses important data concerning higher moments 
of asset returns. Using the restriction that 1/8 + 11q = 1, Snow exploits the 
relationship 1= E[r(l + r)] ý:, E[7r'lll6E[(l + r)q] 11q (1161der's inequality). 
Therefore there is a general restriction on the bth moment of the IMRS in 
terms of the qth moment of asset returns. The case 6=q=2, the Hansen- 
Jagannathan bound, is a specific case of this general rule. Snow examines the 
general bound for 6=2,3/2 and 3 using numerical techniques. See also He 
and Modest (1992) for an analysis of how transaction costs and short selling 
borrowing constraints affect the bounds. 
The aim of this section is not to provide a comprehensive review of em- 
pirical tests of Hansen-Jagannathan bounds. Instead, the aim is to alert 
the reader to the fact that any "true" potential explanation to the Mehra 
& Prescott puzzles must also pass the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds tests. 
For example, Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) themselves show that habit 
formation models fit their bounds more closely than time-separable models. 
Of particular relevance here is Telmer (1993). Telmer works in the envi- 
ronment of Mankiw (1986), which is central to the models in later chapters 
(particularly chapter 6) incorporating borrowing constraints. There is one 
financial asset, a riskless bond, through which agents can partially smooth 
their endowment fluctuations. As endowment shocks are transitory in his 
model, adding idiosyncratic endowment risk does not help explain violations 
of the Hansen-Jagannathan bound unless borrowing restrictions are very se- 
vere. This, therefore, is highly similar to the results of Heaton & Lucas 
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reviewed above for the equity premium puzzle. Of course, if endowment risk 
is persistent in the way described by Constantinides and Duffie (1996) then 
any bound can be satisfied. 
14.2 (Co)Variances of asset returns 
If adjustments to standard consumption based pricing models to account 
for the puzzles of Mehra & Prescott are robust then, not only should they 
satisfy the Hansen-Jagannathan bound, but 'they should also explain higher 
moments of asset returns. In particular, the variance/covariance matrix of 
asset returns should be also be explained by a valid asset pricing model". 
This is a more stringent test than Hansen-Jagannathan bounds (Cecchetti et 
al. (1993)). In general the adjustments to the standard model presented in 
this chapter cannot explain both the first and second moments of the excess 
return to the market and real rate of return on treasury bills. See Heaton 
(1995) for evidence on habit persistence (and his own mixed persistence / 
durability model), Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) for recursive utility func- 
tions, Lucas (1994) for incomplete market models and Cecchetti et al. (1993) 
for Markov models. 
The problem is as follows. In order to have a high equity premium and 
a high volatility in observed excess returns, the intertemporal marginal rate 
of substitution needs to be volatile. However, as soon as a highly volatile 
MRS is included in the model the volatility of the riskfree rate becomes too 
"Other characteristics of asset markets could also be included - particularly autocor- 
relation in asset returns and transaction velocities. 
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great. That is, the difficulty arises because the real riskfree rate is so smooth 
while the equity premium is so high and stock returns are so volatile. To 
quote Heaton (1995): "... the requirement that there is little volatility in 
the bond returns constrains the model from fitting the equity premium and 
the volatile stock returns" (ibid. p. 706 - see also the concluding sentence 
in Cecchetti et al. (1993)). So not only must the low average riskfree rate, 
high average equity premium be explained, but also the low volatility of the 
riskfree rate and high volatility of equity returns must also be explained. 
15 Empirical tests of consumption based as- 
set pricing models 
In this chapter so far, the Mehra & Prescott puzzles have been developed 
and various potential explanations have been presented. This section does 
not aim to provide detailed econometric analysis, nor indeed be comprehen- 
sive in its treatment, of the numerous tests of the CCAPNI that have been 
conducted as this dissertation has, in general, a more theoretical than sta- 
tistical approach. The reader is referred to, for example, excellent reviews 
of this area that are given by Singleton (1990) and Ferson (1995) for more 
comprehensive coverage. Instead this section aims to address two questions 
by examining the main papers in the area. First, can the cross-sectional 
variation in asset returns be reconciled with the complete market version of 
the Euler equation/CCAPM under power utility and, if so, what parameter 
values for P, -y might be reasonable. 
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An early estimate for the coefficient of relative risk aversion of a repre- 
sentative agent was provided by Friend and Blume (1975) who conclude that 
it is almost certainly more than 1 and probably more than 2. Grossman 
and Shiller (1981) essentially test an Euler equation version of the variance 
bound of Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981). Grossman and Shiller 
used the multiperiod Euler equation, with "perfect foresight" of consumption 
and dividends to try to simulate the behaviour of the market index. They 
find that for -y =4 they can find reasonable correlation between predicted 
asset returns and the observed values. In tests of the arbitrage pricing the- 
ory Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) find that consumption is not statistically 
significant as an explanatory factor for the US (Poon and Taylor (1991) do 
not include consumption as a variable in their UK based test of the APT). 
Aside from these, there are essentially four approaches to testing these con- 
sumption based models. The first is to assume some parametric form for 
consumption and asset returns and test the models restrictions under these 
parameterisations. The first paper to take such an approach was Hansen 
and Singleton (1983). The second method is to make no assumptions about 
the distribution of consumption and asset returns and use a non-parametric 
technique. This was initially used in this context by Hansen and Singleton 
(1982). Brown and Gibbons (1985) try to adjudicate on which of these two 
approaches is more satisfactory. They find (using a simplification of the Euler 
equation that requires only market index and riskfree rate data), that there is 
very little difference in the precision of their parameter estimates between the 
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parametric and non-parametric tests. Given the increased robustness of the 
latter, they conclude that more emphasis should be given to non-parametric 
than parametric tests". A third approach initially advocated by Mankiw 
and Shapiro (1986) is to test the relationship between realised returns and 
consumption betas. Some authors (notably Breeden, Gibbons and Litzen- 
berger (1989)) argue, though, that this underestimates the predictive power 
of the model as consumption data is observed discretely and yet the model 
is continuous. The fourth approach, therefore, is to adjust spot consumption 
data to account for the fact that it is non- continuous and test the model 
under the adjusted consumption data. 
15.1 Parametric tests 
In the previous chapter it was shown that, under a single period parametric 
representation of asset returns and consumption (equations 29,26): 
E[Ri] + 0.5Var(Ri) = -ln(P) +, y(E[Alncl + Cov[Ri, Alnc]) 
-0.57'Var(Alnc) 
Et[Rit - Rit] = 
Var(Rit) - Var(Rjt) 
2 
(40) 
-jCov(Rjt - Rit, Alncýll) 
This equation forms the basis for analysis of Hansen and Singleton (1983), 
Ferson (1983), Hall (1988) and Wheatley (1988). Notice, though, that it is 
not possible to observe E[Alnc) directly. Three ways have been adopted to 
overcome this problem. First, one can take survey data on expected changes 
701t is worth mentioning that Brown and Gibbons (1985) estimate the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion to be between 1 and 2, which shows reasonable intertemporal stability. 
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in variables as a proxy for average investor expectations. Hall (1988) uses 
this approach for part of his paper. The second technique is to estimate the 
expectation using instrumental variables that are available to the econome- 
trician at time t-1. Following Hansen and Singleton (1983), all four papers 
in this area assume that E[Alncj can be expressed as a polynomial in lags 
of log asset returns and log consumption changes. Notice that, from the 
previous equation, expected changes in log asset returns are proportional to 
expected changes in log consumption changes, with the coefficient of pro- 
portionality being the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Therefore, the 
assumption that expected changes in log consumption can be expressed as 
a polynomial in lagged operators of log asset returns and log consumption 
consumption changes imposes a similar property on expected changes in log 
returns. Using maximum-lik-elihood methods, these papers are then able 
to jointly estimate these lag polynomial parameters as well as -f, # (under 
assumptions of stationarity). They can also test the accuracy of the null 
hypothesis of the equation 40 by using a likelihood ratio test statistic to 
look for overidentification of the model". The third approach is to deal with 
equation 41 direct by observing that Rit - Rjt is orthogonal to all variables 
in the economet ri ci an's observable data set at t-1. Therefore Rit - Rjt can 
be regressed against lagged asset returns with the null hypothesis being that 
the regression coefficients should be zero. This approach, though, does not 
"A discussion of the full econometric issues are outside the scope of this paper. The 
reader is referred to, for example, Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) for a discussion on in- 
strumental variables, overidentification (both chapter 7) and likelihood ratio test statistics (chapter 8). 
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provide estimates for -y, P. 
Using monthly data from 1959 to 1978 and a value weighted market in- 
dex Hansen and Singleton (1983) find -1 to be between 1 and 2 and estimate 
P to be below, but close to one. Under this specification, they were un- 
able to reject the general model. However, under alternate specifications of 
the model (using individual share data, riskfree returns or the difference be- 
tween asset returns) the model appeared to perform badly. Wheatley (1988) 
confirms that treasury bill returns and consumption data do not appear to 
corroborate these parametric specifications of the Euler equation. Through 
the use of simulations, though, he argues that maximum likelihood estima- 
tors of high coefficients of relative risk aversion are too low in small samples. 
This is very closely related to the work of Kocherlakota (1990b), that finds 
coefficients of relative risk aversion can also be underestimated using non- 
parametric approaches. The main contribution of Wheatley (1988) is, that 
he contends that if consumption data is measured with error then the true 
relationship between consumption and asset returns will be underestimated 
by applying econometric techniques to reported data. This leads to overre- 
jection of consumption based asset pricing models. Again using simulations 
he shows that the model can be rejected 50% of the time at the 1% level using 
"reasonable" estimates of measurement error. Ferson (1983) observed that 
equation 40 holds not only under the assumption of power utility, lognor- 
mal asset returns and consumption changes but also for constant absolute 
risk averse utility, changes in normal real consumption and lognormal as- 
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set returns. Therefore, this equation can be used to test constant relative 
risk aversion against constant absolute risk aversion utility functions. Us- 
ing quarterly data from 1947-1980 he finds very little evidence of predictable 
patterns in changes in consumption using inflation, stock market returns and 
consumption data as instrumental variables. However, there are predictable 
patterns in changes in the real returns on 3-month treasury bills over the 
period. This is difficult to reconcile with the observation that expected asset 
returns and expected log consumption changes should have the same charac- 
teristics in terms of the lagged polynomial on instrumental variables under 
the null hypothesis. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Ferson (1983) has difficulty in 
reconciling his consumption/t-bill data with the Euler equation. Two out of 
three estimates of relative risk aversion are negative in the case of CRRA. 
He suggests this might be due to time variation in the covariance terms - 
that is, a violation of the assumptions of stationarity. 
15.2 Non-parametric tests 
The non-parametric approach relies heavilY on the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GNIM) approach as developed by Lars Peter Hansen (1982). Again, 
a full review of this technique is outside the scope of this thesis and the reader 
is referred to one of many text book treatments of this area 72 .A brief 
dis- 
cussion of the intuition behind the tests follow. It is known from the Euler 
equation that for all assets i, EO[(1 + ri)U'[cl, 111P[co, 0] - 1] = 0. There- 
"Again Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) provides a good review, while Hamilton (1994) 
explicitly refers to Hansen and Singleton (1982) in its discussion of GNINI. Ferson (1995) 
reviews this area from more of a financial economics perspective. 
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fore, (1 + ri) U'(cl, 11 /U'[co, 01 -1 is orthogonal to all data observable to the 
econometrician at time 0. Therefore, it is possible for the econometrician to 
introduce a set of instrumental variables available at time t=0 and test for 
orthogonality between these variables and (1 + ri) U'[cl, 11 IU'[co, 0] - 1. If 
(s)he is going to observe the returns to x assets and there are z instrumental 
variables then there are xz orthogonality conditions that can be tested. The 
econometrician is trying to estimate two parameters (in the case of isoelastic 
utility), #, -I, and GMNI provides a technique to identify the values of these 
parameters that comes "closest" to fulfilling all xz orthogonality conditions. 
However, as most tests have many more than two orthogonality conditions, 
it is possible for the model to be overidentified. Therefore GNIM also pro- 
vides an overidentification diagnostic to test whether the model itself can be 
rejected by the model. 
There are two main papers in this area. Hansen and Singleton (1982) 
(and errata - Hansen and Singleton (1984)) test isoelastic utility under 
GMNI using monthly data from February 1959 to December 1978. They use 
three series of asset returns and various series of instrumental variables to 
implement GMNI. They estimate y to be somewhat less than one and # to 
be below, but very close to one. Their tests of overidentification depend on 
the instrumental variables used in the test. However, for certain sets of in- 
strumental. variables the model is clearly overidentified while GMNI should 
not be overidentified for any viable instrumental variable sets. So, while the 
parameter estimates are reasonable, the support for the model is not strong. 
185 
Epstein and Zin (1991) use GMNI to test the Kreps-Porteus utility function. 
Using monthly data from April 1959 to December 1986 they estimate that 
the ela§ticity of substitution is always less than one, the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion is about one and beta is greater than one. As with Hansen and 
Singleton (1982) they find that the choice of instrumental variables signifi- 
cantly influence their results. The overidentifying restrictions again suggest 
that the model is often overidentified. Ferson and Merrick (1987) uses, as its 
instrumental variable, a dummy variable indicating whether the economy is 
in a recessionary or non-recessionary period. The coefficient on this variable 
is significantly different from zero which can only be reconciled with the Eu- 
ler equation if parameters fl, -y are different in recession and non-recessionary 
periods. So, these non-parametric tests cannot be considered to give strong 
support for standard models 
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. 
"The (GIUM) test is based on a X2 statistic that summarises, in one 
number, how the data conform to the model's many restrictions. The 
tests usually reject. This is not surprising since we know all models 
are false. The disappointment comes when the rejection is not pursued 
for additional descriptive information, obscure in the X2 test7 about 
which restrictions of the model (time-series, cross-sectional or both) 
are the problem. In short, tests of the consumption model sometimes 
fail the test of usefulness; they don't enhance our ability to describe 
the behaviour of returns. " 
Fama (1991) p. 1596 
Kocherlakota (1990a), in the vein of Wheatley (1988), conducts a sim- 
ulation using GMM to test the accuracy of the parameter estimates and 
73 See also Chan, Foresi and Lang (1996) who produce empirical evidence (including 
GNINI tests) which gives greater support to their money-based CAPNI than the CCAPNI. 
The tests are not really supportive of either model and in both cases the estimates of 
relative risk aversion are both very high and imprecise. 
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overidentifying restrictions". In order to match the mean return and vari- 
ance of the riskfree rate and equity premium over the period 1889 - 1978 
she sets #=1.139, -y = 13.7 (notice that these values of #, -y that solve the 
puzzle). Using GMM and four hundred simulations of ninety data points 
she finds that the point estimates of P, -1 are reasonably close to their true 
values. However, the overidentifying restrictions reject the model much too 
frequently. She argues that the Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) bounds test 
is less prone to overrejection. 
15.3 Realised returns vs. consumption betas 
Mankiw and Shapiro (1986), Wheatley (1988) (for the US) and Sauer and 
Murphy (1992) (for Germany) estimate the CCAPNI using an approach to 
see whether there is a positive relationship between consumption betas and 
realised returns for assets. They also compare the predictive abilities of the 
CAPM against those of the consumption CAPM. As mentioned in chapter 2, 
under Kreps-Porteus utility, predicted asset returns have both a CCAPNI and 
CAPM component. Using quarterly data from 1959-82, Nlankiw and Shapiro 
(1986) find "no support" for the CCAPM in isolation and discover that, when 
comparing the CAPM and CCAPM, "the coefficient on the market beta 
is always far larger and far more significant than is the coefficient on the 
consumption beta" (ibid. p. 457). Sauer and Murphy (1992) support these 
findings for quarterly data (and monthly data using the MCP method of 
"She also shows that the technique of Friend and Blume (1975) provides very misleading 
(understated) estimates of risk aversion. 
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Breeden et al. (1989) outlined below) from 1968-88 in Germany. Returning to 
the US, Wheatley (1988) finds, using monthly data from 1959-81, a positive, 
and significant, coefficient on the beta coefficient. However, the estimate of 
relative risk aversion is very high (over 100). Therefore, while the model 
cannot be rejected, the estimates of risk aversion appear to be unrealistic. 
15.4 Adjusting spot consumption data 
It can be argued that tests that use quarterly data to test the CCAPNI will 
understate the predictive power of the model. This is because quarterly 
consumption is less volatile than spot consumption. It can be shown (see, 
for example, Breeden et al. (1989)) that the variance of quarterly consump- 
tion is 2/3 the variance of spot consumption and consumption betas will be 
estimated that are 3/4 their true "spot" values. Moving to monthly data 
significantly reduces this problem - the estimated consumption beta now 
becomes 93.75% its true spot value. Unfortunately monthly consumption 
data is not available over the long term and therefore the major empirical 
studies of the CCAPM have used quarterly data for their analysis. Gross- 
man et al. (1987) and Breeden et al. (1989) address this issue in different 
ways". The latter does not attempt to measure betas against consumption 
per se, but against a portfolio of stocks that has maximum correlation with 
quarterly consumption data (the "maximum correlated portfolio" (NICP)). 
Such an approach is theoretically justified by Breeden (1979) and Breeden 
et al. (1989) themselves. The consumption CAPM can then be tested using 
75 See also Litzenberger and Ronn (1986) for an early paper in this area. 
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monthly stock market data. Using data from 1929-82 and implementing a 
maximum likelihood estimation approach, they find that higher consump- 
tion betas earn higher returns and the relationship between risk and return 
appears reasonably linear. This paper can be considered to give qualified, 
but by no means overwhelming, support for the general consumption based 
asset pricing model. Grossman et al. (1987) postulate a joint continuous time 
form for consumption and asset returns that predict that samples of these 
variables taken at regular intervals should describe an ARMA(1,1) process. 
Using a number of different data sets over the period 1890-1981 and using a 
maximum likelihood estimation approach they use point values of asset and 
consumption data to estimate the parameters of the continuous time process. 
Using this process, they find that the model is both overindentified and get 
a wide range of estimates of relative risk aversion from around 2 to well over 
100. 
16 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the representative agent consumption 
based asset pricing theory developed in chapter 2 is unable to explain the 
average equity premium and real riskfree rate in the US over the last cen- 
tury. The theory "fails" because aggregate consumption has grown so fast 
and so smoothly. As the Mehra & Prescott puzzles can be presented under 
a number of different specifications of the representative agent paradigm, 
this restricts the number of potential solutions to the puzzles: four paths 
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to reconciling the theory and evidence have been presented here. First, the 
ex-post realisation of aggregate consumption and asset returns may not be 
representative of ex-ante expectations. The crash model of Rietz (1988) and 
survivorship evidence of Brown et al. (1995) might suggest that investors were 
worried in advance about potential market / consumption crashes that have 
not been realised in this century in the United States. This would violate 
the assumption of smooth aggregate consumption that was needed to derive 
equation 35. The low precision of estimates of average asset returns should 
also be emphasised: an average equity premium of 4% and real riskfree rate 
of 2.5% lies within the 95% confidence bound of Cecchetti et al. (1993). Sec- 
ond, by relaxing the assumption of additively time-separable power utility 
functions, the coefficient of relative risk aversion can be separated from the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. While allowing for habit persistence 
and recursive utility functions helps explain the riskfree rate puzzle the eq- 
uity premium puzzle is surprisingly robust to more general specifications of 
investor preferences. Third, it has been suggested that incomplete markets 
may solve the puzzles. The impact of market incompleteness is amplified 
by a fourth relaxation of the representative agent paradigm - market fric- 
tions and borrowing constraints. It has been argued, both in a precautionary 
savings context and in models with both risky and riskfree assets, that the 
key driver of such models is the persistence of idiosyncratic risk. If individ- 
ual risk is long lived, then it is optimal for investors to prepare themselves 
in advance for such risk. This has significant impact on equilibrium asset 
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prices. If endowment risks are short term then financial markets can be used 
to smooth consumption. Only in the presence of severe market frictions in 
all financial markets will asset prices deviate significantly (in the economic 
sense) from the complete market case. The incomplete market models that 
appear most likely to resolve the Mehra & Prescott puzzles are ones where 
there is a low probability, high impact, endowment "crash" (unemployment) 
that is long lived. Evidence for the US, though, suggests that unemployment 
shocks are reasonably short term, although periods of unemployment in the 
UK are longer lived. This has lead several authors (see, for example, Heaton 
& Lucas and Aiyagari (1994)) to conclude that incomplete market models 
are unlikely to explain the puzzles of Mehra & Prescott unless there are fairly 
strong market frictions in both the stock and bond markets. This evidence is 
not, though, conclusive and in chapter 6 an innovative empirical test is run 
that aims to determine the importance of idiosyncratic endowment shocks to 
equilibrium asset prices. 
Following this lengthy debate on the Mehra & Prescott puzzles, the chap- 
ter finishes with two sections on related empirical tests. Section 14 consid- 
ers Hansen-Jagannathan bounds tests and the ability of various models to 
explain higher moments of observed asset returns. As no model has been 
presented that is fullY successful in explaining the first moments, it is un- 
surprising that the models presented earlier in the chapter do not pass these 
more stringent tests. Section 15 briefly highlights the fact that the Mehra 
& Prescott puzzles are by no means the only empirical anomalies that result 
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from standard representative agent consumption based asset pricing theory. 
Several studies have been able to reject the model while none have found 
strong support for it. Estimates of the coefficient of risk aversion have varied 
widely and in some cases have even been negative. The standard errors of 
the point estimates quoted are also often very large. Because of this, some 
authors are now looking to associate the pricing kernel with other macro vari- 
ables than aggregate consumption. For example, Cochrane (1991a) believes 
that production variables influence equilibrium asset pricing while Chan et 
al. (1996) argues that the growth in monetary aggregates (such as M2 or N13) 
is more likely to explain asset returns than aggregate consumption growth. 
This complete the main literature review section of the thesis. The next 
three chapters proceed as follows. In this chapter, the one period incomplete 
market model of Mankiw (1986) was presented. In this model, personal en- 
dowment risks are high when dividends are low. The next chapter looks in 
detail at the model of Weil (1992a), where dividend risks and endowment 
risks are independent. Two major contributions are made. First, an in- 
tegrated approach is taken to the highly relevant theoretical literature on 
proper risk aversion. This provides a framework for linking several papers in 
the area. A new type of proper risk aversion, called "Basic Risk Aversion", 
emerges naturally. The second major contribution is that this chapter high- 
lights the extreme sensitivity of estimates of the effect of unemployment on 
asset returns to the exact specification of the utility function used. Chap- 
ter 4 makes it clear that further work is urgently needed on estimating the 
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behaviour of investor preferences in low endowment states. In chapter 5, 
optimal aggregate dividend policy is considered in an economy with idiosyn- 
cratic endowment shocks. It is argued that investors are averse to dividend 
cuts (at the aggregate level) at times of high income risk. This may explain 
the observed tendency for dividends to be smoothed and for rights issues 
to be concentrated in bull markets. This is, to the author's knowledge, the 
first application of the incomplete market theory discussed in this chapter 
to corporate finance issues. Chapter 6 looks at the impact of unemployment 
shocks on stock and treasury bill returns. If unemployment is the key fac- 
tor determining the long term average equity premium and real riskfree rate 
then we might expect unemployment news to be a key state variable deter- 
mining changes in asset prices. That is, chapter 6 makes a contribution to 
asset pricing theory by examining how changes in asset prices are affected by 
changes in expectation of unemployment. It is concluded that it is difficult 
to reconcile the rise in the riskfree rate prior to "bad" unemployment news 
with the precautionary savings motive. 
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Part IV 
Proper risk aversion and the 
Mehra & Prescott puzzles 
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Proper risk aversion and the Mehra & 
Prescott puzzleS76 
Abstract 
This chapter examines Weil's application of proper risk aversion to 
the puzzles of Mehra & Prescott and particularly the equity premium 
anomaly. The qualitative effects of proper risk aversion are captured 
by decreasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing prudence. This 
chapter examines the quantitative effect of including independent ex- 
ogenous income risks in equilibrium asset pricing models. If it is as- 
sumed that the utility function can be described by an equation with 
fixed parameters across its domain then it is shown that the model's 
predictions may vary considerably depending on the properties of very 
high derivatives (fifth and above) of the equation. This chapter also 
provides an integrated approach to local proper risk aversion. 
76 Versions of this chapter were presented to the Accounting and Finance group, Uni- 
versity of Warwick, February 1996 and as part of the Doctoral Finance Seminar Series, 
University of Warwick, May 1996.1 am grateful to the participants for their useful com- 
ments. I would also like to thank Philippe Weil and Christian Gollier for their helpful 
observations on this chapter. 
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17 Introduction 
In the last chapter, the puzzles of Mehra & Prescott were described in de- 
tail and potential solutions to these anomalies were outlined. The role that 
uninsurable income risk might play by increasing the volatility of individ- 
ual consumption is highlighted. In particular it is contested that the one 
period model of Mankiw (1986), where the cross-sectional variance in indi- 
vidual income is negatively correlated with the dividend paid by the market, 
is capable of resolving the puzzles". In this chapter, a one period model is 
also applied to the Mehra & Prescott puzzles but in this case income risk 
is independent of marketable risk. Such an approach was initially taken by 
Weil (1992a) and his paper forms the basis for the current study. 
The intuition is as follows. Alehra and Prescott realised that the ob- 
served average equity premium can be explained if the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion of all investors is much higher than is generally accepted. Pratt 
and Zeckhauser (1987) have recently started a debate which considers the 
role that independent exogenous risk to personal capital plays in the de- 
termination of risk aversion. An investor whose aversion to a marketable 
risk increases on the introduction of a background external income risk is 
called "proper risk averse". Recent papers, notably Kimball (1993), show 
the change in an investor's aversion to a marketable risk on the introduction 
of background uncertainty is driven by the second to fourth derivatives of 
77 Although Heaton & Lucas have repeatedly questioned the economic reality of the 
model. 
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her utility function. This result has already been hinted at in section 13-1. 
Weil (1992) has attempted to resolve the equity premium puzzle by com- 
bining a proper risk averse investor with a low probability, highly negatively 
skewed exogenous consumption risk ("unemployment") which is independent 
of stock market risk. His paper includes an example using constant relative 
risk aversion (which ensures proper risk aversion) in an idealised economy. 
Predicted asset returns in this case are reasonably close to their observed 
historical values. This chapter has two main aims. First, a detailed litera- 
ture review of local proper risk aversion provides insight into the relationship 
between its various forms and a new type of proper risk aversion emerges nat- 
urally. Then a series of counterexamples shows that Weil's economy is largely 
driven by assumptions stronger than he explicitly recognises with derivatives 
higher than the fourth playing an important role. Applying the properties 
of proper risk aversion more restrictively the equity premium puzzle remains 
unsolved. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 18 provides an integrated ap- 
proach to local proper risk aversion. As a consequence of this, a new form of 
proper risk aversion emerges (labelled Basic Risk Aversion) and the concept 
of "caution" is introduced. Section 19 describes Weil's example, economic 
interpretation is placed on the fifth derivative of the utility function and the 
problem being addressed is discussed more fully. Section 20 provides util- 
ity functions that are proper risk averse and in many ways similar to power 
utility and yet estimate very different equity premia for Weil's example than 
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power utility. It is inferred that the first four derivatives of the utility func- 
tion do not fully capture the empirical effects of proper risk aversion. Section 
21 concludes. 
18 Proper risk aversion 
This section provides an integrated approach to local proper risk aversion - 
a condition under which exogenous income gambles increase the aversion of 
investors to independent marketable gambles. This section is based in style 
on that given by Gollier and Pratt (1996) and the associated working paper 
(Gollier and Pratt (1993)). Nevertheless, the discussion here does develop 
the existing reviews of this area in a number of ways. By concentrating 
on local proper risk aversion (proper risk aversion in the presence of small 
background gambles) it is possible to create an integrated theory that ties 
together the different strands of proper risk aversion that have been developed 
by different authors at different times. Also, by concentrating on local proper 
risk aversion, the intuition is clearer than in the more complicated case of 
global proper risk aversion (proper risk aversion in the presence of any size 
background gamble). As a consequence of this development a new type 
of proper risk aversion - labelled Basic Risk Aversion here - naturally 
emerges. It is shown that the joint conditions of Basic Risk Aversion and 
positive third derivative of the utility function (denoted by the term Core 
Basic Risk Aversion) is a more general class of proper risk aversion than any 
considered so far. Despite this the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
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local Core Basic Risk Aversion are the same as the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for local Standard Risk Aversion. For this reason the properties of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing absolute prudence guarantee 
proper risk aversion under a broader class of (local) endowment gambles than 
has previously been recognised by the literature. 
18.1 On the utility function 
18.1.1 Risk Aversion, Prudence and Temperance 
Consider a five times differentiable utility of consumption function u(-) that 
is monotonic increasing and risk averse across its domain. The following 
definitions will be useful in the analysis to follow. Consider the utility func- 
tion at some non-stochastic point of consumption c within the domain of the 
function. Use the notation u(')(c) to denote the nth derivative of u at c (so, 
for example, u(1)(c) = u'(c)). Define: 
A -U(')(C)/U(')(c) Absolute risk aversion 
,P _U(3)(C)/U(I)(C) Absolute prudence 
T-U (4) (C) /U (3) (C) Temperance 
C _U(5)(C)/U(4)(C) Caution 
?IT are, of course, functions of u(. ) and c, but the notation takes this 
relation as implicit for simplicity. Here absolute risk aversion is attributable 
to Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1970), prudence to Kimball (1990) and tem- 
perance to Kimball (1992) and Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1993). 
"Caution" is introduced in this chapter for the first time. These proper- 
ties can be easily interpreted. Consider -U(I)(. ), U(2)(. )l _U(3) (-) as "pseudo- 
utility functions" in their own right. The assumptions of monotonicity and 
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risk aversion of u(-) does not ensure that -u(')(-) is risk averse (although it 
must be increasing) nor that U(2) 
(. )j 
-u(') are either increasing or risk averse. 
Despite this, the measures of risk aversion of _U(I)l U(2)ý _U(3) (denoted by 
A(-U(I))) A(U(2))qA(-U(3)) respectively) are defined if we assume that the utility 
function is five times differentiable and that none of the first four deriva- 
tives are equal to zero at c78. By definition P= A(_,, m), T= 
A(U(2)) 
and 
C=A(-U(3)). Therefore P, T and C can be interpreted as the risk aversion of 
pseudo-utility functions _U(I), U(2) and _U(3) respectively79. It is easily seen 
(as noted by Kimball (1990) amongst others) that: 
A! U(3) U(2) 
+ A,: -- A- A(-um) - -: - -- ý(I) .; 
ý "- ý(2) 
Given A>0 by assumption, the following statements are equivalent: (i) 
-u(') is more risk averse than u (ii) P>A (iii) the utility function exhibits 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) A' < 0. This argument can be 
taken up one derivative to give: 
'PI U(4) U(3) 
-T =---=T +P = A(-um) - 
A(U(2)) 
U(3) U(2) 
The assumptions given for u do not ensure that ? is positive so this 
time the equivalent statements are: (i) U (2) is more risk averse than -0) 
"We will return to occurrences where the higher order derivatives are equal to zero at 
c as special cases below. 
79jt should be observed that this interpretation of P, T is not the only one that provides 
economic insight. In particular recall that the observation that A>0 is equivalent to 
observing that an investor is averse to a mean preserving increase in risk of a marketable 
gamble. Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schneider (1995) note that P, T>0 can also be readily 
interpreted in terms of how an investor's aversion to a marketable gamble is influenced by 
the probability distribution of that gamble. 
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(ii) T>P (iii) P and ? are of opposite sign. In particular, for a positive 
prudence utility function the function must also exhibit decreasing absolute 
prudence (DAP) P<0. Just repeating the argument up one more derivative 
gives: 
U(S) U(4) 
---=C +P = 
A(U(2)) 
-A(-U(3)) IT U(4) U(3) 
As the sign of T is again undetermined by the assumptions on u so the 
equivalent statements are: (i) -u(') is more risk averse than u(') (ii) C>T 
(iii) T' and T are of opposite sign. 
While consideringU, _U(I), U(2)1 _U(3) as utility function, it will be helpful 
to consider the Markowitz risk premia, 7r, q, 0,0 respectively, for these utility 
functions for a small gamble g: 
E[u(c + u(c - r) 
E[-u(')(c + -U(, )(c (42) E [u(') (c + u(1)(c - 
E [_U(3)(C + _U(3) 
(c 
- 
If 9 is sufficiently small so that approximations can be taken in the manner 
of Pratt (1964): 
7r = -E[g] + 0.5a? A y 
71 = -E[g] + 0.5cr?? y 
= -E[g] + 0.5a? T y 
= -E[g] + 0.5a? C y 
It is now possible to find relationships between 7r,, q, 0 and 0: 
7r + 0.5a? (P - A) 
+ 0.5akr - P) (43) y + 0.5a? (C - T) v 
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This confirms the equivalence statements derived above that -u(') is more 
risk averse than u if and only if prudence is greater than risk aversion, u(') is 
more risk averse than -u(') if and only if temperance is greater than prudence 
and _U(3) is more risk averse than U(2) if and only if caution is greater than 
temperance. 
18.1.2 Risk aversion with stochastic consumption 
In the previous subsection the Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion 
of utility function u and pseudo-utility functions -u('), U(2)7 -U(3) was con- 
sidered at a p'oint of certain consumption c. Now suppose that consumption 
is stochastic and denoted by 6=c+g+6. Here c is "certain" income, y is 
exogenous income risk (not necessarily with zero mean) and 6 "marketable" 
risk (that is, comes from trading in a gamble) with zero expectation. To 
find the absolute risk aversion in the presence of these two sources of risk, 
a "derived utility function" is used. The derived utility function at c in the 
presence of background risk g is defined by Ei [u (c + 9)] - See Kihlstrom, 
Romer and Williams (1981), Ross (1981) and Nachman (1982) for a detailed 
discussion of how the Pratt-Arrow properties of risk aversion transfer to the 
derived utility function. If g and 6 are independent so that Ep = EjEj then 
the risk premium= for 6 is defined by: 
Ej, j[u(c +g+ 6)] = Ej[u(c +g- w)] 
Taking Taylor's series expansions in the usual way of Pratt (1964) gives: 
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tu O%J 
12 _EU(2)(C +12 
f-ýo 2a6 Eju(')(c + g) 2-" 
where Aj denotes absolute risk aversion in the presence of exogenous risk 
y- that is, the risk aversion of the derived utility function. Notice that 
It is the former and not the latter that 
gives risk aversion in the presence of background uncertainty. In this section 
the focus is on small income gambles. In this case it is possible to use the 
Markowitz risk premia of equation 42 to derive an equation to define the 
difference between the risk aversion of an investor with stochastic income 
c+9 and one with certain income c: 
AA: = AV -A= 
Pýj 
u (2) (C _ lk) +u 
(2) (C) 
u (1) (c -- u (1) (c) 
U(3) (U(2»2 
71) (U(l»2 
0-p. 4 _, qA2 
where the second line comes from approximating u(c - q) ; zzi u'(c) in the 
denominator. So, by applying equation 43 to the previous equation, for g to 
cause AA >0 (under the assumption that A> 0): 
r(A-? ) < 0.5a? [(T-? )? +(A-? )'] v 
q(A - P) < 0.5or? (T - y 
O(A - P) < 0.5a? (T - P)A v 
0.5a? [(T-P)A+(C-T)(A-? )] y 






18.2 Standard and Proper Risk Aversions 
This subsection on proper risk aversion is based on that given by Gollier and 
Pratt (1996) but here includes Very Weak Risk Aversion (defined below) 
and the concept of Basic Risk Aversion is introduced for the first time. Con- 
sider a set of exogenous background gambles Ej (c, u) for i=0,1,2,3,4a, 4b. 
Elements of Ej (c, u) will be denoted by g. These will be defined as follows: 
EO(C, U) 19JEu(')(c+g): 5u(')(c)}; 
EJ(C, U) jgjEu(')(c+P)ý: u(')(c)j; 
E2(C, U) fgjEu(c+g): ý, u(c)}; 
E3(Ci U) f91 Eg < 0}; 
4&(Ci U) fg I Eg = 0}; 
rj4b(CsU) M {913yo: 5 0 :5= yo with probability 1}. 
We now define u to be "proper at c" with respect to Ei(c, u) (and the fact 
that it is proper under Ej at c will be denoted by Pi(c)) if: 
Eu (c +ý+ 9) :5 Eu (c + g) whenever Eu (c + ýi) :5u (c) and 9E Ei (w, u) 
In words, this can be understood as "Any unattractive gamble cannot be 
made attractive by the introduction of an independent background gamble 
in Ei if the utility function at c is proper with respect to Ei". Alternatively 
it can be said that an investor is at least as risk averse in the presence of 
9E Ei as in its absence if the investor is proper risk averse with respect to 
Ei. That is, AA ý! 0 for 9E Ei". We restrict the discussion here to strict 
'01 am grateful to Christian Gollier for the observation that, strictly speaking, this 
chapter is dealing with "local local proper risk aversion" as "AA(c) ý: 0 does not imply 
that AA(c) ý: 0 for c' 0 c" (private correspondence with author). Therefore this definition 
of proper risk aversion will only hold if both the marketable and nonmarketable gamble is 
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Property Risk Aversion Paper 
POW Basic This chapter 
A (c) Standard Kimball (1993) 
P2 (C) Proper Pratt & Zeckhauser (1987) 
P3(C) Risk Vulnerability Gollier & Pratt (1996) 
P4. (C) "Very Weak Proper" Franke et al. (1995) 
P O(C) DARA 
Table 3: Definitions of the various forms of Proper Risk Aversion with the 
initial paper that developed the concept. The term "Very Weak Proper" 
is used here but Franke et al. do not give this property a name. Risk 
Vulnerability was called Weak Proper Risk Aversion in Gollier and Pratt's 
1993 working paper. 
inequality 81 
. 
A utility function is said to be "propee if it is proper at all c within the 
domain of the utility function. The various concepts of properness that relate 
to the different forms of Ei(c, u) are defined in table 3". Property Po(c) - 
that of Basic Risk Aversion - is introduced for the first time in this chapter. 
This chapter now proceeds by examining necessary and sufficient con- 
ditions for these types of proper risk aversion for small exogenous income 
gambles 5. The utility function will then be said to be "locally propee (at 
c) as opposed to "globally propee, which refers to general endowment gam- 
bles in Ej (c, u). In general, it is not possible to derive simple necessary and 
small. This chapter stays with the terminology "local proper risk aversion" for simplicity 
but it should be borne in mind that it is "local local proper risk aversion" that is being 
referred to. 
"Except for the alternating sign of derivative condition of Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) 
which is a weak inequality condition. This can be seen by looking at exponential utility, 
which does have alternating sign derivatives but which does not satisfy the strict inequality 
conditions for proper risk aversion. 
"Somewhat ambiguously, "proper risk aversion7' and "Proper Risk Aversion" are taken 
to have different meanings. A utility function is said to be proper risk averse with respect 
to Ei for unspecified i. If i=2 then the investor is Proper Risk Averse. 
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sufficient conditions for general background gambles. This more limited ap- 
proach increases the economic intuition and also enable us to consider the 
inter-relations between the different forms of proper risk aversion. 
18.2.1 Local proper risk aversion 
The six types of Ej (c, u) can be divided into two categories. For i=3,4a, 4b, 
Ei is defined depending on the properties of g alone. For i=0,1,2 Ej is 
defined by the relationship between g and u. For the purposes of this sub- 
section, it is useful to consider these two categories of Ej separately 
Ei(c, u) for i=3,4a, 4b 
Decompose P into a zero expectation gamble Z and a certain negative shift 
in income b. How does this change the absolute risk aversion of the investor 
with certain background consumption c? Assume that 6 is sufficiently small 
to ignore terms in 6' and above: 
AA 
-T = [A] -E 
[U(2)(C +2_ 6)11 
E[u(l)(c +2- 6)] j 
E [22] U(4) U(3) U(5) U(4) U(3) 
U(2) U(I) U(j)] 
)+6 (U(2) 




where the utility function is evaluated at c and where: 
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00 
Q (E3) = 




fj (j2) = 
00 





. ! u (I) um 
n=2 
For small gambles the omega terms , E[P]8 term and the bU(2)/U(I) term 
in the denominator can be considered sufficiently small to ignore. Therefore, 
a zero expectation consumption gamble is going to increase the absolute risk 
aversion of an investor if and only if P(T - A) = P(T - P) + P(P - A) = 
I -pl +, p(, p 
A) > 083 
- Notice that this does not restrict P>0 nor 
T>A. This condition can be restated to say that d[U(3)/U(I)]/dc < 0. This 
is the necessary and sufficient condition given in Franke, Stapleton and Sub- 
rahmanyarn (1994) for local Very Weak Proper Risk Aversion 84 .A certain 
decrease in wealth will increase risk aversion if and only if P>A-a condi- 
tion equivalent to DARA. For local Risk Vulnerability, it is necessary for the 
utility function to be locally Very Weak Proper and DARA. That is P>A, 
T>A are necessary conditions for local Risk Vulnerability. These condi- 
tions are also sufficient for negative expectation stochastic background risk 
to increase absolute risk aversion; a condition not covered by either DARA 
or Very Weak Proper Risk Aversion and yet covered by Risk Vulnerability. 
Therefore ?>A, T>A are necessary and sufficient conditions for local 
Risk Vulnerability -a result given by Gollier and Pratt (1996). 
831f U(3) =0 then T is not well defined. In this case equation 48 shows that 0) <0 is 
necessary and sufficient for the function to be locally Very Weak Proper Risk Averse. 
8'Strictly speaking, Franke et al. show that this condition is necessary for an increase 
in an existing exogenous risk to increase risk aversion. This is slightly different from the 
comparison of risk aversion in the presence and absence of a background risk. The strict 
result of Franke et al. can also be derived without difficulty from this analysis. 
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Ei(c, u) for i=0,1,2 
The proofs in this subsection are somewhat similar to the ones given in 
Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) and Weil (1992a) where certainty equivalents 
are used to prove that DAP and DARA are sufficient for global Proper Risk 
Aversion. There are important differences between their proofs and the one 
given here, however. They derive a sufficient condition for a global property 
of one form of proper risk aversion. The results here are, though, both neces- 
sary and sufficient and apply to more general classes of proper risk aversion. 
These conditions do, though, only apply locally. The proofs rely on three 
straightforward observations: (i) if the first three derivatives are non-zero at 
c then, for any iEf0,1,2}, there exists some real number g such that, if 
9=g with certainty, then 9E Ej (ii) For any 9E Ej the Markowitz risk 
premium of this gamble on the pseudo-utility function associated with Ej 
will have the opposite sign to the sign of y, (iii) By adjusting the expected 
value of g, it will be possible to create a gamble in Ej with Markowitz risk 
premium on the pseudo-utility function associated with Ei arbitrarily close 
to zero. The proofs now follow: 
Return to the Markowitz risk premia given in equation 42. First, suppose 
that 9E E2(C, u). Then, there exists some positive number y+ such that, if 
y= -y+ with certainty then 9E E2(C, u) as u'(1) > 0. For this gamble, the 
right hand side of equation 44 is zero as y- has zero variance. This restricts 
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A<? as 7r >0 (z has the opposite sign to -g+). Consider the set of 
gambles in E2(C, U) with positive variance, which again is certainly a non- 
empty subset. The left hand side of equation 44 will always be negative as 7r 
must be positive and A<P from above. So provided that (T-? )P > -(A- 
? )2 then the inequality will always hold true. This condition is therefore 
sufficient for Proper Risk Aversion in the presence of small consumption 
gambles. It is also necessary as there will be elements Of E2 (Ci U) with non- 
infinitesimal variance and positive expectation with 7r arbitrarily close to 
(but always above) zero. For these cases, the right hand side must be strictly 
positive and so the condition is necessary as well as sufficient. So, necessary 
and sufficient conditions for local Proper Risk Aversion are P>A and 
(T - P)? > -(A - P)'. These conditions are algebraically equivalent to 
the local necessary and sufficient conditions given in Pratt and Zeckhauser 
(1987) (A' < 0, X> A'A) and Gollier and Pratt (1996) (? > A, TIA > 
2- (AIP)). 
Consider now Ej(c, u). Because U(2) <0 by assumption, there again 
exists a positive V+ such that g= -9+ E Ej (c, u). Given that q>0 for this 
particular risk (opposite sign to -9+), applying equation 45 for this g it is 
clear again that P>A. Now consider a gamble g with positive variance but 
mean adjusted so that q is arbitrarily close to zero. Then the right hand side 
of equation 45 must be positive and this restricts 'T >P (as P>A> 0). 
This is also a sufficient condition as the left hand side of equation 45 will 
always be negative. So T>P>A is necessary and sufficient. 
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The case of Eo(c, u) is the most complicated as no assumption is made 
about the sign of 0). As U(3) 00 by assumption g=9E Eo(c, u) for 
positive or negative g. First consider the case when U(3) > 0. An investor 
who has positive third derivative of utility and is Basic Risk Averse (at c) will 
be said to be "Core Basic Risk Averse". In this case 5= -9+ E Eo so 0>0 
for all gambles in E0. Therefore, as the left hand side of equation 46 must 
be negative for this g, this restricts P>A. Applying the usual arguments 
now of examining a stochastic gamble P with mean adjusted such that 0 is 
arbitrarily close to zero, this implies that T>P is a necessary condition 
for local Core Basic Risk Aversion. It is also sufficient through the usual 
argument. If U(3) <0 the non stochastic gamble in Eo(c, u) is 9= V+ E Eo, 
and 0<0 for all gambles in E0. As U(3) < 0, ?<0 and so the left hand 
side of equation 46 is certainly negative. Again, by introducing a stochastic 
gamble with mean adjusted to make 0 arbitrarily close to zero, the usual 
argument shows that T>? is necessary and sufficient. Notice that, in this 
case, T is not restricted to be positive. So for Basic Risk Aversion one of the 
following two sets of conditions are necessary and sufficient: (i) T>P>A 
(ii) P<0, T> *P. The former (Core Basic Risk Aversion) is of more interest 
here. Notice that uP) is bounded away from zero from above in this case. So 
if a utility function is Basic Risk Averse over its domain and Core Basic Risk 
Averse at some point then it is Core Basic Risk Averse over its domain". As 
the focus here is on Core Basic Risk Aversion the restriction that 0) 00 is 
85Provided that the third derivative is continuous, which is assured as the utility function 
is five times differentiable. 
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not constraining. 
Result 1A necessary and sufficient condition for Standard and Core Basic 
Risk Aversion in the presence of small consumption gambles is: 
T>P>A 
While Kimball (1993) has shown that DAP and DARA are necessary and 
sufficient for global Standard Risk Aversion the author believes that this is 
the first time that it has been shown that these conditions are also necessary 
for local Standard Risk Aversion. These conditions are also necessary and 
sufficient conditions for local Core Basic Risk Aversion. 
Examine the inter-relations between the various forms of proper risk aver- 
sion. If an investor is Core Basic Risk Averse then it is necessary that her 
temperance is greater than her prudence (this is true for local Core Basic 
Risk Aversion and so must also be true for global Core Basic Risk Aversion). 
This implies that 0) is more risk averse than -0) and so Ei(CU) C Eo(cu). 
So if an investor is Core Basic Risk Averse then she is certainly Standard Risk 
Averse. If an investor is Standard Risk Averse then her prudence is greater 
than her risk aversion. This implies that -0) is more risk averse than u 
and so E2(Cu) C EI(Cu). So if an investor is Standard Risk Averse then she 
is certainly Proper Risk Averse. That E3 C E2 follows from the risk aversion 
of u. So Proper Risk Aversion is sufficient for Risk Vulnerability. Finally, 
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by definition and the assumption that 0) > 01 
E4a C: E3 and E4b C E3- 
So Risk Vulnerability is sufficient for Very Weak Proper Risk Aversion and 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. Notice that local Core Basic Risk Aversion 
is a strictly stronger property than local Standard Risk Aversion - that is, 
El (c, u) is a strict subset of Eo (c, u). Despite this, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for local Core Basic and Standard Risk Aversions are identical. 
Hence the conditions given by Kimball (1993) for Standard Risk Aversion 
apply locally to a greater class of consumption gambles than he recognises. 
Is it possible to broaden the class of local consumption gambles P further 
and still have DAP and DARA as necessary and sufficient conditions to have 
the utility function proper risk averse with respect to this set of gambles? 
Define E-1(c, u) = 
19JE[U(3)(C + p)] - U (3) (C) Assume that the utility 
function is DAP and DARA and five times differentiable. Do these conditions 
ensure that the utility function is proper with respect to E-I? Because DAP 
ensures that u(4) <0 this means that P= -9+ E E-1. So, ý>0 for all 
gambles in E-1. As 'P >A this implies that the left hand side of equation 
47 is certainly negative but can be made arbitrarily close to zero as usual 
by adjusting the mean of g. So, the right hand side must be positive. The 
assumption of DAP and DARA says nothing about the relationship between 
C and T. Notice, though, that this form of proper risk aversion will only be 
of interest if EO C E-1 or _U(3) is more risk averse than u('). This only holds 
if C>T, which is the case now considered. Considering the right hand side 
of equation 47 with C>T and A<P the condition that T>P (DAP) is 
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no longer sufficient to ensure that the right hand side is positive. So DAP 
and DARA do not imply local properness with respect to E-1 which is the 
next obvious progression from Core Basic Risk Aversion. 
18.2.2 Global proper risk aversion 
The chapter so far has focused on local proper risk aversion; that is, proper 
risk aversion in the presence of small background gambles that are indepen- 
dent of marketable gambles. However, in general, even if a utility function 
is locally proper with respect to Ei(c, u) for some i across its domain this is 
no guarantee that the utility is globally proper with respect to i. Authors 
have, in general, had great difficulty in establishing tractable conditions that 
are necessary and sufficient for global proper risk aversion. The only simple 
necessary and sufficient condition that has been established for global proper 
risk aversion is attributable to Kimball (1993). He showed that, if a utility 
function exhibited DAP and DARA across its domain, then this is necessary 
and sufficient for global Standard Risk Aversion. Therefore, in this case, 
if the local conditions hold across the domain, then this is necessary and 
sufficient for the global condition to hold. 
For Proper Risk Aversion, the analogous result does not hold. Gollier 
and Pratt (1996) show that if a utility function is locally Proper Risk Averse 
across its domain then this is sufficient for the function to be globally Risk 
Vulnerable. The sufficiency condition for global Proper Risk Aversion orig- 
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Figure 7: Sufficient and necessary k sufficient conditions for the various 
forms of local and global proper risk aversion. 
tives of the utility function is, in fact, more restrictive than the conditioll Of 
DAP and DARA that ensure the stronger property of global Standard Risk 
Aversion. That is, there are no known easily tractable restrictions on the 
utility function that are sufficient for global Proper Risk Aversion and yet 
are weaker than necessary for global Standard Risk Aversion. 
Despite having introduced the notion, the author makes no attempt here 
to develop tractable sufficient conditions for global Basic Risk Aversion. This 
is seen as an area for possible future development. Figure 7 represents the 
interrelationships between the various forms of local and global proper risk 
aversion. 
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19 Weil's example 
Weil's 1992 paper is perhaps most easily related to the model of Mankiw 
(1986). Both work in a one period framework where there is a marketable 
gamble and risky personal capital. The risk to personal capital is low prob- 
ability, high impact and so is, in many ways, reminiscent of unemployment 
risk. In Nfankiw's model, the cross-sectional variation in income is greatest 
when dividends are low. The main difference is that Weil's economy has 
independent income and market risk. He is, then, able to apply the theory of 
proper risk aversion to the problem. Section 5 of Weil describes the follow- 
ing economy. At time 0 there are two assets that can be traded, a riskfree 
bond and a share. At t=1, each investor stands a probability (0.01,0.99) 
of receiving income y= (1,3). The bond will pay 1 with certainty and the 
share will pay a dividend d= (0.7,1) with probability (0.1,0.9). These two 
risks are independent. It is assumed that utility is U(c) = 6`11(1 - j). 
Consumption c at time 1 will be y+d. The predicted equity premium and 
riskfree rate in this economy is compared with an identical economy where 
the probability of unemployment (y = 1) is zero. It is shown that introducing 
the risk of unemployment reduces the required value of y to make the equity 
premium 6% from c. 17 to c. 8. For values of -y around 15, it is shown that the 
predicted equity premium is increased around threefold by the possibility of 
unemployment. The impact when unemployed income is zero is even more 
pronounced. The example also shows a dramatic impact on the predicted 
riskfree rate through the precautionary savings motive. 
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While, in Weil's example, the exogenous background risk has small neg- 
ative expectation (as the baseline case has y=3 with certainty), the change 
in expectation of consumption caused by this risk is a second order effect. 
For the remainder of this section it is convenient to assume that Weil's ex- 
ample has zero expectation and apply the theory of Risk Vulnerability. The 
following result will also prove useful: 
Result 2 The relative change in absolute risk aversion caused to a Risk Vul- 
nerable investor by a small zero expectation uninsurable consumption back- 
ground risk is decreasing in expected consumption if and only if. - 
C> 'P+ A 
[1 
P ro of. From equation 48 dldc[AAIAI I 6=o = 
dldc[(U(4)IU(2))_(U(3)IU(I))] 
0. By calculating the differential and remembering that *PT > 0, result 2 
follows direct. 
It is not possible to establish whether result 2 or decreasing temperance 
(which implies and is implied by C>T for a positive temperance utility 
function) imposes a stronger restriction on C. This is because Risk Vulnera- 
bility places no restrictions on the relationship between T and 'P. Even if the 
requirement for Standard Risk Aversion and local Core Basic Risk Aversion 
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is imposed (T > P), the stronger of these conditions can vary. To see this, 
try A=1, P =2 and then T=2.1 or 3. Decreasing temperance requires 
C>T>P. So C>2.1,3 respectively. Result 2 requires C>2.52,2.66 
respectively. Therefore decreasing temperance is neither necessary nor suf- 
ficient for a decrease in expected consumption to lead to a greater relative 
increase in risk aversion from the introduction of the same exogenous con- 
sumption risk". Notice also that result 2 need not hold for a Very Weak 
Proper Risk Averse investor even though the income risk is assumed to have 
zero expectation. This is because PT need not be positive in this case. 
Power utility is proper risk averse under all the definitions given in this 
chapter. Further, it has fifth and sixth derivatives that will ensure that 
AAIA is monotonic decreasing and convex in c. So, examples that use 
power utility may be exploiting proper risk aversion phenomena or may be 
appealing to properties of high order derivatives (greater than four) of the 
utility function. Result 2 also places, for the first time, intuition on the 
role that the fifth derivative of the utility function plays. It informs us of 
how the change in aversion of a proper risk averse investor to a marketable 
gamble on the introduction of a small zero expectation background exogenous 
consumption gamble is influenced by the expected consumption level of the 
investor. 
'61t should be noted that if AAIA is required to be convex in c, as well as monotonic 
decreasing, then this will place economic interpretation on the sixth derivative of the utility 
function. The algebraic restrictions on u(6)(c) that will ensure this convexity is too messy 
to present here but can be easily established by the interested reader. 
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19.1 The issue to be addressed 
If an investor is globally Risk Vulnerable then, by definition, the predicted 
equity premium in the presence of Weil's unemployment risk will be higher 
than in its absence. Standard Risk Aversion implies Risk Vulnerability and it 
is known that, for global Standard Risk Aversion, restrictions must be placed 
on the first four derivatives of the utility function but place no limitations 
on higher order derivatives. To quote two leading authors: 
To tell into which direction one is misled by the representative agent 
assumption when there is idiosyncratic labor income risk, it is nec- 
essary to know how consumers' attitudes towards dividend risk are 
affected by the existence of background uninsurable labor income risk 
- an aspect of behavior determined by the signs and magnitudes of 
higher order (i. e., larger than 3) derivatives of the utility function. 
While it is difficult to get introspective knowledge of those high deriva- 
tives, it is fortunate that all commonly used utility functions (except 
for the watershed case of exponential utility, and for quadratic utility) 
guarantee - because they exhibit DARA and DAP - that the rep- 
resentative agent model underpredicts, and sometimes by a very large 
factor, the size of the equity premium. 
(Weil (1992) p. 788) 
... the combination of monotonicity, concavity, decreasing absolute 
risk aversion and decreasing absolute prudence imposes no require- 
ments on the fifth and higher derivatives of the utility function... 
(KimbaU (1993) p. 599) 
The remainder of this chapter emphasises an important issue that arise 
from these quotations. In the first paragraph, Weil appreciates that it is all 
higher order derivatives that drive the theoretical equity premium. In the 
second paragraph it is implied that it is the properties of DAP and DARA 
that cause the "very large factor" underprediction in the representative agent 
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model. Similarly Kimball implies that the impact of background risk is well 
captured by the first four derivatives of the utility function. Here it is argued 
that, while DAP and DARA cause a theoretical difference to the predicted 
equity premium, the magnitude of the predicted equity premium in the ex- 
ample of Weil (1992a) is driven by higher order derivatives of the utility 
function. 
It is known from above that Ai = -Ei[U(2)(C+ 9)]/Ei[u(1)(c+9)j- While 
the consumption gamble in Weil's example has low variance it is highly neg- 
atively skewed and spans a wide domain. How does one estimate Aj? There 
are two potential solutions. First, one can explicitly estimate 0), 0) at 
all points over the consumption domain and the expectations can be calcu- 
lated directly. This is not the solution that Weil takes. The alternative is 
to assume that the utility function can be expressed as an equation (or set 
of equations) over the consumption domain and the expectation can be cal- 
culated with respect to this (these) equation(s). This is what Weil does - 
he assumes that the utility function can be described by power form with a 
fixed parameter of relative risk aversion over the total consumption domain. 
The question then arises as to how to estimate the equation(s) that describe 
the investor's utility. Because the probability of the low consumption state 
is so small financial economists are likely to estimate the equation describing 
the utility function close to the point of expected consumption. Over a small 
local interval there are a number of equations that will appear almost indis- 
tinguishable. However over the large consumption domain covered by Weil's 
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example they might appear very different. So, what degree of accuracy does 
one have to achieve locally in estimating the equation describing the util- 
ity function in order to have robustness in estimating the equity premium 
in Weil's example? Unlike chapter 3, the assumption that utility is addi- 
tively time separable is not relaxed, nor is it assumed that different investors 
have different utility functions. The analysis and quotations presented above 
might suggest that all utility functions that are locally similar to the first 
four derivatives and that are both DAP and DARA over the whole domain 
will predict similar equity premia for Weil's example. This chapter shows 
that this is not so. So, the focus of this chapter is on the functional form of 
the utility function and not parameter estimation. 
Why should derivatives higher than the fourth matter? From result 2 it is 
clear that the fifth derivative tells us about how AA changes as an investor's 
expected consumption changes. Given that Weil's example is over a large 
consumption domain this might imply that, for different levels of caution, 
the impact of this highly negatively skewed gamble might have a different 
quantitative effect. The sixth derivative tells us about the convexity of AA, 
which again might be of empirical significance. Therefore it is not clear 
why we should assume that the first four derivatives capture the important 
quantitative as well as qualitative effects for this example. Considering this 
issue more formally, examine the accuracy of the Taylor's series expansion 
given in equation 48 for an example similar to that of Weil with b=0. As 
with Weil's example it is assumed in this section that consumption can take 
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one of two levels cj, c2 with cl <c without loss of generality and where c 
is the level of expected consumption. It is assumed that cl will occur with 
probability p, 1 -p for C2. Due to the form of equation 48 it is known that the 
volatility of consumption a, influences AA and so this will be kept constant 
throughout. Therefore, given that the expectation of i must be zero, this 
gives only one degree of freedom in the choice Of A C1, C2. Without loss of 
generality, it will be assumed that cl is allowed to vary. In this case: 
p a, 'I[(c - cl)' + a'] 







(C _ C, )n 
Assume that the utility function takes power form with coefficient of 
relative risk aversion -y. It is clear that the term involving E [En] in f)(0) is 
given by 
Term in E[P] + 
1) (-y + 2) ... 
(-y +n- 1)C-n 
E[P] 
(n - 1)1 
Using the simple two level consumption model presented here, this can 
be rearranged to give: 
Term in E[p] 
+ 1) 
... (-y +nC, 
(n - 1)! c 
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where the approximation works for highly negatively skewed gambles 
where p is very small. Taking ratios: 
Term in E[V+I] -I+n 
Term in E[jn) nIc 
It is now clear that the term in E[V+1] is less than the term in E[in] if 
and only if n> -1[(clcl) - 11. This puts a lower bound on the possible number 
of Taylor's series terms that must be used to get a local approximation. Of 
course, the true number of required terms must be higher than this as this 
value of n gives the greatest individual term in the Taylor's expansion. So, if 
cl = 0.4c and -y = 10, an example similar to the situation under which Weil 
(1992a) can explain the equity premium, the terms in the Taylor's series 
expansion start diminishing at the sixteenth term. It is therefore suggested 
here that any local approximation of the Taylor's series expansion to provide 
a reasonable indication of the magnitude of the effect of proper risk aversion 
caused by a small background consumption gamble is dependent on very high 
order derivatives of the utility function. 
It should, though, also be noted that terms in E[P] in fl(P) also decay 
very slowly and all are positive 8T . Therefore, by terminating the Taylor's 
series expansion at the fourth derivative creates two offsetting truncation 
errors. The numerator and denominator of equation 48 are both underesti- 
mated and so the relative approximation given by multiplying the variance of 
971t can easily be verified that, for fl(P), (Term in E[V+I])/(Term in E[! "]) ;: 4 [(, y + 
n)/(n + I)I(I - cl1c). For -1 = 10, cl = 0.4c, the terms start to diminish at around the 
13th term. 
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the consumption gamble by a term involving the first to fourth derivative of 
the utility function will depend on how these errors offset. The conclusion of 
this chapter is that if idiosyncratic labour income risk is included when mod- 
elling an economy and it is assumed that the utility function can be described 
over the whole consumption domain by a simple equation with fixed param- 
eters the predicted equilibrium asset prices can vary substantially depending 
on the influence of very high order derivatives of the equation. Examples in 
the next section demonstrate this point. 
20 The magnitude of the equity premium 
20.1 Creating alternate utility functions 
To show the importance of the higher order terms, this chapter applies three 
alternative utility functions to the example of Weil (1992a). Two have "con- 
stant DAP". By this, it is meant that *P' = -k for some positive constant 
k. These two utilities functions will differ by the level to which k is set. The 
third has "constant AAP" where AAP stands for Accelerating Absolute Pru- 
dence. Here constant AAP means that P" = -1 for some positive constant 
1. A fuller description follows: 
0 44TO U(3)t? utility. This utility function will be constant DAR The 
value of k will be set very close to zero (k = 1E--5). The first three 
derivatives of the utility function will be set to be equal to those of 
power utility at the point of expected consumption. 
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"To U(4)11 utility. This utility function will be constant DAR The 
value of k will be set so that the utility function has the same rate of 
change of absolute prudence at the point of expected future consump- 
tion as power utility. The first three derivatives of the utility function 
will also be set to be equal to those of power utility at the point of 
expected consumption. 
e "To UO)" utility. This utility function will be constant AAP. The 
value of I will be set so that the utility function has the same accelera- 
tion of absolute prudence at the point of expected future consumption 
as power utility. The first four derivatives of the utility function will 
also be set to be equal to those of power utility at the point of expected 
consumption. 
It is possible to find analytical form for U(2) for constant DAP and 
constant AAP utility functions. p= _U(3)/U(2), so for constant DAP, 
U(3)(C) 
= k(c + b)U 
(2)(C) for some constant b. Similarly for constant AAP 
U(3)(C) = (1/6)(W + 2mc + nj U(2) (C) for constants m, n. Solving: 
Constant DAP U(')(c) = 
Constant AAP U(2) (C) = 
-Exp 
k 
(C + b)2 -a 2 
-Exp ý(O + mc2 + nc + q)] 
where a, q are constants of integration. It is not possible to construct ana- 
lytical form for UM. The next issue is to resolve the values of a, b, k, 1, m, n, q. 
The aim is to have the utility functions looking identical to power utility with 
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coefficient of relative risk aversion -y at some point C (the value of next pe- 
riod's expected consumption) up to the third, fourth or fifth derivative. For 
constant DAP, it will be demanded that the constant DAP utility function 
will have the same first (the starting point for the Taylor's series expansion), 
second (which will determine a) and third (which, as a ratio with the second 
derivative, will determine b) derivatives as the power utility at c=C. For 
these conditions to be satisfied: 
U(I)(c) = C-'T b= _(1 + -, + C2 k)I(Ck) 
a= k(C + b)2/2 + (7 + 1)ln(C) - In(-t) 
Next determine k. By definition, k= 1E-' for "to U(3)" utility. For 
"to U(W utility we also require the utility function to have same coefficient 
of *P' at C. In this case k= (-y + 1)IC', b= -2C and a= (-f + 1)/2 + 
(-y + I)ln(C) - In(-y). Solving for "to U(5)" utility, I is determined by the 
acceleration of absolute prudence, m is solved by the decrease in absolute 
prudence, n is solved by the level of absolute prudence and q is solved by the 
second derivative of the utility function. These give: 






+ 31n(C) - 5.5] 
Values for the second, third and four derivatives of the utility function can 
now be calculated analytically at all points along the domain. Using these 
three derivatives, the value of marginal utility for all three of these functions 
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can be determined numerically using a Taylor's series expansion through 
a Turbo Pascal programme. The step size was 1/10,000 and a sensitivity 
analysis was undertaken to ensure that the results were not sensitive to this 
step size". It was also checked that the utility functions were well behaved 
across the domain. That is, it was required that the signs of the first four 
derivatives of each utility function alternate (the first being positive) and 
that each have DAP and DARA at all points on the domain. All three utility 
functions were well defined in this sense. Values of the first four derivatives 
of these utility functions are given at seven consumption points in the range 
[1,4] for -1 = 3,15 in tables 4 and 5 respectively. 
"Graphs were also produced for 1/500 step size that the author cannot distinguish from 
those presented here. In order to check the sensitivity, the marginal utility of power form 
was estimated using the same Taylor's series technique. For -1 = 15 at c=1, UM was 
estimated at 1.0015 against its true value of 1. 
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T. FIO) , i; ]; t. 1-11 r... t. nt nAPI 
1 0.2454402 -0.244421 0.2475217 -0.250665 0.99S8457 -0.016772 1.0126877 -IE - 05 1.5 0.1495376 -0.147311 0.1491796 -0.151073 0.9851117 -0.02TI61 1.0126827 -IE - 05 
2 0.0917375 -0.088784 0.0899097 -0.09105 0.9679063 -0.043427 1.0126777 -IE - OS 
2.5 0.0569014 -0.05351 0.0541682 -0.054675 0.9403995 -0.067966 1.0126727 -IE - 05 
3 0.0359058 -0.032251 0.0326591 -0.033073 0.8981994 -0.2028IS 1.0126677 -1E - os 
3.5 0.0232517 -0.029437 0.0196636 -0.019933 0.8359601 -0.147716 1.0126627 -IB - 05 
4 0.0156239 -0.01171S 0.0119633 -0.012014 0.7498149 -0.197083 1.0126577 -IE - 05 
Tn rim , t; i; t. n ... ii. nAPI 
1 0,4725475 -0.745737 1.31917 -2.524726 1.5791212 -0.301147 1.7689473 -0.256369 
1.5 0.2229542 -0.317966 0.5217075 -0.937515 1.4261516 -0.306068 2.6407627 -0.256369 
2 0.1135434 -0.144549 0.2196399 -0.367768 1.2730627 -0.304918 1.5225781 -0.256369 
2.5 0.0623909 -0.070061 0.0969921 -0.152237 1.1229372 -0.293599 1.3843935 -0.256369 
3 0.0368843 -0.036206 0.045482 -0.066417 0.9816023 -0.269555 1.2562089 -0.256369 
3.5 0.0233193 -0-019949 0.0225025 -0.030498 0.8554546 -0.233171 1.1280244 -0.256369 
4 0.015625 -0.011719 0.0117169 -0.014719 0,750002 -0.187379 0.9999398 -0.256369 
'r. M-) 11-11. AA PI 
1 0.6517192 -1.299563 3.0328815 -7.908861 1.9940532 -0.677415 2.3337708 -0.6393 1.5 0.2607591 -0.437076 0.8674147 -2.052914 1.6761659 -0.593665 2.0303465 -0.574397 
2 0.1209892 -0.169699 0.298564S -0.611747 1.402599 -0.500412 2.759374 -0.509493 
2.5 0.0636129 -0.074838 0.1138173 -0.206372 1.1764562 -0.405168 1.5208533 -0.44459 
3 0.0370161 -0.036884 0.0484939 -0.077763 0.9964183 -0.31T226 1.3147844 -0.379686 
3.5 0.0233241 -0.019988 0.0228096 -0.032321 0.6569669 -0.24355 1.1411673 -0.314782 
4 0.015625 -0-011719 0.0117198 -0.014647 0.75 -0.187502 1.000002 -0.249879 
1 1 -3 12 -60 3 -3 4 -4 
1.5 0.2962963 -0.592593 1.5802469 -5.26749 2 -1.333333 2.6666687 -1.777778 
2 0.125 -0.1675 0.375 -0.9375 1.5 -0.75 2 -1 
2.5 0.064 -0.0768 0.12288 -0.24576 1.2 -0.48 1.6 -0.64 
3 0.037037 -0.037037 0.0493827 -0.082305 1 -0.333333 1.3333333 -0-444444 3.5 0.0233236 -0.019992 0.0228476 -0.032639 0.8571429 -0.244898 1.1428571 -0.326531 
4 0.015625 -0.011719 0.0117188 -0.014648 0.75 -0.1975 1 -0.25 
Table 4: Properties of the first four derivatives of the four utility functions 
used in this chapter at seven values in the range [1,4] with the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion equal to 3 at the point of next period's expected 
consumption in each case. 
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From looking at these tables, the key insight that lies behind this chapter 
becomes clear. This table was created with C set at 3.95 (this is average con- 
sumption when unemployed income is 1/3 employed income). Take -f = 15, 
which is close to the point in Weil's example where the introduction of unem- 
ployment risk makes the largest change to the predicted equity premium. At 
c=3, which is 76% of expected consumption, A=5,4.955,4.800,4.043 for 
power utility "to U(5)", "to U(4) " and "to U(3)17 utility respectively. Given the 
low precision in estimates of the coefficient of risk aversion of individuals (as 
highlighted in chapter 3), it is highly unlikely that a financial economist could 
determine which of these functions best reflects investor preferences over the 
range [3,3.95]. At c= 17 A= 157 9.042,6.924,4.049 for the four utility func- 
tions. The distinctions between the functions are much clearer at this point. 
Therefore, if examples are being driven by values of A at points some way 
distant from C, and given that it is very difficult to precisely estimate the 
functional form of investor preferences locally, the quantitative effects of the 
introduction of unemployment cannot be established with precision. 
20.2 Results and discussion 
The results are presented in figures 8 and 9. These figures give the ratio 
of the predicted equity premium or riskfree rate in the presence of unem- 
ployment risk to the predicted value in the absence of unemployment risk 
for various levels of risk aversion. For figures 8,9 unemployment income is 
1 and 0 respectively. The x-axes give the coefficients of relative risk aver- 
sion (Gamma) of the power utility that the three alternate utility functions 
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'rý I-11 --t-6 TNAIPI 
1 0.0001632 -0.000661 0.0026769 -0.0108i-3 4.0490178 -0.006659 4.0506624 -IE - os 1.5 2.15tE - 05 -8.72E - 05 0.0003532 -0.001431 4.0490014 -0.00670S 4.0506574 -lE -os 
2 2.842B - 06 -1. ISE - 05 4.661 E- 05 -0.000189 4.0489099 -0.007055 4.0506524 -IE - 05 
2.5 3.75E - 07 -1.52E - 06 6. ISE - 06 -2.49B - 05 4.0482502 -0.009705 4.0506474 _IB -os 
3 4. OSSE - 08 -2E - 07 8.11sE - 07 -3.29E - 06 4.0432899 -0.029728 4.0506424 -lE -os 
3.5 6.59sE - 09 -2.64B - 08 1.07lE - 07 -4.34E - 07 4.0061219 -0.178335 4.0506374 -IE - 05 
4 9.31lE - 10 -3.49B - 09 1.413E - 08 -5.72B - 08 3.7463254 -1.140033 4.0506324 -IE -os 
T. Fril) ut; l; tý (I ... 11. nAPI 
1 0.0082714 -0.057273 0.4052514 -2.926206 6.9242005 -1.04963 7.0757891 -1.025477 
1.5 0.0002958 -0.001893 0.0124233 -0.083476 6.3982691 -1.054317 6.6630508 -1.025477 
2 1.377E - 05 -8.08E - 05 0.0004891 -0.003042 5.8698101 -1.060652 6.0503124 -1.025477 
2.5 8.36B - 07 -4.46E - 06 2.471B - 05 -0.000141 5.3372236 -1.069315 5.5375741 -1.025477 
3 6.62gE - 08 -3.18B - 07 1.59gE - 06 -8.38E - 06 4.800075 -1.078869 5.0248358 -1.025477 
3.5 6.882E - 09 -2.93E - 08 1.323E - 07 -6.27E - 07 4.2611057 -1.069502 4.5120974 -1.025477 
4 9.313E - 10 -3.49E - 09 1.397E - OB -5.94 E- 08 3.7500421 -0.934949 3.9993591 -1.025477 
, r. MO) ., tait. (I ... 11. AAPI 
1 0.0584176 -0.528196 4.930755 -47.37971 9.0417346 -2.652379 9.335083 -2.557201 1.5 0.0008643 -0.006758 0.0548861 -0.461279 7.8190873 -2.3637 8.1213859 -2.297587 
2 2.283E - 05 -0.000154 0.0010808 -0.007919 6.7284147 -2.079627 7.037496 -2.037973 
2.5 1.006E - 06 -5.81B - 06 3.534B - 05 -0.000225 5.7724881 -1.794812 8.0834133 -1.778358 
3 6.916E - 08 -3.43E - 07 1.802B - 06 -IE -OS 4.9554876 -1.504735 5.2591377 -1.518744 
3.5 8.903E - 09 -2.96E - 08 1.34gE - 07 -6.53E - 07 4.281862 -1.210942 4.5646693 -1.25913 
4 9.313E - 10 -3.4gE - 09 1.397E - 09 -5.94 E- 08 3.7499996 -0.937532 4.0000081 -0.999515 
1 1 -15 240 -4080 15 -15 16 -16 1.5 0.0022837 -0.022837 0.2435902 -2.760689 10 -11.666667 10.666667 -7.211111 
2 3.052E - 05 -0.000229 0.0016311 -0.015564 7.5 -3.75 a -4 
2.5 1.074E - 06 -6.44B - 06 4.223B - 05 -0.00028 6 -2.4 6.4 -2.56 
3 6.969E - 08 -3.48E - 07 1.958E - 06 -1.05E - 05 5 -1.666667 5.3333333 -1.777778 3.5 6.902E - 09 -2.96B - 08 1.352E - 07 -6.57E - 07 4.28ST143 -1.22449 4.5714286 -1.306122 
4 9.313E - 10 -3.49E - 09 1.39TE - 08 -5.94B - 09 3.75 -0.9375 4 -1 
Table 5: Properties of the first four derivatives of the four utility functions 
used in this chapter at seven values in the range [1,4] with the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion equal to 15 at the point of next period's expected 
consumption in each case. 
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are mimicking. These figures can be directly compared with four of the six 
graphs presented by Weil (1992a) on pages 786-7. Notice first that the "to 
U(3)17 utility has a predicted equity premium very close to that of the repre- 
sentative agent model for all values of Gamma. So, despite the fact that this 
utility function is globally Standard Risk Averse there is little change in the 
risk aversion of the agent through the introduction of unemployment risk. 
This is the initial indication that the "very large factor" underprediction of 
the representative agent model is dependent on stronger assumptions than 
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Figure 8: These graphs replicate and adjust two of the three graphs on 
page 786 of Weil (1992a). Unemployed income is one third the employed 
income. The top (bottom) graph is the ratios of the predicted equity premium 
(riskfree rate) in the presence of unemployment risk to the predicted equity 
premium (riskfree rate) in the absence of unemployment risk. 
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6 11 16 21 26 31 36 
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The riskfree rate is significantly altered for this utility function by the 
introduction of unemployment risk as the demand for savings is driven by 
the precautionary savings motive: that is by prudence P and not A. Con- 
sider next qo U(4)" and "to U(5)". For these, the ratio of predicted equity 
premia in the presence and absence of unemployment are similar to the same 
ratio for power utility for high levels of relative risk aversion. However for 
intermediate values of -y, the ratios are significantly lower. For example, in 
the case when unemployment income equals 1, the highest ratio is around 
2 and 2.5 respectively compared with a ratio of over 3 for power utility. 
When unemployment income equals 0, the highest ratio is around 2.5 and 
4 respectively compared with a ratio of over 9 for power utility. Therefore 
there is a significant change in the predicted equity premium compared to 
the representative agent model under the same utility function but not to the 
same extent as with power utility. Given that these two utility functions are 
identical to power utility locally to the fourth (fifth) derivative, this implies 
that the magnitude of the equity premium is significantly affected by very 
high order derivatives for negatively skewed gambles such as Weil's. The 
importance of these higher order derivatives in the quantitative (as opposed 
to qualitative) assessment of the equity premium are of great importance. 
21 Conclusion 
By using certainty equivalents and concentrating on small consumption gam- 
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Figure 9: These graphs replicate and adjust two of the three graphs on page 
787 of Weil (1992a). Unemployed income is zero. The top (bottom) graph 
is the ratios of the predicted equity premium (riskfree rate) in the presence 
of unemployment risk to the predicted equity premium (riskfree rate) in the 
absence of unemployment risk. 
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ducing a more integrated framework for understanding the different forms of 
proper risk aversion. As a consequence of this approach, a new and highly 
general form of proper risk aversion - Basic Risk Aversion - follows nat- 
urally. If the utility function is restricted to have positive third derivative 
and the investor is Basic Risk Averse then the investor is certainly proper 
risk averse under all existing forms of proper risk aversion. Despite this, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for local Core Basic Risk Aversion are no 
more restrictive than for local Standard Risk Aversion. Therefore DAP and 
DARA will ensure that a greater class of small consumption gambles than 
has previously been recognised will increase the aversion of an investor to an 
independent marketable gamble. 
Weil (1992a) makes an important contribution to the Financial Economics 
literature by showing how the introduction of independent uninsurable in- 
come risk can make a dramatic impact on equilibrium asset pricing when 
utility is assumed to take power form. He also provides robust theoretical 
justification for this phenomena through the properties of decreasing abso- 
lute risk aversion (DARA) and decreasing absolute prudence (DAP) which 
ties his paper in with an established literature on proper risk aversion. This 
chapter contributes to this debate by comparing the theoretical literature 
that predicts an increase in the equity premium with the example of Weil 
that gives the magnitude of this effect for one specific example. The mag- 
nitude of the effect will depend on the ratio of the expected value of the 
second derivative to the expected value of the first derivative. This can be 
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calculated in one of two ways. Either the derivatives are estimated explicitly 
over the consumption domain or the utility function is assumed to follow a 
given equation. If, as with Weil's example, it is assumed that the utility 
function can be described by an equation with fixed parameters, then it is 
must be decided to what precision the functional form of the equation must 
be estimated. From the literature on proper risk aversion, through its em- 
phasis on the first four derivatives of the utility function, the reader might 
infer that concentrating on these derivatives alone might provide a reasonable 
approximation for the magnitude of the effect of proper risk aversion. This 
chapter has shown that this inference is not supported for Weil's example. 
By creating alternate utility functions that are well defined and well behaved 
(in terms of monotonicity, concavity, DAP and DARA) across the domain 
and identical locally to power utility to the third, fourth or fifth derivative 
at the point of next period's expected consumption it is shown that very 
different equity premium can be predicted. So if we are interested in the 
quantitative (as opposed to qualitative) effects of the introduction of exoge- 
nous uninsurable background risk in an example like Weil's and are going to 
use a utility function described by a simple equation then it is necessary to 
get introspective knowledge of high order derivatives of this equation. 
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Part V 
Uninsurable risk and optimal 
dividend policy 
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Uninsurable risk and optimal dividend 
poliCy89 
Abstract 
In this chapter, the role that risk to individual income plays in de- 
termining the attractiveness of a claim that has stochastic financial 
obligations ("investments") as well as payoffs is examined. It is shown 
that investors prefer economies where the uncertainty about future 
investments is lowest in states with the greatest risk to personal cap- 
ital. It is argued that this is consistent with an optimal financing 
policy where dividends are smoothed and right issues are a bull mar- 
ket phenomenon. It is also contested that observed corporate finance 
behaviour is consistent with the incomplete market models that lie at 
the heart of this thesis. 
"A version of this chapter was presented to the Doctoral Colloquium, European Finance 
Association, Milan, August 1995 and the Financial Options Research Center, University 
of Warwick, November 1995 
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22 Introduction 
In the previous chapters of this thesis, the role that idiosyncratic endowment 
shocks might play in resolving the puzzles of Mehra & Prescott has been 
discussed in some detail. In chapter 6a series of empirical tests are run that 
examine whether the change in asset returns with variations in the risk to 
personal capital is consistent with these models. This chapter considers an 
entirely separate market anomaly using the technology of incomplete market 
theory that has been discussed above. Rather than examining the Mehra & 
Prescott puzzles, the dividend controversy discussed most notably by Black 
(1976) is considered in an incomplete market framework. This is, to the 
author's knowledge, the first attempt to use incomplete market theory to 
address problems in corporate finance. Strictly speaking, it is an aggregate 
optimal dividend policy that will be constructed9o. It will be argued that 
the observed corporate finance policies of individual firms that comprises of 
dividend smoothing and concentrating rights issues in bull markets is consis- 
tent with the optimal economy-wide practice that emerges from the models 
in this chapter. 
This chapter follows in the spirit of the Mankiw (1986) model described 
in chapter 3. At t=0 all investors are ex-ante homogeneous. At future 
"While this is, perhaps, somewhat unusual, there are precedents: cf. Miller (1977) on 
optimal capital structure with personal and corporate taxes. This type of macro solution 
to the dividend puzzle is also hinted at by Marsh and Merton (1987): "For example, in a 
purely demand-driven model for dividends, the demand for dividends is not firm specific 
because investors only care about the dividend-capital gain mix at the portfolio level ... 
Thus equilibrium aggregate dividends may be determinate, but which firms service this 
demand and the quantity each chooses to supply may not" (pp. 4-5). 
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time periods there are two states of the world, an upstate and a downstate. 
In the upstate there is no risk to personal capital. In the downstate there 
is the possibility of unemployment. Previous chapters show that the risk to 
individual income combined with risk to dividends increases the risk aver- 
sion of investors to the market and so the equity premium puzzle can, at 
least theoretically, be resolved in this way. This chapter is not primarily 
concerned with dividend / profit risk. Instead this chapter focuses on the 
effects of combining endowment shocks with investment uncertainty. That 
is, the main "worry" for investors within this economy does not concern the 
return on capital but is, instead, the possibility that aggregate investment 
will not always be at the optimal level9l. The less information investors have 
about future investment plans, the more concerned they are about it being 
suboptimal. It is shown that this effect is amplified in states where there is 
also a risk to personal capital. 
The corporate finance implications of the findings in this chapter are as 
follows. There are two effects. For DARA utility functions, investors prefer 
lower investment in the low state to the high state as there is less endow- 
ment to fund investment in the former case. So, positive shocks to investment 
should be concentrated in high states. As higher than expected investment 
will coincide with lower than expected net payouts (dividends - rights issues) 
to investors within this type of model this means that rights issues should 
"Investment is "optimal" in this context if managers cannot increase the expected utility 
of consumption of at least one investor and not reduce the expected utility of consumption 
of any other investors by changing investment from this level. 
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be mainly bull market phenomena and dividends should not be cut in bear 
markets. This argument about the optimal level of investment in different 
states is, though, reasonably straightforward and does not require the in- 
tricate simulations contained within this chapter. Here, in an environment 
where expected investment is the same in both states, the role of mean zero 
investment shocks is examined. These are undesirable in low endowment 
states as this coincides with a period when there is also high risk to personal 
capital. The combination of these two risks is examined below. So, if mean 
zero investment shocks are less desirable in low states than high states, and 
if the optimal level of investment is greater in the latter case than the former, 
then it is argued that a corporate finance policy of smooth dividends com- 
bined with rights issues concentrated in high endowment states is consistent 
with the model developed here. Paying dividends and having a rights issue 
in the same year may also be justifiable within this type of model. Essen- 
tially dividends are smoothed because the company is saying that "this is 
the minimum cash flow that you will receive from your investment at times 
of low endowment. We will not have a rights issue at these times to reclaim 
this cash from you. " Rights issues are concentrated in bull markets as mean 
zero investment uncertainty and positive investment shocks are most easily 
absorbed in these states. 
Within the economy to be described there are two types of individual: 
managers and investors. This is not, though, an agency model. The simu- 
lations are constructed in such a way that managers are rewarded by aiding 
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investors. The simulations show that, by working in their own interests, 
managers also maximise the expected utility of investors. That is, purely 
benevolent managers and purely selfish managers would make the same deci- 
sions in all the cases considered. Therefore we do not need to worry about the 
usual manager / investor "games" that sometimes appear in the corporate 
finance literature. 
This chapter is an innovative application of incomplete market theory. In 
order to fully motivate the work to follow, there now follows a long intro- 
ductory discussion. First, the two-period version of the model is described 
in depth. Then, the key assumptions that drive the model are drawn out 
and discussed. Third, the work is placed in the context of other theories of 
optimal dividend policy. Finally, the testable implications of the model are 
drawn out and existing empirical evidence is reviewed in the light of this new 
theory. 
22.1 The economy 
This chapter works in both a multiperiod and two period world. A brief 
description of the two period model is now given. The multiperiod model is 
a natural extension of this: 
e There is one firm in the economy (the "market portfolio") which is all 
equity financed. There is no real investment either before t=1 or after 
t=2. 
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e At t=0 managers tell investors that they have a real investment 
opportunity that will give constant returns to scale of r which may, or 
may not, be known with certainty. They announce that they will have 
a rights issue of approximately (say) El per share at t=1. There are 
no other investment opportunities available. 
e The assumption that drives the simulations is that the true size of the 
rights issue at t=1 may not be revealed at this stage. That is, at time 
0, investors are uncertain about time 1 investment per claim. 
e At t=0 all parties know that in the next period the economy will 
go into either a high state h or low state 1. At t=1 the true size 
of the rights issue will be JC1 + e.,, (x E Ih, 1}) where e-, is a mean 
zero random draw whose variance is state dependent. The managers of 
the firm have control over the volatility of e-. but not its expectation. 
That is managers can choose to "shock" investors over the size of the 
rights issue but cannot choose a positive or negative shock. Within this 
model, the constraint is that investors will be shocked if the economy 
turns out to be in one state but not if it is in the other. That is eh ý-- 
or ei =0 with certainty and e., will have non-zero variance in the other 
state. Managers reveal to investors at t=0 which state contains the 
investment uncertainty and which state does not. 
e On the basis of this information the investors choose the number of 
shares k that they wish to take up. By having complete control over 
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k, investors decide on the size of real investment at t= 1". As there 
is ex-ante homogeneity within this economy, all investors choose the 
same k. At t=0 this involves no investment at this stage but there is 
commitment for the future. 
e At t=1, each investor receives exogenous endowment. If the state 
is high then all investors will receive the same income. If the state is 
low then some will continue to receive this endowment but some will 
get a much lower level of income ("unemployment benefit"). Ex-ante 
all investors have the same probability of becoming unemployed should 
the state be low at t=1. Whatever their income level, each investor 
must then pay k(Ll + e,, ) to the firm or else sell some securities on 
to another investor who will fulfil the obligation on this portion of the 
portfolio". 
* At t=2 each investor receives the same endowment as at t=1. That 
is, unemployment is persistent. The firm returns a dividend (El 
e-, )(1 + r) per claim and the economy terminates. 
* The point of contention is "In which state should investors' receive the 
investment shock? " It is argued in this chapter that the combination 
of potential low income combined with an investment shock will make 
investors more wary of the company if investment is uncertain in the 
state with high risk to personal capital. 
92An equivalent way of modelling this would be to allocate each investor with one share 
and then let investors choose the expected size of rights issue per claim. 93 In the multiperiod world there is no opportunity for this type of trade. 
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As this is the first model of its kind in the literature, it may be helpful 
at this point to demonstrate the effects with an example. In this simplified 
case, trading is prohibited. At t=0 the one firm modelled announces that 
it has a real investment opportunity offering fixed return to scale of 5%. 
Managers tell investors that the expected size of the rights issue will be 0.05 
units of the consumption good per claim. In one state the size of the rights 
issue will certainly be 0.05, while in the other state investment will either 
be 0 or 0.1 with equal probability. Investors are told which state contains 
the investment shocks and they then choose how many shares they wish to 
hold (k). At t=1 the economy goes into either a high or low state. In 
the high state all receive income of 1 unit of the consumption good. In the 
low state 90% of the population continue to receive this endowment while 
10% become unemployed and receive only 0.4 units. Each individual is given 
the same endowment at t=2 as t=1. If all investors have power utility 
with P=1, -y =3 (U(c) = -0.5c-') then the optimal number of claims is 
k=0.0518 if ei E J-0.05, +0.05} and eh =0 and k=0.0807 if el =0 and the 
investment uncertainty is in the high state. The respective expected utility 
of future consumption is -1.26239, -1.26233. Investors prefer investment 
uncertainty in the high state as their expected utility of future consumption 
is higher in this case (if only by a small amount). Managers also prefer 
investment shocks in this state as the expected value of their firm is also 
higher in this case. This is what is meant by there being no agency conflicts 
in this model. Selfish and benevolent managers take the same action - to 
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concentrate aggregate investment shocks into states of low risk to personal 
capital. 
22.2 The key assumptions 
In this section, the key assumptions that drive the model are discussed and 
it is argued that these assumptions are reasonable. The main driving as- 
sumption is that investors have uncertainty about the future levels of real 
investment undertaken by firms in a well diversified portfolio and, also, they 
cannot always rely on the managers of the firm to invest optimally on their 
behalf. This is rather like Jensen's (1986) idea that managers have a sys- 
tematic tendency to overinvest. In this chapter, though, deviations from the 
original investment plan have zero mean and so this model does not rely 
on agency theory". There are two parts to this assumption: (i) aggregate 
investment is uncertain and (ii) aggregate investment is sometimes subop- 
timal. These are dealt with in turn. Consider the top of figure 10 which 
shows fixed investment by manufacturing companies in the UK from 1955- 
96. This time series appears unpredictable and volatile. Certainly, at the 
microeconomic level, the investment plans of individual firms are unknown 
as 44 ... one of the "inside" variables that a firm cannot readily communicate 
without moral hazard is the level of new investment" (Bhattacharya (1979) 
p. 261) as "... the firm may not be able to announce its investment plans be- 
cause of competitive reasons... " (Ang (1987) p. 45). The top graph in figure 
10 suggests that there is a systematic component in the difference between 
"Although it would be possible to construct an agency story around these simulations. 
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actual and expected investment across firms (as might be predicted by, say, 
a fads theory of investment) leading to aggregate uncertainty. 
It may be that the unpredictable pattern of the top graph of figure 10 just 
reflects the changing optimal level of real investment. Managers amend their 
investment plans at each point in time to keep the level of investment optimal. 
While it is not possible to reject to hypothesis, it does not seem economically 
reasonable. Optimal investment rates change instantaneously as investors 
receive endowments and change their expectations of future endowments. 
Real investment, on the other hand, has a large degree of irreversibility - 
this point lies at the heart of the real options literature: see, for example, 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) - and new projects take considerable planning. 
Indeed, looking again at the top figure of 10, it seems that real investment 
does not fall (rise) as soon as discount rates rise (fall). This supports the 
anecdotal evidence that there is a significant lag between changes in interest 
rate and real economic activity. Further, it would be possible to construct 
an agency story around these simulations where investment is suboptimal 
because managers are too lazy to cancel negative NPV projects or find new 
positive NPV projects in which to invest. Therefore to assume that future 
real investment may be suboptimal, which is the key driver of this chapter, 
appears to be an economically plausible assumption. 
If each individual managed their own portfolio of real projects in addition 
to equity in the firm then, by adjusting their own real portfolio, optimal 
investment levels could be maintained. This is assumed away by making 
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the equity in the firm the only investment opportunity: "... the vision of 
an economy dominated by large corporations that are owned by portfolio 
investors has in large measure been realised, at least by the most advanced 
capitalist countries, so that this assumption may well be considered the most 
innocuous of the five stated earlier 95" (Gordon (1996) p. 14). 
Finally, there is an assumption that the expected level of investment is 
state independent: investment shocks have zerci mean in both cases. It is 
reasonable, though, to suppose that investors would prefer more investment 
in the high state than the low state as discussed above. For an investor with 
power utility who is offered certain return r on investment i over the interval 
[1,2] and has known endowment of y at both times, the optimal value i is: 
i-y[_1-(1+r)1/" - 1+(1+r)1_(1h)] 
So, the higher the endowment the higher the desired level of investment' 
This means that the employed will want to invest more than the unemployed. 
Therefore, for power utility the optimal strategy for the manager is to change 
the expectations of e, el to make the former positive and the latter negative. 
However: 
"The five propositions that underlie the neoclassical theory of finance and investment. 
"Although this is not true for exponential utility function U(c) = -Exp(-ac) when the 
optimal i= ln(l + r)/a(2 + r), which is independent of y. If i is small compared to y 
then the optimal i s: ts r1A[1 + (1 + r)2] So this result is a feature of DARA. The effect is 
amplified if the state can change between times 1 and 2. This is because, in the high state, 
investors will wish to precautionary save against the prospect of becoming unemployed 
next period. In the low state, while this effect still occurs for those who remain employed, 
it is offset by the unemployed who will be prepared to save less in the hope of becoming 
reemployed next period. 
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While the expected level of real investment should be lower in low 
states than high state, the difference is not very great. As can be seen 
in the previous offset equation, the optimal level i is linear in y. If 
the risk of unemployment is 5% and unemployment benefit is 40% of 
employed income, optimal investment in the low state will only be 3% 
lower than in the high state". Further, as for most of the population, 
endowment is the same in both states, the optimal level of investment 
per share is state independent for most investors. Therefore if managers 
listen only to the "majority view" then the level of investment will 
be state independent. Also the argument given above about the time 
delay between planning a project and undertaking a project means that 
companies will not be able to switch from "big" projects to "small" 
projects (or vice-versa) at the time the state reveals itself. 
0 As mentioned above, the implications of this chapter are strengthened 
by having the mean value of e.., state dependent. The mean of el is 
optimally lower than the mean of e.,. So times of positive investment 
shock should be in the high states. Therefore, on this expectations 
argument, rights issues and dividend cut, which will be used to fund 
high investment, should be concentrated in high states. Section 24.2 
corroborates this. In this case, the probability of a rights issue is made 
state dependent. It is shown in this case that the results are ampli- 
fied. The other simulations extend this result to show that even if the 
"'Indeed, if expected endowment is the same in both states then the allocation of income 
shocks does not alter optimal aggregate investment as i is linear in y. 
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investment shock has zero expectation then it is still more favourably 
received in a high state than a low state. 
22.3 The theory of dividend policy 
This subsection aims, very briefly, to present the model just described in 
the context of existing theories of optimal dividend policy. This subsection 
does not attempt to be exhaustive. While the author feels that chapters 
2&3 make a substantive contribution to the literature by providing more 
comprehensive coverage of the Mehra & Prescott puzzles than any previous 
study, an equivalent chapter on dividend policy would not make such a con- 
tribution. This is because major overviews of the dividend policy literature 
already exist. See, in particular, Ang (1987) but there are several from which 
to chooseP". The reader is referred to these sources for more detail. 
The closest model to the one developed here is the overinvestment theory 
of Jensen (1986). In his economy, there is a systematic tendency for the 
firm to overinvest as this is in the interest of managers. Even though in the 
simulations in this chapter investment uncertainty has zero expectation, it is 
still the danger of overinvestment that is driving the results. Essentially the 
threat of overinvestment at a time when endowment is low is the dominating 
factor here. This is because the company will either have to pay a lower 
dividend than expected or have a rights issue at a time when some individuals 
have lower income than usual. Because this threat is so strong, it is not 
"See, for example, Miller (1986), a set of articles in the Journal of Economic Perspectives 
(1988), Weston (1989) and Gordon (1989), amongst others. 
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necessary to have a systematic risk of overinvestment. So it is the possibility 
of suboptimal investment that gives the results of this chapter rather than 
systematic overinvestment. This means that it is not necessary to appeal to 
agency problems to motivate the economy. Indeed, as stressed above, the 
economy is constructed in such a way that agency conflicts are removed. 
It is contested that companies pay dividends in each year to "signal" to 
investors the level of payouts that they will receive in future low states. 
Rights issues are added in high states to fund investment commitments. So 
dividends in high states are conveying information about net cash payouts in 
low states. How does this compare with a standard signalling model? "If one 
accepts that dividends convey new information, it is not certain which of the 
following types of "new" information is sent. It could be a forecast of future 
earnings ... a more precise estimate of current earnings ... an indication of 
the permanence of past earnings" (Ang (1987) pp. 39-40). In this chapter, 
the new information conveyed is about future dividends and not earnings. 
Further, a number of problems with the more traditional dividend signalling 
models are overcome. Again, Ang highlights three difficulties with signalling 
(i) why signal with dividends? (ii) who pays the price for false signals? (iii) 
signalling can become self-fulfilling - managers won't cut dividends because 
they are afraid it will be seen as a signal so investors view dividend cuts as 
a bad signal. In this model, dividends are being used to convey information 
about future dividends, which seems natural, although there may still be less 
expensive ways of conveying this information. False signals are punished by 
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sharply falling share prices following dividend cuts, which has been widely 
reported. In this economy managers gain benefit from maximising the value 
of their firm. In this model investors don't like dividend cuts because of the 
cash-flow implications and the self-fulfilment of the usual signalling model 
is therefore removed. So this model is not heavily based on the traditional 
dividend signalling models of Bhattacharya (1979), Hakansson (1982), Miller 
and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985) and Bar-Yosef and Huffman 
(1986). 
Finally, this chapter has a model with endogenous investment and financ- 
ing decisions. This brings to mind the literature started by Myers and Majluf 
(1984). In their model, companies should retain profits rather than pay div- 
idends if there are potential future positive NPV investment opportunities 
as issuing new shares can result in a redistribution of wealth from existing 
shareholders to new shareholders. Again, this chapter is clearly not based 
on this type of model. So, it is argued that, while the economy described in 
this chapter has echoes of other theories of optimal dividend policy, this is a 
"new" approach. Indeed, this chapter is based more heavily on the work on 
incomplete market theory described and developed in the other parts of this 
thesis than existing studies on corporate finance tactics. 
22.4 The empirical evidence 
Finally, some existing empirical studies on the impact of dividend policy are 
interpreted in the light of the model described above and simulated below. 
As with the whole of this section, there is no specific attempt to formally 
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reject the model. Instead, the aim is to motive the reader into believing that 
this is a model that merits detailed future empirical investigation. 
The main testable implication of this model is that dividend cuts and 
rights issues will be most unfavourably received at times when risk to personal 
capital is high. This is partly because positive investment shocks are best 
received at times when endowment is high. It is also because the simulations 
below will show that, even if the investment shock has mean zero expectation, 
then it is still better absorbed in the high state. So, if an event study of 
abnormal performance after a rights issue or dividend cut were to be run 
then it should be expect that the residuals would be at their most negative 
at times of high individual risk. Unfortunately, due to the procyclical nature 
of the volatility in individual income, this makes the model quite difficult 
to distinguish from other business-cycle based models of corporate finance 
policy. Despite the many studies on market responses to dividend changes 
there appears to be no work on how these reactions change over time. The 
bottom graph in figure 10, based on evidence given in Sant and Cowan (1994), 
shows the number of dividend omissions in the US over the interval 1963-86 
and the level of unemployment at the time (see the next chapter for more 
details on this time series). This shows that the number of dividend omissions 
often rise at times of high unemployment (1974,1982). This is not direct 
evidence against the model presented here, however. As high unemployment 
often coincides with economic recession it might be reasonable to expect 
more refinancing by firms at times of high unemployment. With regard to 
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the timing of rights issues, Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) show that rights 
issues are more prevalent in bull markets than bear markets, although the 
difference is not great. In real (1983) terms, the annual average value of rights 
issues in the US was $12.4bn in upmarkets and $10.1bn in down markets over 
the interval 1971-91. Further, the market's response to rights issues is less 
negative in times of economic boom than economic recession. Unfortunately 
these results are not only consistent with the simulations presented above - 
see Choe et al. (1993) for alternatives. Therefore, while the implications of 
these results are ambiguous for the model presented here, they are at least 
consistent with our economy. 
There has been a group of papers (for example, Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989), Yoon and Starks (1995), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994)) that have 
examined whether the empirical evidence is more supportive of Jensen's over- 
investment model or a cash-flow- signalling model. On balance, the evidence 
does not support Jensen's model (although Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
does argue in its favour). This is because both Yoon and Starks (1995) 
and Denis et al. (1994) find evidence of investment increasing after dividend 
increases". Therefore an increased dividend is not a sign of lower overin- 
vestment. This, though, does not conflict with the model presented here as 
an increase in dividend is just increasing the commitment of the company to 
higher net payouts in states with high risk to personal endowment. It says 
"Pruitt and Gitman (1991) find in a survey of 114 firms that "... the dividend decision 
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Figure 10: Top graph: fixed investment by manufacturing companies includ- 
ing leasing in 1990 in the UK (left hand axis) and the nominal riskfree rate 
(right hand axis) 1995Q1 - 1993Q4. Source: Office of National Statistics 
and the LSPD. Bottom graph: the number of dividend omissions against 
unemployment for the US 1963-86. Data on dividend omissions is described 
in Sant and Cowan (1994) and unemployment data is discussed in the next 
chapter. Dividend omissions should be read against the right hand axis. The 
max-min bars, which should be read against the left hand axis, give the range 
of monthly unemployment over the year. The Unempl. line gives average 
monthly unemployment in that year. 
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nothing about the future level of investment. Also, it is the smoothness of 
aggregate dividends in states with a high risk to personal income that is im- 
portant rather than the cross-sectional sourcing of this dividend. Therefore 
this model has the advantage of being consistent with the empirical find- 
ings of Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) who find that 
dividend yield is inversely related to investment opportunities. 
Finally it is clear why the model presented here would suggest a smooth 
dividend policy as famously found by Lintner (1956). The dividend of a 
company is giving a commitment to investors as to the minimum amount 
of net cash flow at times of economic recession. This commitment can be 
increased steadily as the firm grows but may not be cut. So, in conclusion, 
existing studies are consistent with the results of the simulations in sections 
23 and 24. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 23 numerical methods are 
used to describe a two period economy. The reason for concentrating in a 
two period economy is that, at times of high unemployment, the unemployed 
might still be able to make "home-made dividends" through selling their 
assets. By simplifying to a two-period model the economy is sufficiently 
simple so that numerical methods can determine the price and quantities of 
trading in the market. Within a multiperiod economy calculating the optimal 
trading rules is extremely complex as the number of potential paths through 
the economy are so many. The multiperiod economy is left to section 24 
and there will be no trading in this case. The contribution of this chapter is 
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clear. This is the first application of a model in the style of Mankiw (1986) 
to issues in corporate finance. While additional empirical tests are needed, 
the existing evidence appears to be unable to reject the model. Further, 
the intuition behind this model is highly appealing. That companies pay 
dividends at times of low profitability because investors require the cash flow 
to smooth their endowment shocks has, to this author, more elegance than 
standard signalling / taxation models. It is likely that a similar technique 
could be applied to issues of optimal (aggregate) capital structure. It is not 
contended that all issues are resolved, but this does appear to be a fruitful 
route for further investigation. 
23 A model with trading 
23.1 Describing the economy 
In this chapter both two period and multiperiod models are examined. In 
the former models there is trading so that individual consumption can be 
partially smoothed by buying and selling assets. The long term implications 
of a particular investment strategy is better examined in the latter class of 
models even though it will not be possible to construct trading rules in this 
case. 
This section deals with two-period models with trading. This model was 
described in some detail in the introduction, so here the aim is to convert 
this into notation and formally define the problem. As before, there is one 
firm in the economy (the "market portfolio") which is all equity financed. 
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There is no real investment either before t=1 or after t=2. At t=0 
managers tell investors that they have a real investment opportunity that 
will give constant returns to scale of r which may, or may not, be known 
with certainty. 
* At t=0 all parties know that in the next period the economy will 
go into either a high state h or low state I with equal probability. 
They know that at t=1 there will be a right issue of size It =i+e. ý 
(x E Ih, 1}) per claim where e,, is a mean zero random draw whose 
variance is state dependent. Managers can choose to have el =0 or 
eh --: -- 0 with certainty (but not both). Investors know: (i) i, (ii) whether 
el or Ch =0 and (iii) the distribution of investment uncertainty in the 
other state (which does not depend on whether el or eh = 0). Because 
each state is equally likely to occur, the overall investment uncertainty 
is not decided by whether el or eh ý 
e On the basis of this information the investors choose the number of 
shares k that they wish to take up. As there is ex-ante homogeneity 
within this economy, all investors choose the same k. Use kh* (kl*) to 
denote the number of shares investors will choose if eh =-- 0 (el = 
Managers have sufficient information to be able to calculate these two 
values of k at t= 
* At t=1 the state of the world is determined. If the state is high then 
all investors receive income Yh- If the state is low, then a proportion 
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1-s receive endowment Yhi the remainder endowment yu < Yh- El- 
ante all investors have the same probability s of becoming unemployed 
should the state be low at t=1. The true size of the rights issue i is 
then revealed. 
* In the low state, a financial market then operates to enable the unem- 
ployed to trade shares with the employed. Such a market is redundant 
in the high state as all investors are homogeneous. The unemployed 
will be able to sell I of their k shares to the employed at a price p 
immediately prior to the firm claiming i. Define S := sl(l - s) so that 
then S1 is the number of claims purchased per capita by the employed 
from the unemployed. A negative value for 1 merely indicates that the 
unemployed investor is a buyer rather than a seller. It is clear that, 
in this case that the consumption in the high state (Chl)ý low state, 
employed (cj) and low state, unemployed (qj) at t=1 is given by: 
Chl Yh - ki 
Cel Yh - SlP - (k + Sl)'i' (49) 
c. 1 y. + pl - (k - I)i 
At t=2 all investors continue to receive the same endowment as they 
received at t=1. The firm pays a dividend (1 + r)'Z' per claim and 
the economy terminates. The consumption in the high state (Ch2)1 low 
state, employed(C. 2) and low state, unemployed(Cu2) at t=2 is given 
by: 
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Ch2 Yh + kd 
Ce2 Yh + (k + SI)d (50) 
Cu2 yu + (k - 1)d 
Two issues remain unresolved. How do the investors choose k and how 
do managers decide whether to let eh =0 or el = 0. The choice of k 
comes from investors maximising their (time zero) expectation of utility of 
consumption Eo[u(cl, C2)1- It is assumed throughout that investor preferences 
are additively time separable with no time preference so that Eo[u(cl, C2)] 
EO[U(Cl)] + EO[U(C2)]. Formally: 
kh* max E,,,, [U(Chl) + U(Ch2) + S[U(Cul) + U(Cu2)1+ kjehýO 
(1 
- S)[U(CI) + U(C, 2)11 (51) kl* max E,,,,. [U(Chl) + U(Ch2) +, 9[U(Cul) + U(Cu2)1+ klei=o 
(1 
- S)[U(CI) + U(C, 2)11 
The baseline case will be for utility to be of power form, although expo- 
nential and quadratic utility are also considered in some of the models. 
Finally it is necessary to decide how managers will choose whether el 
or eh = 0. There are two "obvious" alternatives. First the manager could 
choose to act on behalf of investors and maximise investors' expected (time 
zero) utility of consumption. That is el =0 would be set equal to zero if the 
expected utility with investment uncertainty in the high state and kj* shares 
issued is greater than with investment uncertainty in the low state and k* h 
shares issued. Alternatively managers gain benefit from maximising the size 
of the expected value of their firm at t=1. This is a standard agency- 
style concept as encapsulated by Jensen's model. As the expected level of 
259 
investment per claim is the same whether el or eh = 0, managers gain benefit 
from ensuring that investors choose the larger value of kE jký, k, *}. So 
the managers decision could be determined by either maximising investors' 






In the latter case, if M is positive (negative) then the optimal choice 
for the manager is to choose el (eh) ---: 0- It is postulated that these two 
methods for determining whether managers should set el or eh =0 will give 
the same result. This has been surprisingly awkward to prove as the intuition 
is clear. An investor will only choose to put more money into the investment 
process in one case than the other if it is more attractive in that case. The 
following postulate was checked for all simulations run below and was never 
violated but due to the general difficulty of providing analytical solutions in 
this environment, has not been formally proven. 
Postulate 1 If M >, <0 then the expectation taken at time zero of in- 
vestors'future utility of consumption is maximised by setting el = 0, eh = 
respectively. If M=0 then investors are indifferent to whether eh or el = 
On the grounds that managers choose the investment policy, this chapter 
uses M as the metric for deciding whether el or eh should equal zero. This 
is also a much easier number to interpret as it is the relative difference in 
expected size of the firm with el =0 rather than eh = 0. Relative change in 
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expected utility has no meaning since utility can be arbitrarily rescaled and 
absolute change in expected utility is difficult to interpret. Finally, as with 
the example in the introduction, it will be shown that changes in expected 
utility are small in all cases but the value of M can be large - that is, 
managers have more incentive to get the decision right than shareholders. 
The complexity in this model comes from having trading. It is not pos- 
sible, in general, to determine analytical form for p, 1, although it will be 
possible to generate numerical solutions. In the next subsection I=0 will 
be imposed and r will be made non-stochastic. Some stylised facts can be 
determined analytically in this case. This section provides understanding for 
the more complex simulations that follow. 
23.2 No trade 
In the more general formulation given in section 23.3 there is a market for 
trade open at t=1 in the low state so that the unemployed can trade 
investment obligations with the employed. This market will operate after the 
level of investment and employment status has been revealed but before the 
investment is made. This section, which deals with an economy with certain 
returns, r, fulfils two aims. First, conditions where this market is required - 
that is, that trading will occur if the market opens - is presented. Second, 
the optimal strategy for revealing investment uncertainty should no market 
for trade exist (that is, if I=0 is imposed) at t=1 will be developed. It will 
be shown that A' will determine whether any financial market is required 
at t=1. The optimal policy for revealing investment information in the 
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absence of a market will depend upon the sign of P. 
23.2.1 Is a market required? 
Trading occurs if different investors value the claims differently. Remember 
that we can use the Euler equation to find the price p at which each investor 
would trade the claim should a market exist. Trading will occur if and 
only if these values differ. In this case, the Euler equation is given by p+ 
E[dU'(C2)IU'(cl)] as the true price of the claim includes the investment 
obligation inherent in buying the asset. The following result holds: 
'I Result 1 If A' has the same sign for all levels of consumption and 1>0 
then trading will occur at t=1 if and only if A' 0 0. If A' < (>)O then 
trading will occur such that an unemployed investor is a seller (buyer). 
Proof 
Trading will occur if one class of investor values the claim at t=1 dif- 
ferently from the other class of investor. So, trading will occur if and only if 
aplOy 0 0. If the partial derivative is positive (negative) across the domain 
then the employed (unemployed) will value the asset more highly than the 
other type of investor and so will purchase the asset. Therefore, to establish 
the result, it is necessary and sufficient to demonstrate that aplOy has the 
opposite sign to A' and that this sign is constant for all c. As the price of 
the asset is given by p= E[dU'(C2)IUI(Cl)] -i and as everything is known 
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with certainty when trading occurs, aPlaY ---: 
ja[UI(C2)1U'(CI)I1'9Y- Simple 
algebraic manipulation shows that: 




Now the ratio of marginal utilities is strictly positive. As (1 + r) > 0, 
d has the same sign as i. If i>0 then C2 > c, so A(ci) - 
A(C2) will be 
positive, zero or negative if A' <, =, >0 respectively. The result has thus 
been established. 
QED 
This result is not intuitively obvious. Remember that trading occurs 
once all uncertainty has been resolved. This dependency on changes in risk 
aversion is perhaps surprising. Given that, for power and quadratic utility, 
>0 respectively, it is clear that there will be trading at t=1 with 
the unemployed selling and buying respectively. For exponential utility, with 
0, any market at t=1 is redundant. 
23.2.2 Optimal managerial policy 
Having shown the conditions under which trading will occur, the optimal 
investment signalling policy in an economy where there is no market at t=1 
is now determined. The manager is deciding whether to fully reveal invest- 
ment policy in the low or the high state. The manager will choose this 
policy depending on which strategy maximises k. Invoking postulate 1, this 
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is equivalent to maximising Eo[u(cl, C2)]. Having just demonstrated the role 
that A' plays, this will highlight the role that P plays in proceedings. 
Introduce some new notation. Let d := i(l + r). Define Z,,,, := yxl - ki, 
Cx-2 := Yx2 + kd for x=h, e, u. That is, these Es are the consumption by 
each category of investor if there is no market for trade and if there is no 
uncertainty in investment. The expected (at t= 0) utility of consumption 
will be expressed in terms of these zs: 
2Eo[U(ci, C2)1 --'2 EO[U(ghl- keh) + U(Zýh2+ (1 + r)keh)1 
+(l - s)Eo[U(Zý, 1 - kel)+ 
U(ý, 2 + 
(l+ r)kcl)] 
+, sEo[U(Z5i - kel)+ 
U(2u2 + (l+ r)kel] 
ý22 U(Zýhl) + U(gh2) + (1 - S) 
[U(gel) + U(ýe2)] + 
'9[U(2u1) 
+ U(iýu2)1+ 0.5k 20,2 hl) eh 
)2 20,2 [(l 9)Ult(iý el) +(l +r U"(Zýh2)1 + 0.5k ei +sU"(iý. 1) + (1 - s)(1 + r)2 Ult(2e2) + S(l + r)2 U"(i-:; u2)1 
Now the terms in U(c., t) do not depend on the state containing investment 
uncertainty. Therefore the impact of concentrating investment uncertainty 
in the low state rather than in the high state is captured in the U" terms. 
It is clear from these terms that the key question is whether or not the 
investor is prudent (in the technical sense that was introduced in chapters 3 
&4-U... > 0)100. If the investor is prudent (which will be true for both 
power and exponential utility) then the second derivative terms associated 
with the low state will be more negative than the second derivative terms 
associated with the high state. Therefore it is clear that if there are no 
markets and the investor is prudent then, for any given k, the investor is 
100H A' <0 then P>0 but that the implication does not run the other way as A' < 
0= U111 > (U, 1)2/Uf which is stronger than U111 > 0, the condition for prudence. 
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happier to have investment uncertainty in the high state than the low state. 
Invoking postulate 1 it can be seen that the optimal policy for managers is 
to set el =0 if P>0, eh =0 if P<0 and, if P=0 then there is indifference 
(both for managers and investors). 
Consider the simple example given in the introduction. Let Yh =1 and 
yu = 0.4. Let r=0.05, s=0.1. Let iEf0.1, Q with equal probability in one 
state and let z=0.05 with certainty in the other state. In the introduction, i 
it was mentioned that for power utility with -1 =3 that kh* = 0.0518 < kj* = 
0.0807. This is what would be expected given that power utility is prudent. 
Consider also exponential utility - U(c) = -, -ac - which is prudent and 
quadratic utility - U(c) = Ac-Bc2 for cE [0, A12B] - which is not prudent 
and for which A' > 0. Choose parameters a, A, B so that A=3 at c=1 
(a=3, A=2.667, B=1). For exponential utility kh* = 0.099 and kj* = 0.113 
while for quadratic utility, kh* = kj* = 0.11521. This demonstrates the result 
proven above (and, indeed, is the first evidence supporting postulate 1). 
To surnmarise, if investors have power or quadratic utility then there 
would be trading in a market at t=1 if the state is low. For power 
(quadratic) utility the unemployed will be the sellers (buyers) in this market 
"t if Z is positive. Any such market is redundant if utility is exponential. In 
the absence of a market at t=1, quadratic utility investors are indifferent 
between which state contains the investment uncertainty. With power or 
exponential utility, investors would prefer the investment uncertainty to be 
concentrated in the high state and hence will choose to hold more of the 
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assets if this is the case. 
23.3 With a financial market 
23.3.1 Certain returns 
Having provided some analytical results with I=0, relax this assumption 
and allow trading in the market. Power, exponential and quadratic utility 
functions are all examined in this subsection. For the moment, returns to 
scale r remain certain, but this assumption is relaxed below. The prices and 
quantities of trades are calculated numerically. The results of this section 
were calculated using Pascal programmes with algorithms based heavily on 
the recipes given in Press, Flannery, Teukolsky and Vetterling (1989). The 
functions and procedures that have been taken from this source are identifi- 
able by the names and section numbers given in the footnotes. One of the 
Pascal programmes, "Powermin. pas", is given in appendix 26. This provides 
the results for power utility. Similar programmes were used for quadratic and 
exponential utility. The structure of the programme is now briefly described. 
* Iterations were run for 40 economies with different parameter values 
chosen to describe the economy. For all three utility functions, pa- 
rameters are chosen so that the coefficient of absolute risk aversion at 
c=1 is generated from a rectangular distribution'01 in (1,10). r and i 
are generated from rectangular distributions with range (0.01,0.1) and 
(0.1,0.2) respectively. Yh --= 1i y. = 0.4 and s=0.05 throughout. 
'OlUsing function "ran3", §7.1. 
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* Within each of the 40 economies, the numerical algorithm was run 
twice: once with investment uncertainty in the low state and once with 
investment uncertainty in the high state. 
e For each of the 40 economies, 100 random numbers, ei with iE 11-100} 
were drawn from a normal distribution"' with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 0.05 (these 100 values are the same for all economies). Out- 
lines were excluded by replacing any ej that had higher absolute value 
than the lowest value of i for the 40 economies. This means that in- 
vestment is never negative. In order to ensure that the mean value of 
the investment deviation was equal to zero for each economy 200 values 
were used for investment shocks; the 100 values of ei and the 100 values 
of -ei. So, Z can take any one of 201 values which will be denoted by 
2,, WE 10,.., 200}. Define to = ij zw =i+ for wE fl,.. 100} and 
2w =i- ew-lool for WE 1101,.., 200}. 
9 Remembering that trading occurs once 3' has been revealed, for each 
.V of the 201 values that i will take it is possible to calculate, using a 
03 numerical non-linear simultaneous equations solver' , unique values of 
p, I that satisfy the two Euler equations for any given k in each economy. 




10'Using function "gasdev", §7.2. 
"Procedure "mnewt", §9.6 
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where consumption is defined by equations 49,50. Notice that this 
is an approximation as the Euler equation gives the equilibrium price 
for an infinitesimal volume trade in equilibrium. In this case, I will be 
finite and so it is not clear that the true price of trade is exactly equal 
to p. This assumption, though, is assumed to be immaterial. 
9 kh*, kj* can now be calculated by using equation 51. c,, t for xE Ih, e, 1}, tE 
11,2} are defined in equations 49,50 with 'i = 'to if investment is cer- 
tain in state x and i takes one of the values of L, wE {1,.., 200} if 
investment is uncertain in state x. In this case: 
U(c. t) e., 0 
E,,,,. [U(c., t)] =11: U(C-, t) e-, 0 
(53) 
200, 
, S=Sl,.., 200 
* FinallY, Al, as given in equation 52, is calculated. If M is positive 
(negative) then managers will prefer to have investment certainty in 
the low (high) state. 
The algorithms were checked for exponential and quadratic utility by re- 
running the programmes and imposing p=I=0 in all cases rather than 
using the non-linear simultaneous equation solver to determine them en- 
dogenously. We know that investors with exponential utility find a financial 
market redundant and therefore M should be the same for each of the 40 
economies whether we impose p=I=0 or not in this case. For quadratic 
utility and no trading, investors should be indifferent between which state 
contains investment uncertainty and so M should be zero in each case. The 
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algorithms passed both of these tests. The non-linear simultaneous equations 
solver was checked separately to ensure that it was providing accurate values 
for p and 1. 
The results from running these simulations are what we might expect 
given the discussions above. For each of the 40 economies, M is always pos- 
itive with power and exponential utility and always negative with quadratic 
utility. The average value of M was 5.5%, 3.4% and -2.5% for power, expo- 
nential and quadratic utility respectively. These are significant differences. 
Postulate 1 was not violated for any simulation. That is, in all 40 cases, the 
expected utility of consumption with el =0 was higher for power and ex- 
ponential utility and lower for quadratic utility than with Ch = 0. However, 
the utility functions were very flat close to the optimal and the change in 
expected utility for the investors from choosing el =0 rather than eh =0 
was very small. So, it is the manager who derives the greatest benefit from 
making the optimal investment choice. 
In the two graphs in figure 11 it is shown how M varies with s (probability 
of unemployment), y. (unemployment benefit), r (certain returns to scale), 
-1 (coefficient of relative risk aversion) for power utility. These graphs were 
generated using a very similar algorithm to that described above. The main 
differences are that, in this case, 200 economies were used but only 5 values 
of ej were drawn in each case (so Z takes one of 11 values). Also, rather 
than picking parameters at random, s, y,,, r, -y are examined across a grid. 
From these graphs it is clear that the two key variables in determining the 
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magnitude of M are the level of unemployment income and the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion. As expected, the lower the subsistence income in 
the low state and the higher the risk aversion the higher is M. The higher 
the probability of unemployed, the greater M, although this effect is not as 
strong as the effect of y.. That is, if unemployment benefit is sufficiently 
low then the probability of becoming unemployed is largely irrelevant - it 
is just the possibility of potential unemployment that drives M. There is no 
clear relationship between the return to capital and M. This absence of any 
relationship between these two variables is confirmed by regressing M on r: 
the coefficient is very close to zero and is statistically highly insignificant. 
23.3.2 State independent risky returns 
An alternate version of the algorithm was run in which returns were risky 
but state independent. In the model described above returns are certain and 
trading occurs in the financial market when all information is known. The 
adjustment was to let the return to capital be stochastic (F) with ý taking 
one of two values with equal probability f=r±0.1. The true value of f 
is not revealed until t=2: that is, after trading has occurred. In this case 
40 economies were simulated with 20 values drawn for ei, so 31w = ej, wE 
11,.., 20} and'z,., = -Ew-209w E 121,.., 40}. Define r, :=r-0.1, r2 := r+0.1. 
kh*, kl* can now be calculated by using equation 51. c.., t for xE 1h, e, 1}, tE 
11,2} are defined in equations 49,50 with i=i if investment is certain in 






















Figure 11: A graph showing how the significance of state dependent invest- 
ment uncertainty varies with unemployment risk, unemployment income, risk 
aversion and fixed return on capital for power utility. M measures the ad- 
ditional percentage of shares investors will choose to take up at t=0 if 
investment is uncertain in the high state rather than the low state. -j is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, r is the return on capital (non-stochastic). 
s is the unemployment rate in the low state and y-u is endowment in the 
unemployed state. For all iterations, i 0-17Yh 1. For the top graph 
,y=3, r=0.1. For the bottom graph, s 0.057 y,, 0.4. 
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uncertain in state x. d= (1 + ri)i or d= (1 + r2)*Z with equal probability in 
either case. In this case: 
1E 
u(ct) ex 0 2 
r=rl r2 (54) l 1: 1: U(c,, t) e, 0 80 
r=rl r2 
The following characteristics were observed. First, the sign of M for all 40 
economies with each of the three utility functions was the same with risky re- 
turns as with certain returns. However, the absolute value of M was reduced. 
For power utility, the average value of M104 changed from 4.66% to 3.83% 
when returns were allowed to be risky. The analogous figures for exponential 
and quadratic utility were 2.89% to 2.39% and -2.14% to -1.76% respectively. 
For all 40 economics and for all three utilitY functions, the absolute value of 
M was lower when returns were risky rather than certain. Obviously, in each 
case as investors are risk averse, the utility of expected consumption and k 
were lower with risky returns than certain returns. Postulate 1 held in all 
cases. Simulations also confirmed that with state dependent risky returns, 
the financial market remains obsolete for exponential utility and if we force 
no trade (I = 0) for quadratic utility M=0 in all cases. 
23.3.3 State dependent risky returns 
Finally, an algorithm was run for power utility where returns were risky 
and state dependent. That is, F=r+0 in the high endowment state and 
""This value of M is not directly comparable with that given above as the number of 
simulations run here is less than in the previous case. 
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f=r-V in the state where unemployment is a possibility with 0>0 as 
unemployment is procyclical. In this case, as the state does not change from 
t=1 to t=2, returns are known when trading occurs but not at t=0, 
when k is chosen. Another adjustment was made to the models described 
above. So far, it has been assumed that there is no real investment before 
t=1 and no real investment after t=2. However, it is reasonable to suppose 
that a company would be more able to finance new projects from internally 
generated funds at times of low unemployment. Therefore, the expression for 
Chl in equation 49 is amended to Chl = Yh - k(i - v) where v >- 0 represents 
the funding for the new project that comes from internally generated profits. 
In the low state, it is assumed that no such funding is available. So equations 
49,50 are amended in this instance to: 
Chl Yh - k(i - V) 
Cel Yh - SIP - (k + Sl)'i 
C', y,, + pl - (k - 1)1 (55) 
Ch2 Yh + kil(l +r+ ý) 
Ce2 Yh + (k + Sl)z(l +r- 
C. 2 y. + (k - 1)'Z(l +r- 0) 
The algorithm used to calculate M in this case was identical to the one 
used to generate the two graphs in figure 11. Again, 200 points are chosen 
across a grid in this space and 5 values are chosen for ej. In this case i=0.15 
(not 0.1 as with the other two graphs), y,, = 0.4, Yh = 1, y=3, r=0.1, s= 
0.05. In figure 12 it is shown how M varies with 0, v. It can be seen that 
M is monotonic increasing in v, but, as 0 gets greater so M gets smaller. 
This is consistent with the state independent risky returns result. Postulate 
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1 held for all 200 points. 
The intuition is straightforward. As v increases so the asset becomes 
more attractive (the company is expected to fund more of the investment 
itself) and kl*, kh* increase. 
However, as 73 increases the asset becomes more risky so less attractive 
causing kl*, ký to decrease. In the first case investors have been persuaded to 
take on more assets because of a potential benefit should the state be high 
at t=1,2. However, if the state turns out to be low, then the effects of 
suboptimal investment are amplified. This drives M up. In the second case, 
the profit risk partially "dominates" the investment risk. 
Concluding, in the case of state dependent returns, there are two coun- 
teracting effects. First, the variability in profits makes investors wary of the 
asset to start with. The effect of the additional risk caused by investment 
uncertainty is lowered. The offsetting effect is that companies are less able 
to finance projects from retained profits in the low state. There is a potential 
double hit in this case - investment may be "too high" and profits may be 
"too low" to fund it - causing a greater shock to investors' cashflows. This 
issue is examined in a multiperiod context with no trading below. 
24 A multi-period economy 
In the previous section, a two-period model with trading was examined. In 
this section, it is assumed that trading is prohibited in order to convert to 
a multiperiod world. Subsection 24.1 considers a model very similar to that 
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given in the previous section. By transferring to a multiperiod economy the 
role that retained profits plays in the investment process becomes clearer 
(that is, v of the previous section becomes endogenised). Subsection 24.2 
then shows the advantage of a dividend smoothing model within an economy 
with endowment shocks. In the multiperiod case, only power utility with 
P=1 is examined. There is one other important difference between the 
two period world and the economy presented here. In the former case, all 
investment was made at t=1 and there was no investment after t=2. In the 
multiperiod case it is assumed that there exists capital in the firm at t=0 
and there will continue to be capital in the firm after t=T. It is fluctuations 
in capital over [0, T] that drive the model. This is more in keeping with an 
economy with long lived firms and shorter lived investors. 
24.1 Certain and state dependent risky returns 
This subsection aims to be the multiperiod equivalent of the two period 
cases of certain returns and state dependent risky returns given above. The 
economy develops as follows: 
e At t=0 the economy is in the high state. There is one company that 
announces that, for every claim that an investor wishes to purchase, 
an external source will place capital Ifo in a real investment process 
on the understanding that, at time T this source will then withdraw 
KT = Ko per claim. At each point t in between it will have capital 
employed Ifo + e., t per claim where e,, t is a mean zero random variable 
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whose variance is state dependent. If retained capital is not sufficient 
to satisfy Ko + e. t then investors will be expected to meet the shortfall 
but, in return, investors will receive a dividend of any excess capital. 
As before, there are two states: an upstate and a downstate. The 
managers can choose elt =0 Vt or eht =0 Vt but not both. They 
announce this decision to investors at t=0. 
In the interval tE ll,..., T} the economy is described by a Markov 
switching model. 
At time t, the economy will be in the same state as t-1 with probability 
(1 - q) and switch states with probability q. The return on capital over 
the period [t - 1, t] is given by rx Ef rh, rj} where x refers to the state at 
time t. So, if the economy is in the high state at t then it makes profits 
rhI'(t-I v per claim else profits are r11(t-I per claim with rh ý: rl. rh, rl 
are known at t=0. e,, t is then drawn and the company calculates the 
capital employed 1(t = Ifo + e., t that it needs per claim for the next time 
period. So, the net payout to investors per claim is dt = r-, Ift-1 - e.., t, 
which can be negative. 
e Investors receive endowment at t of yt ---: Yh if the state is high. If 
the state is low then a proportion s receive endowment yt = yu, the 
remainder yt = Yh with Yh > Yu- In the low state at any time point, the 
probability of becoming unemployed is not dependent on the previous 
employment status of the individual - it is s for each individual for 
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each period in which the economy is in the low state. That is, there is 
no persistence in unemployment in this model. 
e Trading is prohibited. 
* At time T, in order to ensure that the level of capital employed by the 
company is indeed KT, it is necessary to impose the restriction that 
exT ý-- 0 whatever state prevails at that time. The economy then closes 
at time T. 
e At time t=0 investors are given the choice of how many claims k they 
wish to own. Investors are ex-ante homogeneous and so choose the 
same k. If elt =0 Vt then denote by kj* the number of claims chosen. 
Similarly, if eht =0 Vt then kh* is the optimal number of shares. These 
are defined by 
kh* max kleht: --O Vt 
max klelt=O Vt 
T 
E Eo[U(yt + kdt)] 
t=l T 
1: Eo[U(yt + kdt)] 
t=l 
(56) 
9 As in the two period case, the metric M := (kl* - kh*)Ikh* is used to 
determine the optimal managerial policy. Postulate 1 was not violated 
for any of the economies considered. 
Simulations were run for 24 economies for both models. For each of these 
economies 250 simulations were run (denoted by a). A numerical optimiser 
was used" to determine kl*, kh* as defined above. The state at time t varied 
"'Again "brent". 
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between simulations and so values of dt also varied between simulations. Use 
d't to denote the dividend paid at time t in simulation a. Expected utility of 
consumption was calculated as follows: 




1: Uo'(c,., t) 
47=1 (57) 
U0, (C--t) 
U(Yh + kdfft) x=h I 
sU(y, + kdt) + (1 - S)U(Yh + kdt) x=1 
Define the variables. -t = 3, Yh = 1, T= 100, q=0.4. The distribution of 
e, t is either zero with certainty or rectangular in [-0.25Ko, 0.25Ifo]. IfT = 
Ko = 0.2, s = 0.1. rl E 1-0.01, rh}. rh E 10.01,0.02,0.03} if rl = rh, 
otherwise rh E 10.03,0.05,0.07}. Y. E 10.25,0.5,0.75,1}. The results 
are presented in table 6. In the cases when kh* are positive'06 the values of 
M, AU are positive in all cases. Investors and managers prefer investment 
uncertainty in states with low risk to personal capital. Further, M is greater 
for risky r than certain r with the same expectation. This means that the 
possibility of low profits and a positive investment shock combined in the low 
state increases the aversion of individuals to the equity. Postulate 1 holds in 
all cases. The low value of AU should be emphasised. While utility can be 
arbitrarily rescaled, it is worth noting that the value for expected utility was 
in the (-90, -40) range for all simulations. Therefore, the manager appears 
to have more to gain than the investor from making the optimal choice. This 
is one of the main reasons for using M as the main metric in this chapter. 
"'Selling short has little meaning in this context as it is real investment opportunities 















0.04 0.04 retained 0.05 0.05 
Figure 12: A graph showing how the significance of state dependent in- 
vestment uncertainty varies with "profrsk" -= 0, which is half the difference between returns in the low state and returns in the high state and "retained" 
= v, which is the amount of investment funded from retained profits. M 
measures the additional percentage of shares that investors will choose to 
take up at t=0 if investment uncertainty is in the high state rather than 
the low state. For all iterations, i=0.15, -y = 3, y,, = 0.4, s=0.05, Yh 
1, E[r] = 0.1. 
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Yu 
ri = rh 
rh kh* kl* M AU 
ri = -0.01 
rh kh* ki" M AU 
0.25 0.01 0.15 0.56 2.73 0.134 0.03 -0.09 -0.29 n. a n. a 
0.5 0.01 0.48 0.85 0.78 0.043 0.03 0.22 0.40 0.80 0.003 
0.75 0.01 0.72 0.84 0.17 0.011 0.03 0.60 0.71 0.18 0.007 
1.0 0.01 0.79 0.82 0.04 0.003 0.03 0.76 0.80 0.05 0.003 
0.25 0.02 0.30 1.06 2.52 0.610 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 n. a n. a 
0.5 0.02 0.95 1.67 0.75 0.187 0.05 0.56 0.99 0.78 0.062 
0.75 0.02 1.42 1.65 0.17 0.049 0.05 1.20 1.45 0.21 0.042 
1.0 0.02 1.56 1.62 0.04 0.011 0.05 1.45 1.57 0.09 0.018 
0.25 0.03 0.45 1.51 2.34 1.330 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 n. a n. a 
0.5 0.03 1.41 2.44 0.73 0.412 0.07 0.86 1.54 0.79 0.165 
0.75 0.03 2.10 2.44 0.16 0.107 0.07 1.72 2.16 0.26 0.107 
1.0 0.03 2.30 2.38 0.04 0.025 0.07 2.04 2.32 
- 
0.14_ 0.059 
Table 6: Multi-period economy with certain and state dependent risky re- 
turns. The number of assets chosen by investors kh*, kj* if investors are fully 
informed of the investment policy in the high state and low state respec- 
tively. M is the metric (k, * - kh*)Ikh*, quoted only for positive kh*. AU, also 
quoted only for positive kh*, is the change in expected utility for investors 
from concentrating investment uncertainty in the high state rather than the 
low state. For all simulations s=0.1, q=0.4, -1 = 3, yh = 1, T= 100. 
These results are based on 250 simulations in each case. 
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24.2 A dividend smoothing model 
The simulations in this chapter are concluded by presenting some results 
from one that demonstrates the merit of a dividend smoothing policy with 
rights issues concentrated in high states. In this section rights issues are 
more likely to happen in one state than another. Therefore, the expected 
level of investment is state dependent in this model. This, model, then, 
captures both the expected level of investment and uncertainty in investment 
and so is the closest model that is presented to the "real world" situation 
although trading is still prohibited. The benefits of concentrating rights 
issues in high endowment states is clearly demonstrated in this subsection. 
This confirms the intuition of the introduction that, by allowing the expected 
level of investment to be state dependent, the results will be strengthened 
and not weakened. 
e At t=0 the economy is in the high state. There is one company 
that states that, for every claim that an investor wishes to purchase, 
an external source will place capital Ko in a real investment process 
on the understanding that, at time T this source will then withdraw 
IfT = Ifo per claim. At each point t in between the company wishes 
to have capital employed If., *, t = Ifo + e., t per claim where e., t is a mean 
zero random variable whose variance is state dependent. In this case, 
it is predetermined that elt =0 Vt and eht is drawn from a rectangular 
distribution in [-0.25KO, 0.25KO]. This is known by investors at t=0. 
In this case, though, the capital employed at time t, Ift need not always 
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equal The only restriction is that the capital at T must equal IfT. 
* In the interval tE ll,..., T} the economy is described by a Markov 
switching model. 
* At time t, the economy will be in the same state as t-1 with probability 
(1 - q) and switch states with probability q. The return on capital over 
the period [t - 1, t] is given by r. E jrh, rl} where x refers to the state 
at time t. rh ýt rl and rh, rl are known at t=0. 
e Investors receive endowment at t of yt Yh if the state is high. If 
the state is low then a proportion s receive endowment yt = yu, the 
remainder yt " Yh with Yh > Yu - In the low state at any time point, the 
probability of becoming unemployed is not dependent on the previous 
employment status of the individual - it is s for each individual for 
each period in which the economy is in the low state. That is, there is 
no persistence in unemployment in this model. 
9 The dividend process is described as follow. The net payout to investors 
at time t, dt := Dg + Dts - Rt. D, := (Ifo where C is the chosen dividend 
yield. At times tE 12,..., T- 1}, Dt := Max(Dt-1, (Ift-1). This may 
be interpreted by saying that dividends never drop but will be raised 
if possible. There is, though, a risk this way that capital employed will 
fall so that IfT can never be reached. This is counteracted through 
right issues. Define numbers 0., <1 for both states x so that, in 
state x, if, in the absence of a rights issue 1(t < O., Ift* there will be a 
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rights issue of exactly the required size to make Kt = Ift*. Finally, if 
capital employed is getting very much greater than ICt* then a "special" 
dividend Dt" will be paid and investors will understand that this is a 
one-off payment. If, in the absence of this special dividend, Ift > LlIft* 
then a special dividend will be paid to return 1(t to Ift*. Otherwise the 
special dividend is zero. Ift = (1 + r., t)Ift-1 - Dt - Dt' + Rt. 
* Trading is prohibited. 
* In order to ensure that capital truly equals IfT at time T, DT := DT-b 
0 and RT := I(T - (1 + rxT)KT-1 + DT- 
The optimal value of k, denoted by k. * was calculated using equations 56, 
57 above. 250 simulations were run for four economies. The pair (Oh, 01) E 
1(0.8,0.7) 
, 
(0.9,0.8), (0.8,0.9), (1,1)}. Other variables are the same as for 
the ninth column, second row of table 6: -1 = 3, Yh = 1, T= 100, q=0.4, 
s=0.1, ( = 0.01% (dividend yield), Ifo = IfT = 0.2, rh = 0.03, rt = 
-0.01, y. = 0.5. The results can be directly compared with the value of kj* 
in the second row, ninth column of table 6 where kj* = 0.396. 
When (Oh, 01) ý (0.8,0.7), (0.9,0.8), (0.8,0.9), (11 1), ks* = 1.166,0.839, 
0.366,0.432 respectively. Defining AU in this case to be the difference in 
expected utility between the model that generated kj* = 0.396 and the div- 
idend smoothing policy, AU = 0.154,0.084, -0.009,0.004 respectively. So, 
again, proposition 1 holds. Both managers and investors prefer this dividend 
smoothing policy to the investment smoothing policy given in the previous 
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section if Oh > Ol- In this case, dividends are always paid in the low state 
and so consumption is, on average, higher in these states. There is sometimes 
recourse to rights issues, but as these are concentrated in the high states this 
acts as a consumption smoothing effect. So, the number of claims chosen by 
investors may be around three times greater if we allow the expected value 
of investment to be state dependent than if we do not. Notice that rarer, 
but more severe, rights issues are preferred to smaller more regular rights 
issues: that is k* is greater with (Oh,; bl) = (0.8,0.7) than (0.9,0.8). This is 
because, in the former case, small shortfalls in capital can often be reclaimed 
by future profits without necessarily having a rights issue. 
25 Conclusion 
In this chapter an economy has been examined where there is personal endow- 
ment risk and all financial investment is in the equity of a firm that some- 
times invests suboptimally and does not fully reveal its investment plans. 
The economy has been constructed in such a way that there are no agency 
problems: a benevolent manager and a selfish manager always make the same 
choices. There are two effects at work. First, investors want positive endow- 
ment shocks in states where there is low risk to personal capital. Second, the 
simulations show that investors are also more willing to absorb mean zero in- 
vestment shocks in this state as well. Therefore, it is contested that managers 
should amend any prior investment plans in such a way that dividends are 
not cut and rights issues are not undertaken in states where there is a high 
284 
risk to individual endowment. Dividends should be smoothed in order to 
inform investors of the net payoffs that will come from their portfolio in low 
states and rights issues should be concentrated in high states for companies 
to fulfil their investment plans. The two-period model of section 23 shows 
that even with the introduction of a financial market, this is still the optimal 
corporate finance policy. This is, in some ways, similar to the overinvestment 
model of Jensen (1986) except that here there is no systematic tendency to 
overinvest and agency issues are not needed to motivate the model. 
While no existing empirical study can be considered a direct test of this 
model, the balance of evidence from this literature is broadlY supportive 
of the model. Further, it has been argued that the assumptions needed to 
generate the results are reasonable and have, certainly to this author, more 
intuitive appeal than some existing theories of optimal dividend policy. Much 
further work is needed, both theoretical and empirical, but it is contested that 









RealArr&yNP as ARRAY (I.. npl OF real; 
RealArr&yNPbyNP se ARRAY it.. np, l.. npl OF real; 
IntegerArtayNP as ARRAY ll.. np) OF Integer; 
VAR 
(These are the v&riablea for the preset functions/ procedures) 
mcfl, idum: integer; 
mcf2: Re&lArr&yNP; 
mcf3, G&sdevloet, Ran3lntxt, R&n3lnextp: Integer; 
mcf4, mcf5, G&sd*vG&et: real; 
Ran3M&: Arrayll.. 651 of real; 
(These are the variables for my bit) 
r, mm, gamma, bil : artay[l.. Yun&21 of real; 
err: arrayll.. runsl of real; 
hh. li, kk. mm, startup: integer; 
BB, yu, ye, s, Es, d, dcert, i. cl&ims. utilt2 : real; 
cers, minl, maxl, &vgl, retura, axl, cxI - real; 
fllaA, fileB, fiI@C. fileD . text; 
checker : string; 
FUNCTION r&n3(VAR idum: integer): real; 
CONST 
mbig as 4. Oe6; 
mseed as 1618033.0; 
me as 0.0; 
fac vs 2.5o. 7; 
VAR 
i, ii, k: integer; 
mj, mk: reel; 
BEGIN 
IF idum<O THEN BEGIN 
mj: =mseed+idum; 
IF mj >-O. O THEN 
mj: =mj. mbig*trunc(mj/mbig) 
ELSE 
mj: =mbig. &bs(mj)+mbig*trunc(&bs(mj)/mbig); 
R&n3M&[551: wmj; 
mk: nl; 
FOR i: -l to 54 DO BEGIN 
ii: -21*i MOD 55; 
R&n3M&[iil: nmk; 
mk: =mj. mk; 
IF mk<mz THEN mk-mmk+mbig; 
mj: =R&n3M&[iii 
END; 
FOR k: =1 TO 4 DO BEGIN 
FOR Leal TO 55 DO BEGIN 
R&n3M&Iil: =R&n3M&ril-R&n3M&11+ (i+30) MOD 55)1; 









Ran31next : =Ran3lnext+l, 
IF RanMnext=56 THEN 
Ran31next: =I; 
R&n3lnextp := Ran3lnextp + 1; 
IF R&n3lnextp a 56 THEN R&n3lnextp: =I; 
mj: -R&n3M&[R&n3lnext) - Ran3M&IR&n3lnextpl; 
IF mj<ms THEN mj: mmj+mbig; 
R&n3Ma, jR&n3Inextj: =mj; 
ran3: mmj*fac 
END; 
FUNCTION gasdoy(VAR idum: integer)- real; 
VAR 
fac, r, vl, v2: real; 
BEGIN 
IF Gaadevlset =0 THEN BEGIN 
REPEAT 
vI-. -2.0*r&n3(idum)-I. 0; 
v1=2.0ran3(idurný1.0; 
r: =sqr(vl)+sqr(v2); 












PROCEDURE usrfun(VAR x: RealArrayNP; 
n: integer; 
VAR alpha: Ro&lArr&yNPbyNP; 
VAR bew IL*alArr&yNP; 
xa. real); 
VAR 
plocal, Doc&l, cuolocal, cullocal, munlocal: real; 
ceolocal, colloc&l, mueIOC&I, XUIOC&I, XEIOC&I: real; 




IF hh-I THEN BEGIN 
CUOIOC&I: Myu+(Ilocal*ploc&lý((Ra-llocal)*i); 
cullocal: myu+(d*(xa. Uocal)); 
ce0local: myo-(Es*llocal*plocal)ý((xx+(Es*llocal))"i); 
ce I local: = ye +((I a +(Esllloc&l))*d); 
MOUIOC&I: =Exp(. gammauillln(culloc&l/cuolocal)); 
muelocal: -Exp(-gamm&ujl*ln(celIOC&I/COOIOC&I)); 
XUloc&l: m 1. ((d*lioc&l*gamm&Ujl'muulocal)/cuOlocal) 
XElocal: m 1+((d*E&Olloc&10gamm&ojl*muelocal)/coOlocal); 
VUlocal: w dOgamm&Ujl*munloc&10((d/cullocal)+((plocal+i)/cuOloc&l)); 
VElocal: m d'Es*g&rnm&Ujl*mucloc&l*((d/collocal)+((plocal+i)/ce0local)); 
betaill :m -plocal. i+(d*muulocal); 
bet& 21 :m -plocal-i+(d*mueloc&l); 
END ELSE BEGIN 
cuolocal: myu+(Hoc&l*ploc&lý((xs. llocal)Omuujl); 
culloc&l: -yu+(dcert*(x*-Uocal)); 
ce0loical: mye. (Es*Uocal*plocalý((xz+(Es*llocal))*muDil); 
celiocal: -y*+((xs+(EsOHoc&l))*dcert); 
muulocal: -Exp(. gamm&ujl*ln(cullocal/cuoloc&l)); 
muelocal: =Ezp(. g&mmabjl*ln(collocal/cooloc&l)); 
XUloca: w 1. ((dcert. Uoc&l*gammabjl*muulocal)/cuOlocal) 
XElocal: w )+((dcort*E&*Uocal*gammaojl*muelocal)/ce0local); 
VUlocal: m dcert*gammabjl*muulocal*((dcert/cullocal)+((plocal+muojl)/c uOlocal)); 
VEI*cal: m dcort*Esogammaajl*muelocal*((dcert/colloc&l)+((plocal+mubil) /ce0local)); 
b: s&jIj :m ploc&l. mubjl+ dcers*munlocal); 
b ta[2] := -plocaI-mubjJ+jdcer%*mueloc&I); 
END; 
4jph&jI, I): wXUIoc&I; 
&Ipha[I, 2j: mVUloc&l; 
alpha[2,11: n XElocal; 
alpba[2,21: m VElocal; 
END; 
PROCEDURE ludcmp(VAR &: RealArrayNPbyNP; 
n: integer; 
VAR indx: IntegerArr&yNP; 
VAR d: real); 
CONST 
tiny = 1.0o. 20; 
VAR 
kj, im&x, i: integer; 




d: =I. O; 
FOR i: nl TO a DO BEGIN 
big: z: 0.0; 
FOR j: =1 TO a DO 
IF abs(arijj) > big THEN big: xcabs(ari, 11); 
IF big=0.0 THEN BEGIN 
writeln('pause in LUDCMP - singular matrix'); 
readln 
END; 
vvA[il =I. O/big 
END; 
FOR j: =1 to a DO BEGIN 
FOR i-. -I to j-1 DO BEGIN 
sum: -arl, jl; 
FOR k: -l to 14 DO 
sum: =sum-&[i, kj*&jkjj; 
&[i, jl: =sum 
END; 
big: -O. O; 
FOR i: -j to a DO BEGIN 
sum: -ali, jl; 
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FOR k: =l to j-1 DO 
sum: -sum-&[i, k]*&(k, jj; 
a, rl, jj: -sum; 
dum: scVVAji]*abs(sum); 





IF j<>imax THEN BEGIN 
For k: -l TO n DO BEGIN 
dum: -&jima. x, kj; 
&(im&x, kj: =&0, kj; 
ao, kl: =dum 
END; 




IF a, U, j]=0.0 THEN &D, jl: -tiny; 
IF J<>n THEN BEGIN 
dum:. I. O/aa, j]; 
FOR Las j+l to a DO 





PROCEDURE lubkob(VAR a: Re&lArr&yNPbyNP, 
n: integer; 
VAR indx-. InttgerArrayNP, 
VAR b: RealArrayNP); 
YAýR 
j, ip, ii, i: integer; 
sum: rea. 1; 
BEGIN 
ii: -O; 




IF ii<>O THEN 
FOR j: =ii to i-I DO 
sumý-sum-a. ji, jj*bUj 




FOR i: =n DOWNTO I DO BEGIN 
sum: =b[ij; 
FOR J: -i+l TO n DO 
sum: =sum-a, [i, jj*bUj; 
blil: =sum/&[i, il 
END 
END; 
PROCEDURE mnewt(ntrial: integer; 
VAR x-. RealArrayNP; 
n. integer; 




k, i: integer; 








FOR k: =l to ntrial DO BEGIN 
usrfun(x, n, &Iph&A, bet&A, xy); 
errf: =O. O; 
FOR i: =l to n DO 
errf: =errf+abs(bets, Ajij); 
IF errf <= tolf THEN GOTO 99; 
ludcmp(a, lpha. A, njndxA, d); 
lubksb(&Ipha, A, n, indxA, betaA); 
errx: =O. O; 
FOR i: =l to n DO BEGIN 
errx: =errx+abs(beta. A(ij); 
x[i]: -xlil+bet&Alil 
END; 








FUNCTION func(xx: real): real; 
VAR 
culglobal, ce0global, colglobal, ut0u, utile, utilt real; 
pglobal, lglobal, cuOglobal: real; 
yh, probhigh, ch0glob&l, cblglobal, utilb : real; 





for kk: ul to runs do begin 
(Investment noise - gaussian with mean 0.03) 
for H: =1 to 2 do begin 





tnnewt(mcfl. mcf2, mcf3, mcf4, mcfS, xx); 
pglobal: -mcf2[l] 
lglob&I: -mcf2j2j-, 
If hhul THEN BEGIN 
cu0slobal: myu+(Iglobal*pglobal)-((xx. lglobal)*i); 
culglobal: =yu+(d*(zx-lglob&l)); 
ceOglobal: uye-(Eo*lglob&l*pglobalý((xx+(Es*lglob&l))*i); 
ce I global: -yo+((xx +(E&*lglob&l))*d); 
ch0glob&l: =yh-(zx*mubjj); 
chlglob&l: myh+(xx*dcert); 








utilu: w(Exp((I. g&mm&Ujl)*In(cuOglob&l))+Exp((I-g&mm&bjl)*In( cuIglob&I)))/(I-gammabjj); 
u tile: =(E z p((I- gam m &5 jl)*In(ce0glob&l))+ Ex p((I- gam m &bj ])*In( celglob&I)))/(I-g&mm&Ujj); 
utilh: =(Exp((I. g&mmabjl)*In(ch0global))+Exp((I. g&mm&Ujl)*In( chlglob&l)))/(I-g&mm&bjl); 




func: =. &vgl/(2*runt); (As we are using a minimizer) 
END; 
FUNCTION func2(xx: real): real; 
VAR 
culglob&l, ce0glob&l, celglobal, utilu, utile, utilt real; 
pglob&l, lglob&l, cuOglob&l: real; 
y b, probhigh, ch0global, chlglobal, utilh real; 






cu0glob&I: =yu. (xx*mubjj); 
cuI global: wyu+(dcert*xx); 
ce0glob&l: =ye. (xx*mubj]); 
ce -Iglob&l: mye+(xx*dcert); 
ch0glob&l: -yh-(xx*mubj)); 
chlglobal: -yh+(xx*dcert); 
utilu: =(Exp((1-9&mm&Ujl)*In(cuoglob&l))+Exp((I-gamma0j])*In( cuIg1ob&I)))/(I-g&mmabjj); 
U tile: m(Eip((I-g&mm&bjl)*In(ce0glob&l))+Exp((I-g&mm&Djl)*In( celglob&l)))/(I. g&mm&Uj1); 
tilh: =(Exp((I-S&mm&Ujl)*In(ch0global))+Exp((I-g&mmabjl)*In( chlglob&l)))/(I. g&mm&ujl); 
u tilt: xc(probbigh *u tilh)+ ((I- probhigh)*((&* u tilu)+ ((I-@)* u tile) 
func2: =. utilt; (As we are using a minimizerl 
END; 
FUNCTION brent(&x, bz, cx, %oI : real; 






zeps 1.0e. 10; 
VAR 
a, b, d, e, clemp: real; 
fu, fv, fw, fx : real; 
iter : integer; 
p, q, r, toll, tol2 : real; 
U'VIW, x, xm : real; 
FUNCTION sign(a, b: real) : real; 
BEGIN 
IF b >-O. O THEN signm abs(a) ELSE sign -abs(a) 
END; 
BEGIN 
IF ax < cx THEN wwax ELSE &: =cx; 





if startup me I then fx: -func2(x) else fx : -func(x); 
fv: =fx; 
fw: =fx; 
FOR iter : -I TO itmax DO BEGIN 
xm: =O. S*(&+b); 
toll; - tol*abs(x)+seps; 
tol2: -2.0*toll; 
IF abs(x. xrn) <wtol2-0.5*(b-&) THEN GOTO 99; 
IF abs(e) > toll THEN BEGIN 
r: -(x-w)*(fx-fv); 
q: -ýx-v)*(fx-fw); 
p: - x-v)*q. (x-w)*r; 
q: -2.0*(q. r); 




IF (abs(p) >- &bs(0.5*q*eternp)) OR (p<=q*(&-x)) 
OR (p >= q*(bx)) THEN BEGIN 
IF x>=xm THEN e: wax 










IF x >=xm THEN e: wa-x 
ELSE e: =bx; 
d: =cgold*e 
END; 
IF abs(d) >zctoll THEN u: =x+d 
ELSE u: zmx+sign(tolI, d); 
if startupmcl then fu: =func2(u) else fu: =func(u); 
IF in <=fx THEN BEGIN 









IF u <x THEN &: -u ELSE b: -u; 



















assign(fileA, 'c: / thesis/chapte rg /data/ powermin. t x t'); 
rewrite(fileA); 
assign(fileB, Ic: /thesis/chapterS/data/powermi2. txt'); 
rowrite(fileB); 
assign(fileC. Ic-. /thesis/chapterg/data/powerchk. txt'); 
rewrite(filec); 
Gasdovlset: -O; 
mcfl: =5000; INumber of iterations) 
mcf2jIj: -0; (This is the price) 
mcf2[2]: =O; (Number of shares sold) 
mcf3: =2; (Number of unknowns) 
mcMýIe. ll; (Error size - 1) 
mcf5: -Ie-II; (Error size - 2) 
(00*00 SET GLOBAL VARIABLES 
(Employed income) ye: -I; yu,. -O. 4; 
(Percentage unemployed) e: =0.05; 
BB; =I; 
idum: -. I, 
for jj: ml to run&2 do begin 
g&mm&5jj: sxI+(r&n3(idum)*9); 
end; 
(Level of return - rectangular In 10.01,0.111 
idum: --2; 
for jj: =I to runs2 do rUjj: x; 0.0I+(r&n3(idum)*0.09); 
(Expected investment - Rectangular in 10.1.0.21) 
minl: -9999; 
idum: =. 3; 
for jj: =I to runs2 do begin 
muUjj: =0. I+(r&n3(idum)*0. I); 
if mubj] < mial then minl: -mubjl 
end; 
max Lac-9999; 
idum: -. 4; 
for jj: -l to runs do begin 
01 rbjl: =99999; 
while abs(ortbil) > mini do errDjj: -g&sdev(idum)*0.05; 
if abs(errUjj) > mast then maxt : nabs(errUffl 
end; 
writeID('minI: M1. minI, 1 MaXIMI'maxt); 
for bh: =l to 2 do begin 
for jj: ml to runs2 do begin 
writeln(kh, 1 1, jj); 








, xI: zcbxIDjj-0.0I; 
cxl: -bxlUjl+0.01; 





hile func(cxl) < func(bxlojl) do begin 
axl: =axl+0.01; 
bxlUjl: ubxlbjl+o. ol; 
cxl: =cxl+0.01; 
end; 
writeIn(1&xI:: z', &xI, 1 bxln', bxlojl, ' cxl-', cxl); 
If (func(bxIDjj)<func(&xI)) and (func(bxlbjl)<func(cxl)) 
then checker: =IOKI else checker := 'Trouble'; 
Writ eln(checke r); 
startup: =2; 
claims: -bxlbjl; 
utilt2: =-brent(azi, bxlbjl, cxl, le. 25, claims); 
writ eln('cWrns =', claim a); 
writeln(fileC, hh, jj, bxlojl, claime, checker); 
bxlojl: =claims; 
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If hh =1 then 
writ eln(fileA, claims, u tilt 2); 
If bb =2 then 
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Unemployment shocks and asset returns, 07 
Abstract 
In an attempt to explain the long term average equity premium and 
real riskfree rate, several authors have modelled the effect of unem- 
ployment risk on predicted average asset returns. Theoretically these 
models are appealing since quite "small" uninsurable nonmarketable 
capital can have large effects on asset prices. Curiously, existing tests 
have concentrated on examining the static properties of asset returns 
(expected returns and variance / covariance characteristics) rather 
than the dynamic properties in such contexts. If unemployment is a 
key state variable determining the average equity premium and real 
riskfree rate then an empirical consequence is that unemployment 
shocks should be a major factor influencing variations over time in 
asset returns. Using UK and US data, this is the first study that 
examines changes in asset returns as unemployment risk varies. It is 
found that the riskfree rate rises prior to "bad" unemployment news, 
which is difficult to reconcile with the precautionary savings motive. 
"'Versions of this chapter were presented to the Financial Options Research Center, 
University of Warwick, January 1995, the British Accounting Association Doctoral Collo- 
quium, April 1995 and the Department of Accounting and Finance, Lancaster University, 
June 1995.1 am grateful to the participants for their useful comments. I would also like 
to thank Jeremy Smith and Sanjay Yadav for their econometrics advice. 
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27 Introduction 
The role that uninsurable shocks might play in explaining the Mehra & 
Prescott puzzles was discussed in depth in chapter 3. It was emphasised 
that the reason why, in the Weil (1992a) and Mankiw (1986) type models, 
uninsurable risk dramatically alters predicted average asset returns is that 
all risk is persistent within these economies. However, the multiperiod work 
of Heaton & Lucas (see, for example Lucas (1994), Heaton and Lucas (1995)) 
has estimated that real idiosyncratic endowment risk is not sufficiently persis- 
tent to dramatically alter the average real riskfree rate and equity premium. 
However, the cross-sectional data on the length of shocks to personal in- 
come does not provide accurate estimates. Therefore, while Heaton & Lucas 
make a significant contribution by showing how theoretically important the 
persistence of idiosyncratic endowment is in determining the testable impli- 
cations of incomplete market models, their data does not provide conclusive 
evidence. This chapter aims to contribute to the debate on whether unem- 
ployment shocks are likely to lie at the heart of a valid explanation of Mehra 
Prescott's puzzles. 
Existing tests of the application of incomplete market theory to the Mehra 
Prescott puzzles has concentrated on the static properties of asset returns. 
The Mehra & Prescott puzzles, Hansen-Jagannathan bounds tests and exam- 
inations of the (co)variance structure of asset returns discussed in chapter 3 
do not consider how asset prices respond to changes in uninsurable risk. This 
chapter is based on the premise that if uninsurable risk is the key variable 
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determining the average equity premium and real riskfree rate then changes 
in the magnitude of uninsurable risk will be a key state variable influencing 
asset returns at the time. That is, this chapter is the first examination that 
considers how the static models discussed in chapter 3 can be tested in a 
dynamic framework. 
The work to follow is best demonstrated by an example. Consider a one- 
period model different to, but in the spirit of, Mankiw (1986)108. At t=0 
everyone is employed with consumption co. At time t=1a percentage of the 
population s will become unemployed and receive endowment y" while the 
remainder receive Yh. There is a riskfree asset in zero net supply and each 
investor holds one share in the risky asset so that cl =y+d. Here s is the 
key state variable, so that d is a function of s. Let CO = 1i Yh = 0.8, y,, = 0.4. 
Use power utility with P=1, -1 = 3. Let the probability of unemployment 
in the next period be 60% for 5% unemployment when d=0.3 and 40% 
for 6% unemployment when d=0.2. Notice that this is an entirely new 
class of model. Throughout the examination of incomplete market work in 
chapters 3,4 &5 it was assumed that the risk to personal income is known 
with certainty at t=0. The idea that not only are there low probability, high 
impact shocks to personal capital but also that it is also not possible to know 
exactly what the likelihood of this shock is in advance has not featured to date 
in the literature. It is easily verified that Pf = 0.9769, p,, = 0.2443 in this 
example. First consider the realised returns to the market over the interval 
"'Independent dividend and labour income risk in the style of Weil (1992a) is not con- 
sidered in this chapter. 
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1]. If unemployment turns out to be 5% then the realised (simple) return 
is 22.8%, while if unemployment turns out to be 6% then the realised return 
is -18.1%. So, the ex-post return to the market is negatively correlated with 
the level of unemployment as would be expected in a model where dividends 
drop when unemployment rises. 
The ex-post return to the riskfree asset is, of course, fixed as the asset 
pays 1 at t=1 whatever the state. Suppose, though, an instant after 
t=0, "news" emerged so that investors' now believe that there is a 75% 
probability that the unemployment level will be 5% in the next time period 
and a 25% probability that the unemployment level will be 6%. In this case, 
pf = 0.9166, p,,, = 0.2445. So, the reduced precautionary savings motive 
pulls down the price of the riskfree asset. There are two effects at work on 
the risky asset. First, the reduced desire to precautionary save makes all 
assets less desirable. This pressure forces the price p, down. However, the 
expected higher dividend to be paid by the market next period drives the 
price up. So the impact of this news unambiguously pulls pf down but the 
effect on p.. is more complicated. So, from this analysis there are two testable 
hypotheses: (i) if unemployment is lower (higher) at t=I than was expected 
at t=0 then the ex-post return to the equity premium portfolio over the 
interval [0,1] will be higher (lower) than expected at t=0. It is difficult to 
predict how the market will respond to news concerning unemployment at 
t=1 over the interval [0,1] as the dividend and precautionary savings effects 
conflict with each other and (ii) as the true level of unemployment at t=1 
297 
reveals itself over the interval [0,11 so the precautionary savings motive will 
drive changes in the riskfree rate. If unemployment is lower (higher) at t=1 
than expected at t=0 then the riskfree rate will have risen (fallen) during 
the period. 
This chapter examines the movements in asset returns prior to good and 
bad unemployment announcements. The key test will be to see whether the 
riskfree rate falls (rises) prior to poor (good) unemployment news, as the 
precautionary savings motive would imply. The ex-post excess return to the 
market index will also be examined to see whether returns are systemati- 
cally lower prior to bad unemployment news than good news. The tests are 
run on UK data from 1971 - 1993 and US data from 1951 - 1993. It is 
discovered that the evidence is difficult to reconcile with the types of incom- 
plete market model that have been developed elsewhere in this thesis that 
give significantly different asset returns in the presence of nontradable risk 
to the complete market case. The problem arises because of the riskfree rate, 
which rises ahead of positive unemployment shocks. It is difficult to square 
this observation with precautionary savings models where the riskfree rate 
is endogenous. The ex-post equity premium is lower than usual prior to bad 
unemployment news which is consistent with Mankiw (1986) style models. 
It should be noted that the riskfree rate does fall (rise) after the poor (good) 
unemployment news. This is supportive of a finance model where investors 
react to, rather than anticipate, the announcement. However, the market 
index rises (falls) after a poor (good) unemployment announcement which is 
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evidence against a reaction (rather than anticipation) model. This chapter 
can be loosely interpreted as giving support for the economics type precau- 
tionary savings models where rf is given over the finance models where rf is 
inferred. Alternately, it can be reconciled with Heaton Sz Lucas' observation 
that asset returns are not driven by unemployment risk and that the results 
presented here are driven by other factors for which unemployment is just a 
proxy. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 28 develops the theory in a two 
period environment, discusses the implications of testing such a model on real 
data and examines existing literature on asset returns and unemployment 
shocks. Section 29 is the main empirical section of the chapter and tries to 
interpret the results of the tests run. Section 30 concludes. The contribution 
of this chapter is clear. This is the first test of incomplete market models 
that explains the Mehra & Prescott puzzles within a dynamic setting. That 
is, this is an empirical investigation of the first model to consider an economy 
where the individual risk to personal income changes over time and therefore 
investors do not know with certainty, in advance, the probability of receiving 
an endowment shock in the next time period. The results, particularly for 
the riskfree rate puzzle, are not encouraging. There are, though, several 
econometric and theoretical issues that emerge from this chapter that need 
resolving before Mankiw style models can be confidently rejected. 
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28 The economic environment 
28.1 A one period model 
Consider the following economy. At time 0 all investors are homogeneous 
and have consumption co. At time t=1 investors are either in the high 
income group with probability s and have consumption c, = Ch or in the 
low income group and have consumption c, = Cu < Ch- s is not known with 
certainty at t=0 and is assumed to have a probability density function f (s). 
Assume that all dividend risk is linked to unemployment risk in keeping with 
the model of Mankiw (1986)"' so that the dividend ds is uniquely defined by 
the actual unemployment level s at t=1. Because the price of the market 
and riskfree asset are known at t=0, this means that equity premium ep-' 
over the interval [0,1] is also uniquely defined by the realisation of s. It will 
be shown that if s> (<)Eo[s) then the observed excess return to the market 
over the riskfree rate must be lower (higher) than the time zero expecta- 
tion over the interval [0,1]. This is because, in order to have an ex - ante 
positive equity premium in this type of model, dividends must be lower in 
high unemployment states than low unemployment states. So, analysing ex- 
post returns should show a negative correlation between the equity premium 
and unemployment shocks. With regard to the riskfree rate, matters are a 
little more complicated. In the study to follow three month treasury bills 
are used as the riskfree asset and the time interval [0,11 is taken to be a 
year. Therefore, strictly speaking, at t=0 there is not a riskfree asset that 
To remove proper risk aversion considerations. 
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matures at t=1. In order to invest risklessly for one period it is necessary 
to roll over the riskfree portfolio three times. This is, of course, not riskless 
as the price at which the three intermediate trades occur is not known with 
certainty at t=0. What will be examined in the empirical section of this 
chapter is the change in the 3 month t-bill rate over the interval. If news 
comes into the market to causes investors to assign higher probabilities to 
high unemployment states at t=1 then the precautionary savings motive 
should increase over the interval [0,1] and the rate of return offered on the 
riskless bond should drop. These relationships are demonstrated more for- 
mally below. Consider the one period Euler equation model. It is known 
that, for power utility and using ep: = r,,, - rf: 
E[ep] = -Cov(ep, 
cl (58) 
E[cl 
As the ex-ante equity premium is positive, so the right hand side of this 
equation is positive. This means that the covariance between the equity 
premium and c, " must be negative. Let f (s) denote the probability density 
function for possible unemployment rates: 
Cov(ep, cl") 
10 
(ep* - E[ep])[(cU'ý - E(c, "))s + (c h 'y - E(c, 1)) (1 - s)] f 
(s)ds 
[Ch" - E(cl'y)l 
10 
(ep*' -E [ep]) f (s) ds 
+S ICU-'y - Ch-" I (CP' -E [ep]) f (s) ds 





If -C h"ICOV(S, eP) 
U 
Given that Ch > cu it is clear that Cov(s, r,,, - rf < 0. The intuition is 
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straight forward. For a positive ex-ante equity premium the market portfolio 
must have a positive consumption beta. Therefore, the return on the equity 
premium portfolio must be positively correlated with consumption growth 
or negatively correlated with unexpected changes in unemployment. Alter- 
nately this can be interpreted as saying that, within a Mankiw style model, 
the positive ex-ante equity premium results from having lower dividends in 
states with a high risk of unemployment. Therefore, if we regress ex-post 
excess returns to the equity premium portfolio with unemployment shocks 
then we would expect to see a negative coefficient. 
Next consider a riskfree bond which is created at t=0 and matures 
at t=1. Suppose that the bond can be traded at t= -8t (before its 
creation) and at t=0. At t= -8t, co is known with certainty. At t= -6t 
investors' probability density function for unemployment at t=1 is given 
by f (s). Between t= -bt and t=0, some news is revealed into the market 
that causes investors to change their beliefs so that their probability density 
function is now given by f* (s). Denote the price of the bond at t=- 8t and 
0 by pf, pý respectively. 
P; - Pf = CZ 
10 
ISCu' + (1 - S)Ch'llf*(S) - f(s)lds 
Any news that causes investors to place higher probabilities on high un- 
employment states give greater weight to the c-I terms. As Ch > c, this u 
increases the price of the riskfree bond. This implies that, an increase in 
expectation of unemployment will reduce the riskless rate: this is a manifes- 
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tation of the precautionary savings motive described in chapter 3. 
28.2 Application of model to real data 
The theory developed above is in a one period world and is broadly in the 
style of Mankiw (1986). This predicts that the riskfree rate should decrease 
(increase) if investors' expectations of future unemployment increases (de- 
creases) and that, ex-post, unemployment shocks and the excess return to 
the market index should be negatively correlated under rational expectations. 
This is, of course, an unusual phenomenon (although not unique) to observe. 
A reduction in the riskfree rate relates to a reduction in the discount rate 
and therefore, ceteris paribus, a rise in the market index. 
Before proceeding, the problems in applying this single period model to 
multiperiod data is discussed. From the work of chapter 2 it is known that 
there are no theoretical problems in applying a single period Euler equation 
model in a multiperiod context. The problem is that cl, co are no longer 
clearly defined in the multiperiod case. First, consider co. In the model 
described above there is ex-ante homogeneity of investors so that co is the 
same for all. In a multiperiod environment people are, though, reentering 
as well as leaving the workforce and so co should, ideally, not be fixed cross- 
sectionally. Second, the work of Heaton & Lucas has argued that Ch, cl are 
not really a function of unemployment as financial markets allow investors to 
smooth consumption whatever their individual endowments. Therefore the 
seemingly innocuous assumption that Ch > cl is not necessarily true in this 
case. If a short term rise in unemployment can signal a long term decline in 
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the rate, then, under these conditions, a positive unemployment shock would 
be seen as good consumption news. In this case investors might consume 
more at times of positive unemployment shocks in anticipation of the future 
recovery. This issue is addressed in two ways. First, the first order auto- 
correlation for changes in unemployment are 86.4% and 17.6% for the UK 
and US respectively: both significant at the 0.1% level, implying that higher 
(lower) than expected unemployment at any point in time will lead to an 
increase (decrease) in investor's predictions of unemployment (and, indeed, 
change in unemployment) in the next time period. In this sense, positive un- 
employment shocks are permanent. Second, even if bad unemployment news 
is perceived as a signal of good future consumption news - and the positive 
autocorrelation in the rate of change of unemployment shocks suggests that 
this is unlikely - both the money and stock markets should interpret the 
news in the same way. The prediction that the change in riskfree rate and 
abnormal excess returns should have the same sign still holds. 
It is also not clear within a real economy how the markets' expectations 
of unemployment changes over time. Clearly, at the time when the unem- 
ployment figure is announced, the market then has perfect knowledge of the 
shock. Within this study it is assumed that 12 months prior to the month 
to which the unemployment figure refers - which will be called month 0 
throughout - the market estimates unemployment using an ARIMA model 
that is fitted in sample. Between month -12 and the time of announcement, 
the unemployment shock will reveal itself. If the markets anticipate this 
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news, then the change in riskfree rate and abnormal equity premium should 
have the same sign in the pre-event period. If the markets respond to the 
news, then the assumption about ex-ante homogeneity of investors no longer 
holds as the dismissals will already have taken place. However, the unem- 
ployment news will signal information about future unemployment changes. 
If the stock and money markets interpret this signal the same way, then the 
change in riskfree rate and abnormal equity premium should have the same 
sign in the post-event period. It should be emphasised that this in-sample 
method of calculating unemployment news is by no means the only one that 
was available to the author and is not necessarily the best either. A "one step 
ahead" forecasting technique or comparing real unemployment news against 
macroeconomic forecasts are mainstream alternatives. Analysing the sensi- 
tivity of the results presented against different forecasting techniques is a 
planned area for further research for the author. 
Finally, within the "real word", unemployment is clearly not only the 
variable that influences asset returns. The modelling process here will try to 
ensure that the observed changes in asset returns are not driven by changes 
in inflation. The empirical tests use nominal, not real, riskfree rates (for rea- 
sons explained below), and nominal rates are clearly influenced by inflation. 
Further, there are several studies - see for example Pindyck (1984) - that 
show the influence of inflation on stock prices. As mentioned below, inflation 
and unemployment shocks are not independent and so adjusting for inflation 
is clearly important. However, there are numerous other variables for which 
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unemployment might be proxying. Such examinations are considered outside 
the scope of this particular chapter. The rationale is that if unemployment is 
the key state variable determining the average equity premium and real risk- 
free rate then it should also be a key variable in determining intertemporal 
variations in asset returns. 
From this discussion it is clear that, around the month of an unemploy- 
ment shock, the change in the real riskfree rate and abnormal excess return 
to the market should have the same sign. If the market anticipates the shock, 
then the pattern should be observable in months [-12, -1]. If the market re- 
sponds to the news, there should be no observable correlation between unem- 
ployment news and asset returns in period [-12, -11 and the pattern should 
be in the post event period. Within a multiperiod context it is not possible to 
state categorically that positive (negative) unemployment shocks are related 
to negative (positive) changes in the riskfree rate/abnormal excess returns as 
unemployment news changes expectations about future consumption. Never- 
theless, given the positive autocorrelation in changes in unemployment rate, 
it is most likely that the changes will be of this sign. 
28.3 Unemployment shocks and asset returns 
There have been three recent studies of the relationship between unemploy- 
ment, shocks and interest rates. Hardouvelis (1988) looks at the impact of 
15 macroeconomic indicators on interest rate and exchange rate movements 
on the day of announcement. A negative correlation between unemployment 
changes and interest rate movements is discovered. Prag (1994) looks at 
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the change in interest rates with unexpected movements in unemployment 
on the day of an unemployment announcement in the US. It is found that, 
in general, there is a negative correlation between unemployment surprises 
and changes in interest rate. Below a certain unemployment level (the natu- 
ral unemployment rate), the effect is amplified, probably due to inflationary 
worries. Bierens and Broersma (1993) look at the relationship between in- 
terest rate changes and unemployment. They argue that periods of high 
unemployment are often preceded by periods of high interest rates (the lag 
being 18 months in the US). They find a Granger causal effect in both the US 
and UK between interest rates and unemployment with unemployment being 
the dependent variable. This study therefore differs from the previous ones 
in two important respects. First, the relationship between interest rates and 
unemployment is positive. Second, in this case it is unemployment that is the 
dependent variable. Broadly speaking, this can be reconciled with the previ- 
ous studies because of the 18 month lag between an interest rate high and an 
unemployment high. If we examine the instantaneous relationship between 
unemployment and interest rates at a time of high unemployment, interest 
rates will be falling, giving a negative coefficient despite the positive causal 
relationship. Few studies examining the impact of macroeconomic news on 
stock market data concentrate on unemployment. Papers examining cross- 
sectional variations in stock returns using the Arbitrage Pricing Theory with 
real economic factors (a stream of literature started by Chen et al. (1986) in 
the US and Poon and Taylor (1991) in the UK) do not use unemployment 
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as a variable. Similarly, Fama and French (1989) do not choose unemploy- 
ment as a variable in trying to relate stock and bond returns to the business 
cycle. In a study of hourly stock market returns that does look directly at 
unemployment news, Jain (1988) finds that unemployment shocks have little 
influence. Sadeghi (1992), who examines Australian data, is the only paper, 
to this author's knowledge, that looks at longer term stock returns in the 
presence of unemployment news. Ile finds that stock market movements are 
positively correlated with simultaneous unexpected movements in the unem- 
ployment rate but are negatively correlated with revisions in the expected 
unemployment rate. However, while there is little work that directly exam- 
ines the impact of unemployment shocks on equity returns, it may be that 
unemployment acts as a surrogate for other macroeconomic variables that 
have been examined. In particular, inflation changes and unemployment 
changes may be related. Prag (1994) argues that a rise in unemployment 
will lead to a decrease in expectations about inflation (and hence reduce the 
riskfree rate). This chapter will therefore attempt to separate the impact of 
inflation changes from those of unemployment shocks. 
29 Empirical testing 
29.1 Data 
The intertemporal restrictions of the Mankiw (1986) style model are tested 
on US and UK data. The raw monthly data used in this study, together with 
the relevant source, is provided in table 7. Certain points need clarifying: 
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Variable I Description I Source, Formula 
Raw data 
Rf t Nominal monthly rfr LSPD/CRiSP _ R, -,, t Monthly market return 
LSPD/CRiSP 
ept Nominal monthly ep R,,, t - Rf t 
ep Average ep for sample 
Ut Number unemployed, SA Datastrearn 
RPIt RPI - All items (UK) 
Consumer price index (US) 
Datastrearn 
L 't Inflation, month t I 
(RPIt - RPlt-, )/RPIt-, 
IndeDendent variables 
Shk lt Ut ARIMA errors See main text 
_ St Unemployment shock Shk lt -a- bIt 
- fit Pre-event inflation 
KPIt-1 - -H-Pit-13 
RPIt-13 
f1p Post-event inflation 
RPlt+6 - R-Plt-l 
t RPIt-, 
AI3 t Inflation change: pre-event 
t+2 - R-Pit-1 
_ 
R. Plt-10 - RPlt-13 
, RfIt-, RfIt-13 








EPt Pre-event ep ept+i 
i=-12 
ARf t Pre-event change in rfr (1 + Rft-1)" - (1 + 
Rft-13) 12 




AR t Post-event change in rfr 
(1 + Rft+6) 12 _ (1 + Rft-I )12 
Table 7: Definitions of data used in this study. Figures for raw data not 
seasonally adjusted unless stated (SA = Seasonally adjusted). The riskfree 
rate is the return on the 90 day treasury bill, market returns include divi- 
dend reinvestment. The Consumer Price Index for the US is for all urban 
consumers, RPI=Retail Price Index. ep=equity premium and rfr=riskfree 
rate. 
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* Nominal, as opposed to real, returns are used throughout this study. 
The reason for this is that month-by-month variability in the inflation 
rate is very much greater than in the nominal riskfree rate. Therefore, 
the correlation coefficient (in the UK) between inflation and the real 
riskfree rate over the sample period was -96.4%. Looking at the changes 
in the real rate on monthly data is essentially a surrogate for looking 
at minus inflation. The author therefore believes that the nominal rate 
gives a better indication of the precautionary savings motive. Using 
nominal rates requires that the method used is careful in its treatment 
of changes in inflation. 
* The theory refers to the probability of becoming unemployed. De- 
spite this, the empirical tests use the number unemployed (seasonally 
adjusted), as opposed to the unemployment rate, as the basis for cal- 
culating shocks. The reason for this is that the number unemployed 
each month was available to a greater number of significant figures. 
This should not give biased estimates of unemployment shocks. Fur- 
ther, given the number of redefinitions of unemployment in the UK, 
any "official" statistics cannot be said to give an unbiased estimate. 
This issue is not addressed further here. 
Other raw data sources should be self explanatory. The independent 
variables used in the analysis to follow are also described in table 7. Again 
certain points need clarification: 
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9 For the shock in unemployment, it was necessary to remove autocorre- 
lation from the Ut series and so a Box-Jenkins approach was adopted. 
It was found that for both UK and US unemployment over the peri- 
ods examined an ARINIA(1,2,1) with a seasonal lag I component on 
the AR and AIA terms provided the "best" fit. This is an "unusual" 
ARINIA fitting but was used nonetheless as it was suggested by the 
data for both series. 
The seasonal component was required on both series, which is perhaps 
surprising as the unemployment figures used were notionally season- 
ally adjusted already. Errors from these ARIMA models, denoted by 
Shk lt, had acceptable Box-Ljung autocorrelation statistics at all lags. 
The errors from this model, however, were correlated with inflation in 
the event month. As highlighted above, as nominal returns are being 
used, it is important to separate inflation effects from unemployment ef- 
fects. Therefore, it was decided to orthogonalise Shk lt from inflation 
in the event month using linear regression. That is, the unemploy- 
ment shock used in the study was St = Shk lt -a- bIt where a, b 
are the regression coefficients from regressing Shk lt against It in sam- 
ple. Clearly now St is orthogonalised against instantaneous inflation 
although there remained some correlation between St and It at various 
lags. These correlations are, though, substantially lower than for the 








st (u S) -0.024 -0.053 0.028 -0.013 
St (UK) 0.079 0.029 0.009 -0.024 
Qt (US) 0.786 -0.144 -0.141 
Qt (U K) 0.634 -0.124 -0.110 
Qtp- -(US) 0.304 -0.050 





t (UK) -0.320 
Table 8: Correlation coefficients for independent variables used in linear 
regressions for the US and the UK. 
9 In order to further correct for inflationary effects, it was decided to 
include inflationary terms (Qt terms), which might be expected to in- 
fluence abnormal equity premia and changes in inflation terms (Alt 
terms), which might influence the change in the nominal riskfree rate. 
The definitions of these variables are given in table 7. 
29.2 Regression analysis 
The main empirical tests consist of a series of linear regressions of the change 
in riskfree rate and the equity premium against unemployment shocks St. In 
total, the main regressions were run for 262 months for the UK (June 1971 
- March 1993) and 514 months for the US (March 1951 - December 1993) 
using monthly data. The correlation coefficients between the independent 
variables are given in table 8. The dependent variables used in the analysis 
are also given in table 7. These are self explanatory. The main test of this 
chapter is conducted by running the following set of linear regressions: 
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EPt =a+ bSt + cQt + dAI3, t + et 
ARf t=f+ gSt + hQt + jAI3, t + ct (59) 
EPt' = a' + b'St + cpQ' + d'AIP + ep t3tt p +jpA I); p ARP = fp + gpSt + hpQt +c ft 3, t t 
Inherent in these tests is the assumption that the expected equity pre- 
mium in any month in the absence of inflation, inflation changes and un- 
employment shocks is constant over the sample. In this case, a and ap will 
equal this average value. The theory developed above further predicts that 
0. If not, there are factors affecting the rate of change of inter- 
est rate that neither inflation nor unemployment can obviously explain. It 
should also be noted that as Prag (1994) shows that the response of interest 
rates is not symmetric around the NAIRU, it would be desirable to split this 
regression to allow for this effect. This, again, is considered to be outside the 
scope of this chapter. In terms of relating the theory to the available data, 
the testable hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1 Either b, g should both be negative (markets anticipating shocks) 
or b, g should be insignificant and bp, gp should be negative (markets respond- 
ing to shocks) 
There are clear problems here in that the dependent variables EP, EP' 
are overlapping lag 11,6 respectively. The diagnostics on the basic OLS 
regressions (given in table 9) indicate serious heteroscedast i city and autocor- 
relation problems. In order to correct for these issues, all regressions (includ- 
ing those for ARf t, AR' ) are adjusted for the procedure of Newey and West ft 
(1987), Bartlett weights lag 12 (pre event) or 7 (post event). Table 9 outline 
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the results of the OLS regressions that were described in the equation set 59. 
While the diagnostics quoted are parametric, the Newey-West adjustments 
for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation increase the robustness of these 
statistics. 
In the pre-event period for both the UK and US the excess return to the 
market is negatively correlated with unemployment shocks to a high degree 
of statistical significance. This is in keeping with the theory developed in 
this chapter. However, the change in the riskfree rate is positively correlated 
with unemployment shocks, which is not consistent with the precautionary 
savings motive. Again, this effect is significant at very high confidence levels. 
In the post event period the riskfree rate is significantly negatively corre- 
lated with unemployment shocks, as the theory predicts if markets respond 
to unemployment news. However, the post event excess returns are posi- 
tively correlated with unemployment shocks (significant at 5% in the UK, 
not significant at standard levels in the US). 
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a, ap, f, flP b, bp IM 
p c, cp, h, hp d, dp, j, jp Diagnostics 
EP 1.45E-' L, T- -1.29E- -1.72 -1.23 s. c. =412.9[0.000] 
[4.89] [-3-38] [-2.321 [-0.771 het. =8.6[0.003] 
EP 9.75E-' -2.73E-' -4.64E-1 -5.46 s. c. =198.0[0.000] 
[1.49] [-3.751 [-0.56] [-2.591 het. =0.10[0.750] 
ARf . 12E 1.33E 1. GOE-' 8.61E-1 s. c. =376.1[0.000] [-2.341 [3.231 [3.061 [3.991 het. =5.5[0.0191 
ARf -6.85E-3 1.83E 8.41E 6.98E-1 s. c. =207.8[0.0001 
[-1.001 [2.391 [1.161 [2.791 het. =26.7[0.0001 
EP' 8.87E 3.64E -1-58 6.81E-' s. c. =374.9[0.000] 
[4.871 [1-131 [-2.701 [0.741 het. =2.3[0.133] 
EP' 3.87E 1.09E -1.58E-' -1.72 s. c. =195.1[0.000] 
[0.771 [1.95] [-0.141 [-1.841 het. =1.23[0.2671 
AR' f -3.43E - 1.53E-' 1.19E-' 6.26E-T s. c. =344.0[0.000] 
[-2.041 [-3.58] [2.27] [3.561 het. =13.2[0.000] 
ARf - . 13E -2.07E 1.16E-1 3.40E-T s. c. =196.7[0.000] 
[-1.401 [-2.721 [1.451 [2.061 het. =8.7[0.003] 
Table 9. An OLS regression of EP, EPP, ARf and ARP against shocks in f 
unemployment, inflation and changes in inflation. Figures in square paren- 
theses associated with regression coefficients are t-statistics that have been 
Newey-NVest adjusted with Bartlett weights lag 12 or 7. The s. c. and het. 
diagnostics are LM test statistics (X'I) for serial correlation and heteroscedas- 
ticity respectively, with associated p-statistics in square parentheses. Sample 
period: Jun 1971 - Mar 1993 (UK), Mar 1951 - Dec 1993 (US). The col- 
umn headings should be read as follows: "a, ap, f, f P" is the constant in the 
regression, "b, bp, g, gP" is the coefficient of St, etcetera. 
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These results tie in with those of Sadeghi (1992) for the Australian mar- 
ket - the market is positively correlated with contemporaneous changes in 
unemployment but negatively correlated with future unemployment shocks. 
Further, the hypothesis that markets respond to unemployment shocks is 
not in keeping with the high levels of significance associated with EP, ARf, 
which should be insignificant in this case. V, g' are also not of the same 
sign around the time of an unemployment shock. The author interprets these 
empirical findings as a rejection of the hypothesis that unemployment shocks 
can resolve the puzzles of Mehra and Prescott (1985). 
29.3 Further empirical investigation 
In order to study the effect in more detail, an "event study" was run looking 
at the changes in the equity premium and riskfree rate around the time 
of the shock in unemployment. The sample periods for the two markets 
were divided into equally sized (up to rounding error) quartiles depending 
on whether the month had a "very positive", "positive", "negative" or "very 
negative" shock in unemployment as measured by St. Abnormal returns to 
both the equity premium and changes in the riskfree rate were then calculated 
in the months [-12, +6] relative to the event month (the month to which the 
unemployment figure refers) and cumulated. Here the cumulative abnormal 
returns for the equity premium Pij and cumulative monthly changes in real 
riskless rate f! are defined as (the m superscripts denote that it is monthly ij 
returns that are being used - although by taking the riskfree rate terms to 
the power of 12 these are being annualized): 
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t+i 





epk - cr Psj 
k=t+i 
Notice that if i= -12, j = -1, then fi'j = ARft and p',, = EPt _ 6pl2m 
(ep"m is the average annual equity premium). Similarly, if i= Oj = +6, 
then AR' and p!. = EPI P 
77n (6 P 
7m is the average seven month It 13 t 
equity premium). Let fii, pij be used to denote the average values of fit tj tj I Pq 
over the sample periods, with an associated standard deviation. This is, of 
course, not a standard event study as there are 19 events (unemployment 
shocks) over this period. However, as unemployment shocks are random, 
the 18 "events" in the months other than month 0 should "cancel out". 
Figures 13 and 14 show the event cumulative abnormal returns for the equity 
premium and changes in the riskfree rate against unemployment shocks in 
month 0 for i= -12, j = +6 in the UK - the graphs for the US are not 
presented here. As can be seen, there is a significant pattern in both the 
riskfree rate and the equity premium in the run-up to an unemployment 
shock, suggesting that the markets do indeed anticipate the shock prior to 









Vigurc 13: Cumulative abnormal returns to the equity premium around it, 
shock in unemployment as modelled by St. Here "abnorillal rcturll" at 1110111,11 
I Is t he difrel-clice bet weell t lie equity premium in that, mont h and its average 
Over t he whole sample: pi., ,11 
2ý 12 + 6]. Unemployment shocks 
are divided m1o equally sized quartiles. Month 0 Is, the illonth referred to ill 
the unemployment statistic. The sample period is June 1971 to March 1993 
and is based oil UK data. 
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13 12-11-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 0123456 
Event month 
c, 1111,11m, %e . hmigt-s in the nominal riskfree rate around a shock 
in unemployment as ni,,, Iclle*i by 1 12, j 12. +6]. 0 oil the 
y-axis refers to the riskfree rate in nionth -13. Vnemployment shocks are 
, 11% ided into equally sized quartiles. Month 0 Is the niolith referred to in the 
unemployment statistic, Fhe saniple period is June 1971 to March 1993 and 
is 6&, ed on VK data. 
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** 
Table 10 examines the magnitude of this effect for fii, pij with i=- 12, j= 
-1 and i= Oj = +6 in both the US and UK. That is, table 10 gives the 
average values (with associated standard deviations) of EPt, ARf t, EPtP and 
ARP around "V Pos", "Pos" "Neg and "V Neg" unemployment shocks in ft 7 
the sample periods. Table 11 gives a non-parametric test of the significance 
of these results around extreme unemployment shocks. The technique used 
is that suggested by Neave and Worthington (1988) using a Wilcoxon sign 
test. The variables are ranked in ascending order, ranked and the sum of 
ranks converted to a Mann-Whitney "U" statistic. The asymptotic normal 
property of this statistic is invoked (as the sample sizes are relatively large) 
and the associated t-statistic quoted. The t-statistic is quoted for "V Neg" 
("V Pos") when the average return is higher around a "V Neg" ('T Pos") 
shock than a "V Pos" ("V Neg") shock. 
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11 fij I pij 
i= -12, j = -11 i= Oj = +6 1 i= -12, j = -11 i= Oj = +6 
V Pos 9A 0.002 4 -0.00264 -0.02002 0.02114 
us 
1 
(0.0173) (0.0137) (0.163) (0.120) 
V Pos 0.00715 -0.00360 -0.0438 0.0356 
UK 
, 
(0.0253) (0.0184) (0.228) (0.163) 
Pos 0.00160 0.00031 0.00525 -0.01386 
us 
, 
(0.0162) (0.0112) (0.147) (0.111) 
Pos 0.00142 -0.00201 -0.0159 -0.0203 
UK (0.0237) (0.0222) (0.226) (0.204) 
Neg 0.00044 0.00494 0.00514 -0.00865 
us (0.0181) (0.0174) (0.148) (0.113) 
Neg -0.00536 0.001480 0.0109 0.0118 
UK (0.0280) (0.0218) (0.254) (0.187) 
V Neg -0.00180 0.00296 0.00963 0.00136 
us (0.0189) (0.0145) (0.148) (0.123) 
V Neg -0.00088 0.00419 0.0488 -0.0270 
UK (0.0283) (0.0197) (0.243) (0.173) 
Table 10: Average change in nominal riskless rate fij and cumulative ab- 
normal equity premium pij around the time of an unemployment shock as 
modelled by St. Standard deviations (not errors) are given in parentheses. 
Sample period: Jun 1971 - Mar 1993 (UK), Mar 1951 - Dec 1993 (US) 
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As can be seen, the excess return to the market is significantly higher prior 
to a very negative unemployment shock than a very positive unemployment 
shock for both the US and UK as the theory outlined above would predict. 
However, the change in the riskfree rate is more positive prior to a very 
positive shock than a very negative shock. This is significant at the 5% level 
in the US (but not quite in the UK) and is not consistent with the theory. 
Conversely, in the post event period, the riskfree rate moves in the predicted 
direction but the excess returns do not. It is difficult to reconcile tables 10, 
11 with the theory outlined above. 
It has been argued in the preceding section that the results obtained are 
not consistent with a model in the style of Mankiw (1986) for explaining 
the Mehra & Prescott puzzles. Can the data be explained by any alternate 
model? Consider the conclusions of Bierens and Broersma (1993). They 
argue that changes in the riskfree rate is the independent variable and that 
the change in unemployment is driven by changes in this rate. So suppose 
that changes in the riskless rate are exogenous. Under the Gordon Growth 
Model, for given risk premium rp and growth rate g, then (see, for example, 
I EP I EP' ARf ARf 
US -V Pos 1.37 2.27 
US -V Neg 1.86 - 3.1 5 
UK -V Pos - 2.55 1.69 UK -V Neg , 
2.50 
1. I. 12.26 1 
Table 11: The t-statistics associated with the Wilcoxon non-parametric test 
for between difference in means between "V Pos" and "V Neg" for pre and 
post event abnormal equity premiums and changes in riskfree rate. The 
t-statistic is quoted for the sample with the higher average values. 
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p. 243 of Franks, Broyles and Carleton (1985)): 
D 
Pm = rf +rp-g 
So, if changes in the riskfree rate do not influence g, rp, D, then the in- 
stantaneous response on the market r, ',, to a change in the riskless rate from 
rf to rl is: 
i rf - r; 
mg- rý - rp 
On the assumption that g- rý - r, = 5%"0, this predicts that EP = 
-ARI/0.05 and EPP = -ARfP/0.05. This proposition was tested using a 
standard t-test for all 262 months for the UK and 514 months for the US. 
The t statistics were 0.38 and 0.52 in the pre-event period and 0.01 and 
0.43 for the post-event period for the UK and US respectively. This, then, 
appears supportive of a model where the riskfree rate is exogenous and the 
stock market and unemployment react to this variable. 
30 Conclusion 
This chapter was motivated by the substantial existing research that exam- 
ines whether the Mehra & Prescott puzzles can be explained by disaggregat- 
ing consumption to allow for unemployment risk. An empirical implication 
of these models is that shocks in unemployment should result in substantial 
movements in the riskfree rate and the equity premium. This is the first piece 
"'The average dividend yield over the period in the UK is 5.02%, with a range of 2.85% 
to 11.77% - source: Datastrearn. 
323 
of research to consider an economy where investors do not know in advance 
exactly what their risk of suffering an endowment shock in the next period 
is. This risk also changes from period to period. If unemployment turns 
out to be higher than expected then the market's return will be lower than 
expected over the interval as dividends shocks coincide with income shocks 
in a style reminiscent of the model of Mankiw (1986). Further, as the market 
becomes more aware that the risk to personal capital is higher than was pre- 
viously imagined, so the precautionary savings motive rises and the riskfree 
rate drops. So, it is expected that returns to the market will drop at a time 
when the riskfree rate is also falling around the time of poor unemployment 
news. By an analogous argument, if the risk to personal capital is lower than 
expected then the stock market and returns to treasury bills should both 
rise. 
As outlined in the previous section, the data does not appear to be con- 
sistent with these models. Instead, it appears that the riskfree rate is the 
independent variable, with returns to the stock market responding to this. 
This is because the riskfree rate rises (falls) prior to poor (good) unemploy- 
ment news. While returns to treasury bills do drop after the announcement, 
the stockmarket rises during this period. The main conclusion of this chap- 
ter is that unemployment risk is unlikely to be the explanation of the Mehra 
& Prescott puzzles in a Niankiw-style model. This, though, is not to say 
that using disaggregated consumption will not explain the puzzles, just that 
using unemployment would not appear to be the most suitable way of doing 
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the disaggregation. Examining alternate ways of breaking down aggregate 
consumption data that will help explain both average asset returns and short 






This thesis is concluded with three subsections. First, a summary of findings 
is presented. Then several areas for future research are discussed. The thesis 
is completed with some final observations. 
31.1 Summary of findings 
This thesis has analyzed the ability of incomplete market models to explain 
two well documented financial market anomalies - the "Mehra & Prescott 
puzzles" (riskfree rate puzzle and equitypremiurn puzzle) and the dividend 
controversy. In chapter 2, a solid theoretical foundation for the thesis was 
reviewed, starting with the most general asset pricing framework of all - 
the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. Power utility functions were then 
discussed. That the parameter -1 plays two roles in this utility function, 
describing both the instantaneous risk aversion and elasticity of intertem- 
poral substitution, was emphasised. Then, within an equilibrium setting, it 
was shown that the current price of any asset is given by the expectation of 
its payoff in the next period multiplied by the ratio of marginal utilities of 
next period's consumption to this period's consumption. This is the Euler 
equation which lies at the heart of this thesis. The chapter then considers 
environments where a representative agent exists. It was stressed that only 
with complete markets can aggregate consumption be used in the Euler equa- 
tion to determine equilibrium asset prices. If the market is incomplete, as 
assumed throughout this thesis, then individual consumption, which is more 
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volatile than the aggregate, should be used instead. Next, the chapter con- 
sidered both discrete and continuous time developments of the consumption 
CAPAL Essentially, provided that consumption of all investors is smooth and 
the utility function is "sensible", then the CCAPM follows. But if individual 
consumption and asset returns are not smooth and the market is incomplete 
then not only will the CCAPAI not follow, but violations from the model will 
depend on the allocation of idiosyncratic risk. Finally, chapter 2 uses four 
models (single period non parametric, single period parametric, multiperiod 
discrete state and a Merton (1971) style analysis) to provide expressions 
for the equity premium and real riskfree rate. These provide the basis for 
analysis in chapter 3. 
Having provided a comprehensive theoretical basis for development, chap- 
ter 3 is probably the most extensive review of the Mehra & Prescott puzzles 
that currently exists in the literature. It was shown that, under representa- 
tive agent assumptions, the puzzles can be described using any of the four 
formulations for the equity premium and real riskfree rate given in chapter 
2. The intuition is clear; aggregate consumption is growing so fast and so 
smoothly it is not clear why the demand for borrowing does not outstrip 
the supply of savings given the low average real riskfree rate. Interest rates, 
apparently, needed to be higher on average to curb the incentive for borrow- 
ing and encourage saving in the US over the past century. That aggregate 
consumption has been so smooth means that it is difficult within a CCAPM 
framework to generate a large risk premium on any asset. What became 
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clear from this analysis is that the puzzles arise from a combination of four 
assumptions: (i) a representative agent exists (ii) aggregate consumption is 
smooth (iii) utility takes power form with P<1, -f < c. 6 and (iv) there are 
no taxes or market frictions. It is argued that there are three potential ex- 
planations for the Mehra & Prescott puzzles. First, it was argued that the 
ex-post observed average excess return to the market and real riskfree rate 
does not necessarily represent the ex-ante expectation. Second, certain forms 
of investor preferences were examined that separate the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. These are, 
in general, unable to resolve the equity premium puzzle. Third, we concen- 
trated on incomplete market explanations of the puzzles both in the presence 
and absence of market frictions. The economics literature on precautionary 
saving, where the riskfree rate is exogenous and consumption endogenous, 
was briefly reviewed. While the findings of this literature are not wholly 
unambiguous, the balance of evidence presented does point toward the exis- 
tence of substantial precautionary saving. We then concentrated on models 
with exogenous aggregate consumption but where asset returns are endoge- 
nous. It was argued that the persistence of idiosyncratic risk is the key 
factor determining the ability of incomplete market models to explain Mehra 
Prescott's puzzles. Given that personal income risk seems fairly short 
term, particularly in the United States, only with severe market frictions can 
the puzzles be resolved. Chapter 3 was concluded with a very brief review 
of empirical tests of the CCAPM. This provided estimates of the'coefficients 
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P, -f used elsewhere in the thesis and showed that the Mehra & Prescott puz- 
zles are just one of a number of anomalies that arise from consumption based 
asset pricing models. 
Chapter 4 took one key paper on incomplete market explanations of the 
Mehra & Prescott puzzles, Weil (1992a), to examine how sensitive the quanti- 
tative implications of incomplete market models are to the precise functional 
form of the utility function. Unlike existing studies examining investor pref- 
erences in this context, additive time separability is kept in this chapter. 
Instead, it was argued that there is a whole class of utility functions that 
"look" similar close to the point of expected future consumption are very 
different at points of low endowment. Indeed, it was shown that it is virtu- 
ally impossible, given our current understanding of investor preferences, to 
accurately determine the magnitude of any incomplete market effect in this 
case. This chapter also provided a unifying approach to local proper risk 
aversion. From this analysis, a new form of proper risk aversion emerged 
naturally (labelled "Core Basic Risk Aversion"), which locally has the same 
necessary and sufficient conditions as the less general local Standard Risk 
Aversion. 
Perhaps it can be said with some confidence at this stage, that income 
shocks that are independent of marketable jumps will not, on their own, be a 
true explanation for the equity premium puzzle. That is, proper risk aversion 
is not powerful enough to be a full explanation for Mehra & Prescott's puzzles 
on its own. Within Weil's example, dividends can account for up to 50% of 
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consumption in low endowment states (or, indeed, 100% of consumption 
if unemployment income is zero). The required contribution of dividends 
to overall consumption seems too high to be realistic. I do not wish to 
understate the importance of the proper risk aversion literature; instead the 
conclusion is that its application to this particular anomaly may be limited. 
This conclusion is strengthen by the results of chapter 4 which show that 
proper risk aversion, on its own, does not produce equity premia of the 
magnitude reported by Weil. 
Chapter 5 considered the application of incomplete market models to the 
dividend controversy. It might, perhaps, be best understood as a variation 
in the model of Jensen (19S6) where there is a systematic tendency for firms 
to overinvest due to agency problems. Dividends are paid in this case to try 
to minimise this overinvestment. In the economy of chapter 5, though, there 
are no conflicts between managers and investors. The main assumption that 
drives the chapter is that investors are uncertain about the aggregate level of 
future investment and cannot be sure that this investment will be optimal. 
Two effects combine to provide the optimal aggregate dividend policy. First, 
investors want positive investment shocks concentrated into states with low 
risk to personal capital. Second, simulation results demonstrate that even 
mean zero investment "surprises" should be concentrated in states where 
the risk to individual endowment is low. This was demonstrated in a two 
period model where financial assets can be traded and in a multiperiod model 
where trading is prohibited. It is argued that investors can reduce the risk 
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of overinvestment in states of high risk to nontraded assets by ensuring that, 
at the portfolio level, rights issues are concentrated into bull markets and 
dividends arc only cut as a measure of last resort in bear markets. While 
there is no existing empirical studies that gives direct evidence on the validity 
of this model, it is argued that the findings of previous work does broadly 
supports the simulations in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 argued that, if the risk of uninsurable personal income shocks 
is driving the average returns to stocks and treasury bills then the change 
in this risk should influence asset returns. Increased precautionary savings 
motive means that the riskfree rate should fall prior to high endowment 
risk. That the ex-ante equity premium is positive implies that market risk 
should be positively correlated with consumption risk: that is, the ex-post 
return to the market should be lower than average when there is a positive 
realised unemployment shock. This hypothesis was tested on both UK and 
US data. It was discovered that the market does indeed underperform, in 
the twelve months leading up to bad unemployment news. However, the 
riskfree rate rises during this interval, supporting the findings of Bierens and 
Broersma (1993). This is extremely difficult to reconcile with finance-style 
precautionary savings models where the riskfree rate is endogenous. Returns 
to treasury bills do start to fall after a positive unemployment shock, but as 
stock market returns are higher than average over this post-event period, it is 
difficult to see how these two observations could be reconciled by incomplete 
market models. It was concluded that this observation is consistent with the 
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hypothesis that unemployment shocks are too short-lived to have a significant 
impact on equilibrium asset returns. 
In subsection 31.3 1 will draw some general conclusions from the different 
studies described in the body of this dissertation. Incomplete market models 
are, though, in their infancy and it not possible at this stage to make many 
inferences with great certainty. As emphasised in chapter 1, many questions 
addressing the ability of incomplete market models to resolve financial mar- 
ket anomalies remain unanswered. In the subsection below, an outline is 
presented of some of the future research that needs to be undertaken before 
we can say with any certainty whether the Mehra & Prescott puzzles and 
corporate finance anomalies can be resolved by introducing uninsurable risk 
into asset pricing models. 
31.2 Further research 
Many additional tests are needed to determine the ability of incomplete mar- 
ket models to explain financial market anomalies that will keep theorists and 
empiricists busy for many years to come as it is only in the last few years 
that multiperiod incomplete market models have started to appear in the 
consumption based asset pricing literature. Much further work is needed. In 
the opinion of the author, theorists will turn increasingly to computer gener- 
ated simulations to determine the implications of their models. Empirically 
very little is known about the way stocks returns, in particular, are influenced 
by income shocks. Because of the potential for further research in this area, 
this subsection can only highlight a few of the paths for further investigation 
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that may prove fruitful. This subsection is divided into two parts. First, 
the most direct extensions to the three main chapters of substantive original 
contribution in this thesis are discussed. I then briefly consider some other, 
more general, extensions to the existing incomplete market literature that 
would appear to be a worthwhile area for future research. 
The key result from chapter 4 concerns the functional form of the util- 
ity function that we assume is shared by all investors. Several utility 
functions that are very similar close to the point of expected future con- 
sumption are extremely different in low consumption states. Existing 
literature really provides no strong support for power utility over other 
additively time-separable utility functions. Its popularity appears to 
come from a combination of tractability and the fact that to assume 
constant relative risk aversion is not blatantly counterfactual. As, to 
this author's knowledge, there has been no specific test of the risk aver- 
sion of individuals in low endowment states, the continued use of power 
utility in incomplete market models should not continue unquestioned. 
Without necessarily relaxing the assumption of fixed preferences across 
investors, it is of great importance that work is undertaken to specifi- 
cally examine the risk aversion of agents in low income states. Chapter 
4 also provides an integrated approach to local proper risk aversion. 
This literature does, though, remain reasonably abstract and work on 
the applicability of the theorems to "real world" problems is an area 
that needs further investigation. 
334 
* Chapter 5 argues that the possibility of low endowment states should 
influence aggregate dividend policy as the total demand for dividends 
will be high when there is a high probability of low income. There are 
several issues that this chapter raises that require further examination. 
Chapter 5 is based on simulation and further research is needed into 
both the theoretical and empirical consequences of this type of economy. 
From a theoretical standpoint, a joint model where companies issue 
bonds as well as equity might provide an insight into optimal capital 
structure issues as well as optimal dividend policy. This is because 
the timing of cashfiows is secure with bonds and so, default excluded, 
there is no equivalent of dividend cut / rights issue in this case. Ideally 
trading should be introduced into the multiperiod simulations to allow 
for consumption smoothing through the buying and selling of financial 
assets, although given the number of potential paths through a many 
period environment, creating such a model will be a major undertaking. 
The main empirical implication of the model is that rights issues and 
dividend changes will be received more favourably at times of low risk 
to personal capital than periods of high risk. This is, in principle, 
straightforward to test using standard event study methods. The au- 
thor is surprised that more tests of the reaction of shareprices to div- 
idend changes have not concentrated on intertemporal (as opposed to 
cross-sectional) issues. This would certainly seem to be a useful route 
for further study. However, separating out the effect of changes in per- 
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sonal risks on share price reaction to dividend changes from the effects 
of other procyclical market phenomena might prove difficult. Further, 
as emphasised in chapter 6, we cannot yet identify the main sources of 
personal endowment risk. 
e Chapter 6 considers how asset prices move as unemployment risk changes. 
The results indicate that the riskfree rate rises prior to poor unemploy- 
ment news, which is difficult to reconcile with a finance-style precau- 
tionary savings model where the riskfree rate is endogenous. While the 
conclusions seems robust to several statistical tests, both parametric 
and non-parametric, there are certain econometric issues that would 
benefit from further investigation. In particular, different definitions 
of unemployment shock might be used (for example, one step ahead 
forecasting) to see how sensitive the results are to the ARIMA model 
used. Further, this problem might be usefully tackled using a vector 
autoregressive approach. 
Theoretically, it would be desirable to develop a model within a multi- 
period or continuous time framework where, rather than there always 
being a fixed probability s of unemployment next period, there is a 
time varying probability density function ft(s) of low endowment. In- 
deed, it is easy to envisage an "unemployment CAPM" emerging from 
this type of environment. At the most superficial level, this might be 
considered to be a combination of the Mankiw-style model developed 
in chapter 6 and the jump-diffusion CCAPM model of Back (1991) de- 
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scribed in chapter 2. Cross-sectional variations in asset returns could 
also be examined in this context. 
These are the most direct areas for further research that arise from the 
three main studies in this thesis. There are many other more general areas of 
research into incomplete market models that might prove extremely fruitful, 
a few of which are now discussed: 
e The question arises as to what constitutes endowment risk. Through- 
out this thesis, and particularly in chapter 6, the link between unem- 
ployment and income uncertainty has been made. It is by no means 
certain, though, that this is the risk to which incomplete market models 
are most easily applied. It may well emerge that early retirement is a 
more important source of uninsurable risk in determining equilibrium 
asset prices than unemployment. The author is surprised that, with 
the exception of some precautionary savings models in the economics 
literature, life-cycle model have not been more, prevalent in existing 
incomplete market studies. An overlapping generations model with 
stochastic times of retirement and death would appear to be a sensi- 
ble path for future investigation. This has two major advantages over 
the unemployment models presented in this thesis. First, retirement is 
persistent and so one of the main weaknesses of multiperiod unemploy- 
ment models is overcome. Second, as much individual saving occurs 
later in life, it is perhaps easier to see retirement influencing savings 
decisions than unemployment risk. 
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Throughout this thesis, as is standard with incomplete market models, 
it is assumed that investors save directly. Short-term idiosyncratic risk 
endowment can be smoothed in a Heaton & Lucas style model through 
the purchase and sale of financial assets. However, on the London 
Stock Exchange, only around one fifth of the total value of equity is 
owned directly by individual investors. Pension funds and insurance 
companies are the most important groups of shareholder. It may well 
be that the process of financial intermediation has a significant effect 
on the implications of incomplete market models. In particular, it is 
difficult for an investor to sell pension fund holdings in, order to short- 
term consumption smooth. How pension funds react to periods of high 
unemployment (low pension fund contribution) would be an interesting 
area for further research. It would also be interesting to see the effect of 
aggregate, Rietz (1988) style, shocks on insurance companies' portfolio 
holdings. 
* As highlighted throughout this thesis, it is the persistence of personal 
endowment risk that determines the effect of incomplete market as- 
sumptions on predicted equilibrium asset prices. There, seems to be no 
consensus in the literature on this point. In chapter 3 it was shown 
that severe income risk, particularly in the US, appears to be fairly 
short-lived. On the other hand, chapter 2 shows that consumption 
growth does vary considerably between investors. So, existing work 
does not provide accurate estimates of the actual level of persistence 
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facing individual investors. More detailed analysis of the cross-sectional 
distribution of income across equity holders is vital if we are to deter- 
mine whether the models of Heaton & Lucas or Mankiw are more likely 
to describe the real economy. 
o It should be emphasised why it has been so difficult to explain the aver- 
age observed returns to stocks and treasury bills over the last century at 
the same time as explaining the volatility of these returns. In order to 
have a high equity premium and high volatility in the equity premium, 
the pricing kernel should also be highly volatile"'. However a volatile 
pricing kernel should imply a variable riskfree rate. This is at odds 
with the smooth time-series that is observed for real treasury-bill re- 
turns. One way of immediately resolving the riskfree rate puzzle would 
be to assume that spot interest rates are an exogenous variable to fi- 
nance models and are instead set centrally and determined by broader 
macroeconomic considerations. This possibility was briefly discussed 
in chapter 6. An incomplete market model with the riskfree rate pre- 
determined but where the expected return and volatility to the stock 
market index and (say) a well diversified bond portfolio are endogenous 
would be an interesting and innovative route to pursue. 
This list for potential future research into incomplete market explana- 
tions for financial market anomalies is certainly not exhaustive. llopefullyý 
"'Notice that this discussion can be expressed in terms of the fundamental theorem of 
asset pricing itself rather than the more specific Euler equation. 
339 
though, it will motivate the reader to believe that this is an area currently 
under-researched and where there is great potential for important new dis- 
coveries. On a more personal note, the author's own immediate plans for 
future research concentrate on developing a multiperiod simulation of the 
market described in chapter 6 where there is uncertainty about the probabil- 
ity of unemployment in the next period and where unemployment risk varies 
from period to period. The dynamics of asset returns in this context can 
hopefully then be better understood' 
12 
. 
31.3 Final comments 
Given that such a large percentage of wealth comes from sources other than 
equity (dividends currently comprise around 4% of GNP in the UK), to 
assume that all assets can be readily traded does not seem realistic. The 
empirical evidence on the cross-section of individual consumption presented 
in chapter 2 shows that to assume that everyone is fully insured for all po- 
tential outcomes is not reasonable. The results of chapter 5 also suggest 
that the incomplete market paradigm might be applied to a wider range of 
puzzles than had previously been considered. To this author, the question is 
not, then, whether shocks to personal capital should be incorporated in asset 
pricing models (and also, potentially, theorems of optimal corporate finance 
policy), but how this task should be undertaken. 
112 In the period immediately following the submission of this thesis, the author is to 
visit Northwestern University on sabbatical. As the institute of Heaton & Lucas, where 
the "auctioneer's algorithm" has been developed, this is arguably the leading centre for 
multiperiod incomplete market simulations at the time of writing. 
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Detractors of incomplete market models may argue that the results of 
Heaton & Lucas, as well as the findings of chapter 6, give little support to 
this paradigm. This author does not agree with these sentiments. First, 
while Heaton & Lucas show the theoretical importance of persistence in per- 
sonal risk, their cross-sectional evidence on income shocks is not sufficiently 
detailed to show that no important sources of persistent endowment risk ex- 
ist. Further, the cross-sectional evidence on consumption does imply strongly 
that investors are not able to fully smooth personal risks. Chapter 6 focuses 
on unemployment as the source of risk and therefore is not a general test of 
incomplete market models. Also, the results of chapter 6 are not necessar- 
ily inconsistent with a model driven by unemployment if, in the style of an 
economics model, the riskfree rate is made exogenous. 
It should be noted that, if an apparent inability to fully resolve Mehra 
& Prescott's puzzles is seen as sufficient grounds for rejecting incomplete 
market models, then we must also reject whole classes of complete market 
model as well. Despite the vast amount of research time that has been spent 
by many authors trying to settle the anomalies, there is still no generally 
accepted solution. There is a fundamental problem trying to reconcile a high 
average, and highly volatile, equity premium with a smooth real riskfree rate. 
The only "simple" explanation for the puzzles is that the long term first and 
second moments of consumption growth and asset returns in the US and UK 
are not representative of the ex-ante expectations. Indeed it is tempting to 
infer that the equity premium figure that is usually placed in the CAPM is 
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positively biased as the standard textbook treatment is to use a long term 
historic average value. 
In conclusion it is argued that both the extensive literature review pre- 
sented in chapters 2&3 and the three main chapters of substantive original 
contribution have shown that uninsurable risk may play an important role in 
resolving financial market anomalies. While the results have been mixed - 
chapter 5 has demonstrated an important new application of the theorY to 
aggregate dividend policy while the results of chapter 6 are difficult to rec- 
oncile with a standard finance-style (riskfree rate endogenous) precautionary 
savings model - the balance of evidence suggests that this is an important 
area for further research. Important discoveries are likely to emerge as the 
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